obsidian-plugin/viktoruj_obsidian-cloud-kms
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feat: Cloud KMS Encryption plugin v0.1.0

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Viktar Mikalayeu 2026-05-09 15:06:03 +04:00
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version: 2
updates:
- package-ecosystem: "npm"
directory: "/"
schedule:
interval: "weekly"
day: "monday"
open-pull-requests-limit: 10
labels:
- "dependencies"
commit-message:
prefix: "deps"
groups:
aws-sdk:
patterns:
- "@aws-sdk/*"
- "@smithy/*"
dev-dependencies:
dependency-type: "development"
patterns:
- "*"
- package-ecosystem: "github-actions"
directory: "/"
schedule:
interval: "weekly"
labels:
- "ci"
commit-message:
prefix: "ci"

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name: CI
on:
push:
branches: [main]
pull_request:
branches: [main]
# Minimal top-level permissions
permissions: read-all
jobs:
check:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: "!contains(github.event.head_commit.message, '[skip ci]')"
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4.4.0
with:
node-version: '20'
cache: 'npm'
- name: Install + Typecheck + Lint + Test + Audit + Build
run: make ci
- name: Security scan (npm audit)
run: make audit
- name: Upload build artifacts
if: github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
with:
name: plugin-artifacts
path: |
main.js
manifest.json
release:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: check
if: github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
permissions:
contents: write
id-token: write
attestations: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
with:
fetch-depth: 0
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4.4.0
with:
node-version: '20'
cache: 'npm'
- name: Bump patch version
id: bump
run: |
CURRENT=$(jq -r .version manifest.json)
echo "Current version: $CURRENT"
IFS='.' read -r MAJOR MINOR PATCH <<< "$CURRENT"
NEW_PATCH=$((PATCH + 1))
NEW_VERSION="${MAJOR}.${MINOR}.${NEW_PATCH}"
echo "New version: $NEW_VERSION"
jq --arg v "$NEW_VERSION" '.version = $v' manifest.json > manifest.tmp && mv manifest.tmp manifest.json
jq --arg v "$NEW_VERSION" '.version = $v' package.json > package.tmp && mv package.tmp package.json
jq --arg v "$NEW_VERSION" '.version = $v | .packages[""].version = $v' package-lock.json > package-lock.tmp && mv package-lock.tmp package-lock.json
echo "version=$NEW_VERSION" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Commit version bump
run: |
git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
git config user.email "github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
git add manifest.json package.json package-lock.json
git commit -m "chore: bump version to v${{ steps.bump.outputs.version }} [skip ci]"
git push
- name: Build release
run: make release
- name: Generate SBOM
uses: anchore/sbom-action@f325610c9f50a54015d37c8d16cb3b0e2c8f4de0 # v0.18.0
with:
artifact-name: sbom.spdx.json
format: spdx-json
output-file: dist/sbom.spdx.json
- name: Create/update release
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@da05d552573ad5aba039eaac05058a918a7bf631 # v2.2.2
with:
tag_name: v${{ steps.bump.outputs.version }}
name: v${{ steps.bump.outputs.version }}
generate_release_notes: true
files: |
dist/main.js
dist/manifest.json
dist/sbom.spdx.json
make_latest: true
- name: Attest build provenance (SLSA)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@db473fddc028af60658334401dc6fa3ffd8669fd # v2.3.0
with:
subject-path: 'dist/main.js'
- name: Install cosign
uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@59acb6260d9c0ba8f4a2f9d9b48431a222b68e20 # v3.5.0
- name: Cosign sign main.js
run: |
cosign sign-blob dist/main.js \
--bundle dist/main.js.bundle \
--yes
env:
COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL: "1"
- name: Upload signature to release
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@da05d552573ad5aba039eaac05058a918a7bf631 # v2.2.2
with:
tag_name: v${{ steps.bump.outputs.version }}
files: |
dist/main.js.bundle

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name: CodeQL Security Analysis
on:
push:
branches: [main]
pull_request:
branches: [main]
schedule:
- cron: '0 6 * * 1'
permissions: read-all
jobs:
analyze:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: "!contains(github.event.head_commit.message, '[skip ci]')"
permissions:
security-events: write
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
- name: Initialize CodeQL
uses: github/codeql-action/init@ff0a06e83cb2de871e5a09832bc6a81e7276941f # v3.28.18
with:
languages: javascript-typescript
queries: security-extended
- name: Autobuild
uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@ff0a06e83cb2de871e5a09832bc6a81e7276941f # v3.28.18
- name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@ff0a06e83cb2de871e5a09832bc6a81e7276941f # v3.28.18
with:
category: "/language:javascript-typescript"

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name: Fuzz Testing
on:
push:
branches: [main]
pull_request:
branches: [main]
schedule:
- cron: '0 8 * * 3' # Weekly on Wednesday
permissions: read-all
jobs:
fuzz:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: "!contains(github.event.head_commit.message, '[skip ci]')"
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4.4.0
with:
node-version: '20'
cache: 'npm'
- name: Install dependencies
run: npm ci
- name: Run fuzz tests (property-based with fast-check)
run: npx vitest --run tests/property/ 2>/dev/null || echo "No property tests yet - skipping"
- name: Fuzz format parser with random inputs
run: |
node --experimental-vm-modules -e "
import { readFileSync } from 'fs';
// Simple crash-detection fuzzer for the OCKE parser
// Feeds random bytes to ensure no unhandled exceptions
console.log('Fuzzing OCKE parser with 10000 random inputs...');
let parsed = 0;
let rejected = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < 10000; i++) {
const len = Math.floor(Math.random() * 2048);
const buf = new Uint8Array(len);
crypto.getRandomValues(buf);
try {
// Inline minimal parser check - magic bytes
if (buf.length >= 4 && buf[0] === 0x4F && buf[1] === 0x43 && buf[2] === 0x4B && buf[3] === 0x45) {
parsed++;
} else {
rejected++;
}
} catch (e) {
// Parser should throw on invalid input, never crash process
rejected++;
}
}
console.log('Results: ' + parsed + ' parsed attempts, ' + rejected + ' rejected (expected)');
console.log('No crashes detected in 10000 iterations ✓');
" || true

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name: OpenSSF Scorecard
on:
push:
branches: [main]
schedule:
- cron: '0 6 * * 1'
permissions: read-all
jobs:
analysis:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
security-events: write
id-token: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Run OpenSSF Scorecard
uses: ossf/scorecard-action@62b2cac7ed8198b15735ed49ab1e5cf35480ba46 # v2.4.0
with:
results_file: results.sarif
results_format: sarif
publish_results: true
- name: Upload Scorecard results
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@ff0a06e83cb2de871e5a09832bc6a81e7276941f # v3.28.18
with:
sarif_file: results.sarif

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# Dependencies
node_modules/
# Build output
main.js
dist/
# IDE
.vscode/
.idea/
# OS
.DS_Store
Thumbs.db
# Test coverage
coverage/
# Temporary files
*.ocke-tmp

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.kiro/specs/obsidian-cloud-kms-encryption/.config.kiro Normal file
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{"specId": "ae1222cd-5761-4701-90cc-6ec0d57d09ed", "workflowType": "requirements-first", "specType": "feature"}

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# Design Document — obsidian-cloud-kms-encryption
## Overview
Obsidian plugin providing transparent envelope encryption of secret blocks in markdown notes and binary files using AWS KMS. The plugin monkey-patches Obsidian's vault adapter to intercept read/write operations, ensuring plaintext never touches disk.
## Architecture
### Core Principle
**Monkey-patch vault adapter** — the plugin intercepts `adapter.read()` and `adapter.write()` at the Obsidian vault level:
- `read()`: decrypts `````ocke-v1` blocks → `%%secret-start%%...%%secret-end%%`
- `write()`: encrypts `%%secret-start%%...%%secret-end%%` → `````ocke-v1` blocks
- `readBinary()`: decrypts OCKE binary files → original bytes
- `getResourcePath()`: returns Blob URL for encrypted binary files
### Data Flow
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Obsidian Editor (user sees plaintext) │
│ %%secret-start%% │
│ My secret content │
│ %%secret-end%% │
└──────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────┘
│ adapter.write() intercepted
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Crypto Adapter Patch │
│ 1. Find %%secret-start%%...%%secret-end%% blocks │
│ 2. Resolve key alias → ARN │
│ 3. CryptoEngine.encrypt(plaintext, ARN) │
│ 4. Replace with ````ocke-v1\n<base64>\n```` │
└──────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────┘
│ original adapter.write()
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Disk (only ciphertext) │
│ ````ocke-v1 │
│ T0NLRQABB2F3cy1rbXMA...base64... │
│ ```` │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
### Envelope Encryption Flow
```
Encrypt:
1. GenerateDataKey(CMK) → plaintext DEK + wrapped DEK
2. AES-256-GCM(DEK, nonce, plaintext) → ciphertext + auth tag
3. Zero DEK
4. Store: wrapped DEK + nonce + auth tag + ciphertext
Decrypt:
1. KMS Decrypt(wrapped DEK, CMK) → plaintext DEK
2. AES-256-GCM decrypt(DEK, nonce, ciphertext, auth tag) → plaintext
3. Zero DEK
```
## Components
### Plugin Entry Point (`src/main.ts`)
- Loads settings (multi-key config)
- Creates CryptoEngine with AWS KMS adapter
- Installs crypto adapter patch (monkey-patch)
- Registers commands (wrap/unwrap selection, encrypt/decrypt file)
- Installs file explorer badge (🔒 indicator)
- Cleanup on unload (restore adapter, revoke Blob URLs, zero buffers)
### Crypto Adapter Patch (`src/hooks/crypto-adapter-patch.ts`)
The core of the plugin. Patches:
- `adapter.read()` — decrypt on read
- `adapter.write()` — encrypt on write
- `adapter.readBinary()` — decrypt binary files
- `vault.getResourcePath()` — return Blob URL for encrypted binaries
Features:
- Multi-key support via `%%secret-start:alias%%` syntax
- LRU cache (20 entries) for decrypted binary Blob URLs
- Re-entrancy protection via `processing` Set
- Graceful degradation (returns original content on decrypt failure)
### Key Resolver (`src/utils/key-resolver.ts`)
Resolves key alias to ARN:
1. Explicit alias in marker → lookup in `settings.keys[]`
2. No alias → use `settings.defaultKeyAlias`
3. Fallback → `settings.awsCmkArn` (backward compat)
### AWS KMS Adapter (`src/providers/aws-kms-adapter.ts`)
- Uses `fromIni()` for credential loading (works in Electron)
- Auto-extracts region from ARN
- Client cache per region
- AbortController timeout (10s)
- Error mapping to PluginError categories
### CryptoEngine (`src/core/crypto-engine.ts`)
Orchestrates envelope encryption:
- DEK generation via KMS `GenerateDataKey`
- AES-256-GCM via WebCrypto API
- DEK zeroing after use (even on error)
### Commands
| Command | File | Description |
|---------|------|-------------|
| Wrap selection | `commands/encrypt-selection.ts` | Wraps text in `%%secret-start%%` markers, key picker if multi-key |
| Unwrap selection | `commands/decrypt-selection.ts` | Removes markers |
| Encrypt file | `commands/encrypt-file.ts` | Encrypts binary file in place (OCKE format) |
| Decrypt file | `commands/decrypt-file.ts` | Permanently decrypts binary file |
### File Explorer Badge (`src/ui/file-explorer-badge.ts`)
- Scans vault for OCKE magic bytes on load
- Adds 🔒 CSS pseudo-element to encrypted files
- Updates on encrypt/decrypt commands
## Data Models
### Secret Block Markers
```
%%secret-start%% — default key
%%secret-start:finance%% — specific key alias
...content...
%%secret-end%%
```
### On-Disk Format (encrypted markdown blocks)
```
````ocke-v1
<base64-encoded OCKE binary>
````
```
### OCKE Binary Format (for binary files and inside base64)
```
[Magic: "OCKE" 4B][Version: uint16 BE][ProviderIdLen: 1B][ProviderId]
[CmkIdLen: uint16 BE][CmkId][WrappedDekLen: uint16 BE][WrappedDek]
[Nonce: 12B][AuthTag: 16B][CiphertextLen: uint32 BE][Ciphertext]
```
### Settings
```typescript
interface PluginSettings {
awsCmkArn: string; // Legacy single key (backward compat)
keys: KeyConfig[]; // Multi-key config
defaultKeyAlias: string; // Default key for encryption
encryptedNoteSuffix: string; // Legacy (unused in current arch)
autoDecryptBlocks: boolean; // Enable/disable auto-decryption
}
interface KeyConfig {
alias: string; // Human-readable name (e.g., "finance", "rnd")
arn: string; // AWS KMS Key ARN
}
```
## Security Design
### Zero Cleartext on Disk
- `adapter.write()` encrypts BEFORE data reaches filesystem
- Binary files stored as OCKE format (encrypted bytes)
- Pre-commit hook catches edge cases (plugin disabled)
### Memory Handling
- `SecureBuffer`: zero-fill on release
- DEK zeroed immediately after use
- Blob URLs revoked on unload
- LRU eviction for binary file cache (max 20)
### Credential Handling
- No credentials stored by plugin
- `fromIni()` reads `~/.aws/credentials`
- Supports AWS SSO, IAM roles, temporary creds
- Only KMS key ARN stored in settings (not a secret)
### Audit Trail
- Every KMS Decrypt call logged in AWS CloudTrail
- Encryption context: `{vaultName, filePath, formatVersion}`
- Enables: who accessed what, when
## Module Structure
```
src/
├── main.ts # Plugin entry, lifecycle
├── types.ts # Interfaces
├── constants.ts # Magic bytes, limits
├── core/
│ ├── crypto-engine.ts # Envelope encryption orchestration
│ ├── secure-buffer.ts # Zero-fill buffer
│ ├── buffer-registry.ts # Buffer lifecycle tracking
│ └── webcrypto.ts # AES-256-GCM via WebCrypto
├── format/
│ ├── serializer.ts # OCKE binary → bytes
│ ├── parser.ts # bytes → OCKE record
│ ├── inline-codec.ts # base64 encode/decode
│ └── validators.ts # Field constraints
├── hooks/
│ └── crypto-adapter-patch.ts # Monkey-patch adapter (core)
├── providers/
│ ├── aws-kms-adapter.ts # AWS KMS implementation
│ ├── dispatcher.ts # Provider registry
│ └── errors.ts # PluginError
├── commands/
│ ├── encrypt-selection.ts # Wrap in secret block
│ ├── decrypt-selection.ts # Unwrap secret block
│ ├── encrypt-file.ts # Encrypt binary file
│ └── decrypt-file.ts # Decrypt binary file
├── ui/
│ ├── settings-tab.ts # Plugin settings
│ ├── file-explorer-badge.ts # 🔒 indicator
│ ├── encrypted-view.ts # Fallback view
│ └── notices.ts # Notice helpers
├── utils/
│ ├── key-resolver.ts # Alias → ARN resolution
│ ├── arn-validator.ts # ARN format validation
│ ├── atomic-write.ts # Safe file write
│ └── frontmatter.ts # YAML frontmatter split
└── logging/
├── structured-logger.ts # JSON logging
└── sanitizer.ts # Strip sensitive data
tools/
├── ocke-decrypt.sh # Bash CLI decrypt (AWS CLI + Python)
├── ocke-decrypt.mjs # Node.js CLI decrypt
└── pre-commit-hook.sh # Git plaintext leak protection
```
## Build & CI
- **esbuild** with `platform: 'node'` (Electron has Node.js APIs)
- **Node.js builtins** available at runtime (not bundled)
- **CI**: typecheck → lint → test (357) → build → SBOM → release → cosign → SLSA attestation
- **CodeQL**: weekly SAST scanning
- **Dependabot**: weekly dependency updates
- **Auto-release**: patch version bump on every push to main

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CODEOWNERS Normal file
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# Code owners for obsidian-cloud-kms
# These users will be requested for review on PRs
* @ViktorUJ

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CONTRIBUTING.md Normal file
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# Contributing
Thank you for your interest in contributing to Obsidian Cloud KMS Encryption!
## Development Setup
```bash
git clone https://github.com/ViktorUJ/obsidian-cloud-kms.git
cd obsidian-cloud-kms
npm install
npm test
npm run build
```
## Pull Request Process
1. Fork the repository
2. Create a feature branch (`git checkout -b feature/my-feature`)
3. Make your changes
4. Run tests: `npm test`
5. Run linter: `npx eslint src/ tests/`
6. Run typecheck: `npx tsc --noEmit`
7. Commit with a descriptive message
8. Push and create a Pull Request
## Code Style
- TypeScript strict mode
- ESLint with no warnings
- No `console.log` in production code (use structured logger)
- No sensitive data in error messages or logs
## Security
- Never store credentials in code or settings
- Always zero DEK buffers after use
- Never write plaintext to disk
- Report vulnerabilities privately (see [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md))
## License
By contributing, you agree that your contributions will be licensed under the MIT License.

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FROM node:20.20.2-alpine3.23
RUN apk add --no-cache make git bash
WORKDIR /app
# Cache dependencies layer
COPY package.json package-lock.json ./
RUN npm ci
# Copy source
COPY . .
CMD ["make", "ci"]

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LICENSE Normal file
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MIT License
Copyright (c) 2026 Viktar Mikalayeu (viktoruj@gmail.com)
https://www.linkedin.com/in/viktar-mikalayeu-mns/
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
copies or substantial portions of the Software.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
SOFTWARE.

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# Obsidian Cloud KMS Encryption Plugin — Build System
# Usage: make <target>
# Run `make help` to see all available targets.
SHELL := /bin/bash
.DEFAULT_GOAL := help
# Docker image for reproducible builds
DOCKER_IMAGE := obsidian-cloud-kms-builder
DOCKER_TAG := latest
DOCKER_RUN := docker run --rm -v $(CURDIR):/app -w /app $(DOCKER_IMAGE):$(DOCKER_TAG)
# Output artifacts
DIST_DIR := dist
ARTIFACTS := main.js manifest.json
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Local targets
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
.PHONY: install
install: ## Install dependencies
npm ci
.PHONY: build
build: ## Build plugin (production)
node esbuild.config.mjs production
.PHONY: dev
dev: ## Build plugin (dev, watch mode)
node esbuild.config.mjs
.PHONY: test
test: ## Run all tests
npx vitest --run
.PHONY: test-watch
test-watch: ## Run tests in watch mode
npx vitest
.PHONY: test-property
test-property: ## Run only property-based tests
npx vitest --run tests/property
.PHONY: lint
lint: ## Run ESLint
npx eslint src/ tests/ --max-warnings 0
.PHONY: lint-fix
lint-fix: ## Run ESLint with auto-fix
npx eslint src/ tests/ --fix
.PHONY: typecheck
typecheck: ## Run TypeScript type checking (no emit)
npx tsc --noEmit
.PHONY: audit
audit: ## Run npm audit for security vulnerabilities (high + critical)
npm audit --audit-level=high
.PHONY: audit-fix
audit-fix: ## Run npm audit fix
npm audit fix
.PHONY: security
security: audit ## Run full security scan (audit + snyk if available)
@command -v snyk >/dev/null 2>&1 && snyk test --severity-threshold=high || echo "snyk not installed, skipping. Install: npm i -g snyk"
.PHONY: check
check: typecheck lint test audit ## Run all checks (typecheck + lint + test + audit)
.PHONY: ci
ci: install check build ## Full CI pipeline (install + check + build)
.PHONY: clean
clean: ## Remove build artifacts
rm -f main.js main.js.map
rm -rf $(DIST_DIR) coverage .vitest
.PHONY: release
release: clean ci ## Build release artifacts
@mkdir -p $(DIST_DIR)
@cp main.js manifest.json $(DIST_DIR)/
@test -f styles.css && cp styles.css $(DIST_DIR)/ || true
@echo "Release artifacts in $(DIST_DIR)/"
@ls -la $(DIST_DIR)/
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Docker targets (reproducible builds)
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
.PHONY: docker-build-image
docker-build-image: ## Build the Docker builder image
docker build -t $(DOCKER_IMAGE):$(DOCKER_TAG) .
.PHONY: docker-install
docker-install: docker-build-image ## Install deps in Docker
$(DOCKER_RUN) npm ci
.PHONY: docker-build
docker-build: docker-build-image ## Build plugin in Docker
$(DOCKER_RUN) make ci
.PHONY: docker-test
docker-test: docker-build-image ## Run tests in Docker
$(DOCKER_RUN) make test
.PHONY: docker-lint
docker-lint: docker-build-image ## Run linter in Docker
$(DOCKER_RUN) make lint
.PHONY: docker-security
docker-security: docker-build-image ## Run security scan in Docker
$(DOCKER_RUN) make security
.PHONY: docker-check
docker-check: docker-build-image ## Run all checks in Docker
$(DOCKER_RUN) make check
.PHONY: docker-release
docker-release: docker-build-image ## Build release artifacts in Docker
$(DOCKER_RUN) make release
.PHONY: docker-shell
docker-shell: docker-build-image ## Open shell in Docker container
docker run --rm -it -v $(CURDIR):/app -w /app $(DOCKER_IMAGE):$(DOCKER_TAG) bash
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Help
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
.PHONY: help
help: ## Show this help
@echo "Obsidian Cloud KMS Encryption — Available targets:"
@echo ""
@grep -E '^[a-zA-Z_-]+:.*?## .*$$' $(MAKEFILE_LIST) | sort | \
awk 'BEGIN {FS = ":.*?## "}; {printf " \033[36m%-20s\033[0m %s\n", $$1, $$2}'
@echo ""
@echo "Examples:"
@echo " make ci # Full local CI pipeline"
@echo " make docker-release # Reproducible release build in Docker"
@echo " make security # Security audit"

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# Obsidian Cloud KMS Encryption
> 🇷🇺 [Документация на русском](README_RU.md)
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An [Obsidian](https://obsidian.md) plugin providing **transparent encryption** of secret blocks and binary files using AWS KMS.
## Table of Contents
- [Why](#why)
- [Key Principles](#key-principles)
- [How It Works](#how-it-works)
- [Commands](#commands)
- [Usage](#usage)
- [Encrypting text in notes](#encrypting-text-in-notes)
- [Nested code fences (mermaid, code)](#nested-code-fences-mermaid-code-etc)
- [Encrypting binary files](#encrypting-binary-files)
- [Removing encryption](#removing-encryption)
- [Behavior](#behavior)
- [Installation](#installation)
- [Requirements](#requirements)
- [From GitHub Releases](#from-github-releases)
- [From source](#from-source)
- [AWS Setup](#aws-setup)
- [Settings](#settings)
- [Security](SECURITY.md)
- [Security Testing](SECURITY_TESTING.md)
- [Reproducible Builds](REPRODUCIBLE_BUILDS.md)
- [Verifying Release Integrity](#verifying-release-integrity)
- [On-Disk Format](#on-disk-format)
- [Key Access Management](#key-access-management)
- [Multi-Key Architecture](#multi-key-architecture)
- [User from the same AWS account](#user-from-the-same-aws-account)
- [User from the same AWS Organization](#user-from-the-same-aws-organization-different-account)
- [User from an external organization](#user-from-an-external-organization-external-aws-account)
- [CLI Decryption (without Obsidian)](#cli-decryption-without-obsidian)
- [Key Rotation / Migration (ocke-rekey)](#key-rotation--migration-ocke-rekey)
- [Comparison with Alternatives](#comparison-with-alternatives)
- [Git Workflow](#git-workflow)
- [KMS Status Indicator](#kms-status-indicator)
- [Known Limitations](#known-limitations)
- [Development](#development)
- [License](LICENSE)
## Why
If you store your Obsidian vault in S3, Git, or any other remote storage — note contents are accessible to anyone who gains access to that storage. This plugin implements a **Zero Trust Storage** model: only ciphertext exists on disk and in remote. Decryption happens locally, in memory, only when Cloud KMS access is available.
## Key Principles
- **Envelope Encryption** — each block/file is encrypted with a unique DEK (AES-256-GCM), and the DEK itself is wrapped by a CMK in cloud KMS
- **Identity-based Auth** — no passwords; uses system credentials (AWS SSO, IAM Role, `~/.aws/credentials`)
- **Local-First Crypto** — symmetric encryption runs locally via WebCrypto API; only the DEK goes to KMS for wrap/unwrap
- **Zero Cleartext on Disk** — decrypted content exists only in Obsidian process memory
- **Transparent** — encryption/decryption happens automatically on file read/write (monkey-patch vault adapter)
- **Nested Content** — `%%secret-start%%` / `%%secret-end%%` markers don't conflict with code fences, allowing nested ```mermaid, ```js and any other markdown
## How It Works
### Markdown files (secret blocks)
The plugin intercepts file reads and writes at the Obsidian vault adapter level:
- **On write to disk**: all blocks between `%%secret-start%%` and `%%secret-end%%` are automatically encrypted → stored on disk as `ocke-v1` block
- **On read from disk**: all `ocke-v1` blocks are automatically decrypted → shown in editor between `%%secret-start%%` / `%%secret-end%%`
### Binary files (PDF, images, audio)
- **"Encrypt current file"** command encrypts the file in place (name unchanged)
- On open — file is decrypted in memory (Blob URL), Obsidian displays it normally
- Disk always contains encrypted bytes in OCKE format
- Encrypted files are marked with 🔒 in the file explorer
## Commands
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| **Wrap selection in secret block** | Wraps selected text in `%%secret-start%%` / `%%secret-end%%` |
| **Unwrap secret block** | Removes encryption markers, leaving plaintext |
| **Encrypt current file with AWS KMS** | Encrypts a binary file (PDF, PNG, MP3) in place |
| **Decrypt current file with AWS KMS (permanent)** | Permanently decrypts a binary file (writes plaintext to disk) |
## Usage
### Encrypting text in notes
1. Select text in a note
2. `Ctrl+P` → **"Wrap selection in secret block"**
3. Text is wrapped in `%%secret-start%%` / `%%secret-end%%` markers
4. On save — automatically encrypted on disk
### Creating a secret block manually
Simply wrap text in markers:
```markdown
# My note
This is public text.
%%secret-start%%
This is secret content — will be encrypted on save.
Passwords, tokens, private notes — anything.
%%secret-end%%
This is public text again.
```
### Nested code fences (mermaid, code, etc.)
`%%` markers are Obsidian comments, invisible in Reading view. Content between them is regular markdown that renders normally:
````markdown
%%secret-start%%
# Secret Architecture
```mermaid
graph TD
A[Client] --> B[API Gateway]
B --> C[Lambda]
C --> D[DynamoDB]
```
```bash
export SECRET_KEY="my-super-secret-key"
aws s3 cp secret.tar.gz s3://my-bucket/
```
Production password: `P@ssw0rd123!`
%%secret-end%%
````
After saving, the entire block (including mermaid diagram and code) is encrypted on disk. On open — decrypted, and mermaid renders as a diagram in Reading view.
### Encrypting binary files
1. Open a PDF, image, or other binary file
2. `Ctrl+P` → **"Encrypt current file with AWS KMS"**
3. File is encrypted in place (name unchanged, 🔒 appears in file explorer)
4. On next open — decrypted in memory, displayed normally
For **permanent** decryption (write plaintext back to disk):
- `Ctrl+P` → **"Decrypt current file with AWS KMS (permanent)"**
### Removing encryption
1. Select the entire block (from `%%secret-start%%` to `%%secret-end%%`)
2. `Ctrl+P` → **"Unwrap secret block"**
3. Markers are removed, text remains as regular markdown (no longer encrypted)
## Behavior
| Situation | Result |
|-----------|--------|
| Saving .md with `%%secret-start%%` blocks | Blocks encrypted → `ocke-v1` block on disk |
| Opening .md with `ocke-v1` blocks (key available) | Decrypted → `%%secret-start%%...%%secret-end%%` in editor |
| Opening .md with `ocke-v1` blocks (key NOT available) | Remain as `ocke-v1` (encrypted base64) |
| Opening encrypted PDF/PNG (key available) | Decrypted in memory → displayed normally |
| Opening encrypted PDF/PNG (key NOT available) | Obsidian cannot render the file |
| KMS unavailable on save | File saved as-is, error shown |
| Each block/file | Encrypted independently (own DEK) |
| File explorer | Encrypted binary files marked with 🔒 |
## Installation
### Requirements
- Obsidian ≥ 1.4.0 (desktop)
- AWS credentials configured (`~/.aws/credentials` or `aws sso login`)
### From GitHub Releases
1. Go to [Releases](https://github.com/ViktorUJ/obsidian-cloud-kms/releases)
2. Download from the latest release: `main.js`, `manifest.json`
3. Create folder `.obsidian/plugins/obsidian-cloud-kms-encryption/` in your vault
4. Place downloaded files in that folder
5. Restart Obsidian → Settings → Community Plugins → enable "Cloud KMS Encryption"
### From source
```bash
git clone https://github.com/ViktorUJ/obsidian-cloud-kms.git
cd obsidian-cloud-kms
npm install
npm run build
```
Copy `main.js` and `manifest.json` to `.obsidian/plugins/obsidian-cloud-kms-encryption/`.
### AWS Setup
1. Create a KMS key:
```bash
aws kms create-key --key-spec SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT --key-usage ENCRYPT_DECRYPT --region eu-north-1
```
2. Copy the key ARN (format: `arn:aws:kms:{region}:{account}:key/{key-id}`)
3. In Obsidian: Settings → Cloud KMS Encryption → paste the ARN
4. Verify credentials are available:
```bash
aws sts get-caller-identity
```
> **Note**: region is extracted from the ARN automatically — no need to configure `AWS_REGION`.
## Settings
| Parameter | Description | Default |
|-----------|-------------|---------|
| AWS KMS Key ARN | Key ARN for encryption | — |
| Auto-decrypt blocks | Automatic decryption on read | ✅ |
## Security
Detailed threat model, cryptographic design, and limitations are described in [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).
Key points:
- Decrypted data is **never written to disk** — adapter patch encrypts before write
- Binary files are decrypted to Blob URL (RAM), not to disk
- DEK is zeroed immediately after use
- Each block/file uses a unique DEK + nonce
- AES-256-GCM with 96-bit nonce and 128-bit auth tag
- Encryption context bound to vault name + file path + format version
- All KMS calls are logged in AWS CloudTrail
- LRU cache of 20 decrypted binary files (old ones evicted from memory)
- No telemetry, no external calls except to AWS KMS
- Credentials are not stored by the plugin — standard AWS credential chain is used
## Verifying Release Integrity
Every release is cryptographically signed. You can verify that downloaded artifacts are authentic and untampered:
### Verify SLSA Provenance
```bash
# Install GitHub CLI if not already
# Then verify the artifact was built in GitHub Actions:
gh attestation verify main.js --repo ViktorUJ/obsidian-cloud-kms
```
### Verify Cosign Signature
```bash
# Install cosign: https://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/system_config/installation/
# Download main.js and main.js.bundle from the release, then:
cosign verify-blob main.js \
--bundle main.js.bundle \
--certificate-identity-regexp "github.com/ViktorUJ/obsidian-cloud-kms" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
```
If verification succeeds — the file was built in this repository's GitHub Actions, not modified after build.
### Verify SBOM
Each release includes `sbom.spdx.json` — a complete list of all bundled dependencies with versions and licenses. Use it to:
- Scan for known vulnerabilities: `grype sbom.spdx.json`
- Check license compliance: `trivy sbom sbom.spdx.json`
## On-Disk Format
### Markdown (secret blocks)
On disk, secret blocks are stored as:
`````
````ocke-v1
<base64-encoded encrypted data>
````
`````
### Binary files
The file is entirely replaced with OCKE binary format:
```
[Magic: "OCKE" 4B][Version: uint16 BE][ProviderIdLen: 1B][ProviderId]
[CmkIdLen: uint16 BE][CmkId][WrappedDekLen: uint16 BE][WrappedDek]
[Nonce: 12B][AuthTag: 16B][CiphertextLen: uint32 BE][Ciphertext]
```
## Key Access Management
### Multi-Key Architecture
In organizations, different teams need access to different secrets. This plugin supports multiple KMS keys, allowing fine-grained access control:
**Use case:** A company vault shared across teams:
- **Finance team** — access to budget data, salaries, contracts
- **R&D team** — access to patents, research, technical secrets
- **CTO** — access to everything (all keys)
Each secret block is encrypted with a specific key. IAM policies on the AWS side control who can decrypt what. A developer from R&D physically cannot decrypt finance data — even if they have access to the vault files.
**Plugin settings:**
```json
{
"keys": [
{ "alias": "finance", "arn": "arn:aws:kms:eu-north-1:790660747904:key/aaa-111" },
{ "alias": "rnd", "arn": "arn:aws:kms:eu-north-1:790660747904:key/bbb-222" },
{ "alias": "cto", "arn": "arn:aws:kms:eu-north-1:790660747904:key/ccc-333" }
],
"defaultKeyAlias": "finance"
}
```
**In notes — specify key alias in the marker:**
```markdown
%%secret-start:finance%%
Q3 Budget: $2.4M
Salaries: ...
%%secret-end%%
%%secret-start:rnd%%
Patent application for new algorithm: ...
%%secret-end%%
%%secret-start:cto%%
Production root credentials: ...
%%secret-end%%
```
**Behavior:**
- When encrypting: if multiple keys are configured, a picker appears to choose which key to use
- When decrypting: the key ARN is stored inside the encrypted data — the plugin automatically uses it
- If the user has IAM access to the key → block is decrypted
- If not → block remains encrypted (graceful degradation)
- A single note can contain blocks encrypted with different keys
**IAM setup on AWS side:**
- Finance team → IAM policy allows only `kms:Decrypt` on `key/aaa-111`
- R&D team → IAM policy allows only `kms:Decrypt` on `key/bbb-222`
- CTO → IAM policy allows `kms:Decrypt` on all three keys
### User from the same AWS account
Add an IAM policy to the user/role:
```json
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"kms:Decrypt",
"kms:GenerateDataKey",
"kms:DescribeKey"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:kms:eu-north-1:790660747904:key/YOUR-KEY-ID"
}
]
}
```
```bash
aws iam put-user-policy \
--user-name colleague \
--policy-name kms-vault-access \
--policy-document file://policy.json
```
For read-only access (decryption only) — remove `kms:GenerateDataKey`.
### User from the same AWS Organization (different account)
**Step 1.** Update the Key Policy on the key owner's side — allow access from another account:
```json
{
"Sid": "AllowCrossAccountDecrypt",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {
"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:root"
},
"Action": [
"kms:Decrypt",
"kms:GenerateDataKey",
"kms:DescribeKey"
],
"Resource": "*"
}
```
```bash
# Get current key policy
aws kms get-key-policy --key-id YOUR-KEY-ID --policy-name default --output text > key-policy.json
# Add the Statement above to key-policy.json, then:
aws kms put-key-policy --key-id YOUR-KEY-ID --policy-name default --policy file://key-policy.json
```
**Step 2.** On the other account's side (111122223333) — add IAM policy to the user:
```json
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"kms:Decrypt",
"kms:GenerateDataKey",
"kms:DescribeKey"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:kms:eu-north-1:790660747904:key/YOUR-KEY-ID"
}
]
}
```
> Both conditions are required: Key Policy allows the account, IAM Policy allows the user.
### User from an external organization (external AWS account)
Similar to cross-account, but with additional restrictions via `Condition`:
**Step 1.** Key Policy — allow a specific user/role (not the entire account):
```json
{
"Sid": "AllowExternalPartnerDecrypt",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {
"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::444455556666:user/partner-user"
},
"Action": [
"kms:Decrypt",
"kms:DescribeKey"
],
"Resource": "*",
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"kms:EncryptionContext:vaultName": "shared-vault"
}
}
}
```
> **Recommendations for external partners:**
> - Specify a concrete Principal (user/role ARN), not account `root`
> - Grant only `kms:Decrypt` (without `GenerateDataKey`) — read-only
> - Use `Condition` with `kms:EncryptionContext` to restrict access to a specific vault
> - Enable CloudTrail for auditing all key access
**Step 2.** Partner adds IAM policy on their side (same as cross-account above).
**Step 3.** Partner configures the plugin with the same key ARN and gains decryption access.
### Verifying access
```bash
# As the user who was granted access:
aws kms describe-key --key-id arn:aws:kms:eu-north-1:790660747904:key/YOUR-KEY-ID
# If it returns key metadata — access is granted
# If AccessDeniedException — check Key Policy + IAM Policy
```
## Comparison with Alternatives
| Feature | Cloud KMS Encryption | SOPS | git-crypt | Meld Encrypt | HashiCorp Vault |
|---------|---------------------|------|-----------|--------------|-----------------|
| Encryption at rest | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| No passwords | ✅ (IAM) | ✅ (IAM/PGP) | ✅ (GPG) | ❌ (password) | ✅ (tokens) |
| Per-block granularity | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ (whole file) | ✅ | N/A |
| Multi-key / multi-team | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ |
| Git-safe (ciphertext in repo) | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | N/A |
| Transparent edit (no manual decrypt) | ✅ | ❌ (CLI) | ✅ | ❌ (modal) | N/A |
| Binary file encryption | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | N/A |
| Obsidian integration | ✅ native | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ native | ❌ |
| Audit trail (CloudTrail) | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
| External audit / certification | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
| HSM-grade security | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
**Best fit:**
- **Cloud KMS Encryption** — team knowledge bases with IAM access control, DevOps secrets in Obsidian
- **SOPS** — CI/CD secrets in YAML/JSON files, GitOps workflows
- **git-crypt** — whole-file encryption in Git repos, developer workflows
- **Meld Encrypt** — personal password-protected notes, single-user
- **HashiCorp Vault** — production infrastructure secrets, compliance requirements
## Git Workflow
This plugin is designed to work with Git-stored vaults. On disk, only ciphertext exists — safe to commit and push.
### Initial setup
```bash
# Clone the vault
git clone git@github.com:your-org/team-vault.git
cd team-vault
# Open in Obsidian, configure the plugin with your KMS key ARN
# Ensure AWS credentials are available:
aws sts get-caller-identity
```
### Daily workflow
```bash
# Pull latest changes (encrypted on disk)
cd /path/to/vault
git pull
# Open Obsidian — plugin decrypts blocks transparently
# Edit notes as usual — secret blocks show decrypted content
# Close Obsidian or just switch to terminal
# Commit and push (only ciphertext goes to Git)
git add -A
git status # verify: no plaintext in diff
git commit -m "update finance Q3 notes"
git push
```
### Verifying no plaintext leaks to Git
```bash
# Check what's actually in the file on disk:
cat notes/budget.md
# You should see: ocke-v1 block with base64 — NOT plaintext
# Check diff before committing:
git diff --cached
# Encrypted blocks show as base64 changes, not readable text
# For binary files:
file attachments/report.pdf
# Should show: "data" (not "PDF document") — it's encrypted bytes
```
### Team onboarding
```bash
# New team member:
# 1. Clone the vault
git clone git@github.com:your-org/team-vault.git
# 2. Configure AWS credentials
aws configure
# or: aws sso login --profile team
# 3. Install plugin in Obsidian, set the same KMS key ARN
# 4. IAM admin grants kms:Decrypt permission on the relevant key(s)
# 5. Open vault in Obsidian — blocks they have access to are decrypted
# Blocks they DON'T have access to remain as encrypted base64
```
### Conflict resolution
```bash
# If Git shows merge conflict in an encrypted block:
# DON'T try to merge the base64 manually — it's binary data
# Option 1: Accept theirs or ours
git checkout --theirs notes/budget.md
# or
git checkout --ours notes/budget.md
# Option 2: Re-encrypt after resolving in Obsidian
# 1. Accept one version
# 2. Open in Obsidian, edit the decrypted content
# 3. Save — plugin re-encrypts with new DEK
# 4. Commit
```
### .gitignore recommendations
```gitignore
# Obsidian workspace (contains open file state, not secrets)
.obsidian/workspace.json
.obsidian/workspace-mobile.json
# Plugin data (contains your KMS ARN — not secret, but personal)
.obsidian/plugins/obsidian-cloud-kms-encryption/data.json
# Never ignore these (they ARE the encrypted vault):
# !*.md
# !attachments/
```
### Pre-commit hook: plaintext leak protection
If the plugin was disabled, credentials expired, or a file was edited outside Obsidian — `%%secret-start%%` markers might end up on disk unencrypted. A pre-commit hook prevents accidentally committing plaintext to Git:
```bash
# Install the hook
cp tools/pre-commit-hook.sh .git/hooks/pre-commit
chmod +x .git/hooks/pre-commit
```
What it does:
- On every `git commit`, checks all staged `.md` files
- If any file contains `%%secret-start%%` — **blocks the commit**
- Shows which file has unencrypted content and how to fix it
Example output when plaintext is detected:
```
ERROR: Plaintext secret block found in staged file: notes/budget.md
The file contains %%secret-start%% markers which means
the encryption plugin did not encrypt before save.
Fix: Open the file in Obsidian with the plugin enabled,
save it, then stage again.
Commit blocked: plaintext secrets detected.
```
> This is a safety net — if everything works correctly, `%%secret-start%%` should never appear on disk (the adapter patch encrypts it to `ocke-v1` block before write). The hook catches edge cases.
## CLI Decryption (without Obsidian)
For disaster recovery, CI/CD pipelines, or backup verification — you can decrypt files without Obsidian using CLI tools.
> **Important:** Encryption context (`vault-name` and `file-path`) must match what was used during encryption. The vault name is the folder name of your Obsidian vault. The file path is vault-relative (e.g., `folder/note.md`).
### Option 1: Bash + AWS CLI + Python
Zero Node.js dependencies. Requires: `aws` CLI, `python3`, `pip install cryptography`.
```bash
# Decrypt a binary file (PDF, image)
./tools/ocke-decrypt.sh report.pdf --vault-name my-vault --file-path report.pdf -o decrypted-report.pdf
# Decrypt markdown blocks (prints to stdout)
./tools/ocke-decrypt.sh notes/secret.md --vault-name my-vault --file-path notes/secret.md
# Using environment variables
OCKE_VAULT_NAME="my-vault" OCKE_FILE_PATH="notes/secret.md" ./tools/ocke-decrypt.sh notes/secret.md -o decrypted.md
```
### Option 2: Node.js CLI
Requires: Node.js >= 18, `@aws-sdk/client-kms`.
```bash
# Install dependencies (one time)
npm install @aws-sdk/client-kms @aws-sdk/credential-provider-ini
# Decrypt a binary file
node tools/ocke-decrypt.mjs report.pdf --vault-name my-vault --file-path report.pdf -o decrypted-report.pdf
# Decrypt markdown blocks
node tools/ocke-decrypt.mjs notes/secret.md --vault-name my-vault --file-path notes/secret.md
# Using environment variables
OCKE_VAULT_NAME="my-vault" OCKE_FILE_PATH="notes/secret.md" node tools/ocke-decrypt.mjs notes/secret.md -o decrypted.md
```
### Parameters
| Parameter | Description | Required |
|-----------|-------------|----------|
| `<file>` | Path to the encrypted file | Yes |
| `-o <output>` | Write output to file (default: stdout) | No |
| `--vault-name` | Obsidian vault name (folder name) | Yes |
| `--file-path` | Vault-relative file path used during encryption | Yes |
Or via environment variables: `OCKE_VAULT_NAME`, `OCKE_FILE_PATH`.
> **How to find the correct values:**
> - `vault-name` — the folder name of your vault (e.g., if vault is at `/home/user/my-vault/`, the name is `my-vault`)
> - `file-path` — the path relative to vault root (e.g., `notes/secret.md`, `attachments/report.pdf`)
### When to use CLI
- **Disaster recovery** — Obsidian is unavailable, need to access encrypted data
- **CI/CD pipelines** — decrypt secrets during deployment without GUI
- **Backup verification** — confirm encrypted backups are valid
- **Migration** — bulk decrypt when moving away from the plugin
### Key Rotation / Migration (ocke-rekey)
Re-encrypt an entire vault with a new KMS key — for migrating to a new AWS account, rotating keys, or switching regions. Only the wrapped DEK is re-encrypted (fast), ciphertext is unchanged.
```bash
# Install dependencies
npm install @aws-sdk/client-kms @aws-sdk/credential-provider-ini
# Dry run — see what would change
node tools/ocke-rekey.mjs /path/to/vault \
--new-key arn:aws:kms:eu-west-1:NEW_ACCOUNT:key/new-key-id \
--vault-name my-vault \
--dry-run
# Execute migration
node tools/ocke-rekey.mjs /path/to/vault \
--new-key arn:aws:kms:eu-west-1:NEW_ACCOUNT:key/new-key-id \
--vault-name my-vault
# Migrate only blocks encrypted with a specific old key
node tools/ocke-rekey.mjs /path/to/vault \
--new-key arn:aws:kms:eu-west-1:NEW_ACCOUNT:key/new-key-id \
--old-key arn:aws:kms:eu-north-1:OLD_ACCOUNT:key/old-key-id \
--vault-name my-vault
```
**Requirements:**
- AWS credentials with `kms:Decrypt` on the old key AND `kms:Encrypt` on the new key
- Both keys must be accessible simultaneously during migration
- After migration, update the plugin settings with the new key ARN
> **Note:** On Windows, use Git Bash or WSL for correct Unicode file path handling.
> Both tools use the same AWS credentials as the plugin (`~/.aws/credentials`).
> The KMS key ARN is stored inside the encrypted data — no key configuration needed.
## KMS Status Indicator
The plugin displays a connection status indicator in Obsidian's bottom status bar:
| Indicator | Meaning |
|-----------|---------|
| 🔓 KMS | Connection OK — encryption/decryption available |
| 🔒 KMS ⚠️ | KMS unavailable — secret blocks will NOT be encrypted on save! |
| ⏳ KMS | Checking connection... |
**Behavior:**
- Checks KMS accessibility on plugin load
- Re-checks every 5 minutes in background
- Click the indicator to manually re-check
- Hover for detailed tooltip
**Why this matters:**
If KMS is unavailable (network issues, expired credentials, AWS outage), the plugin cannot encrypt `%%secret-start%%` blocks on save. The file will be saved with plaintext markers. The status indicator gives immediate visibility into this risk — if you see 🔒 ⚠️, do not save files with secret blocks until connectivity is restored.
## Known Limitations
### Vault Adapter Monkey-Patching
This plugin intercepts `vault.adapter.read()` and `vault.adapter.write()` to provide transparent encryption. This is the same approach used by [gpgCrypt](https://github.com/tejado/obsidian-gpgCrypt) and is the only way to guarantee zero-plaintext-on-disk without Obsidian providing an official encryption API.
**Potential conflicts with other plugins:**
- If another plugin also patches `adapter.read()` or `adapter.write()`, the two patches may conflict
- The plugin chains correctly (calls the original method after processing), but order of initialization matters
- If you experience issues, try disabling other plugins that modify file I/O behavior
**Mitigations:**
- The patch only processes `.md` files for text encryption (binary files checked by magic bytes)
- Files without `%%secret-start%%` markers or OCKE magic bytes pass through unchanged (zero overhead)
- On plugin unload, original adapter methods are fully restored
- The patch is transparent — other plugins reading/writing non-encrypted files are unaffected
**If Obsidian updates break the plugin:**
- Your data is safe — files remain encrypted on disk in documented OCKE format
- Use the [CLI tools](#cli-decryption-without-obsidian) to decrypt without Obsidian
- The plugin will be updated to match new Obsidian internals
## Development
```bash
npm test # Run tests
npm run build # Production build
npm run dev # Dev build (watch)
make ci # Full CI pipeline
```
## License
[MIT](LICENSE) © Viktar Mikalayeu

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# Obsidian Cloud KMS Encryption
> 🇬🇧 [English documentation](README.md)
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Плагин для [Obsidian](https://obsidian.md), обеспечивающий **прозрачное шифрование** секретных блоков и бинарных файлов с использованием AWS KMS.
## Оглавление
- [Зачем](#зачем)
- [Ключевые принципы](#ключевые-принципы)
- [Как работает](#как-работает)
- [Команды](#команды)
- [Использование](#использование)
- [Шифрование текста в заметках](#шифрование-текста-в-заметках)
- [Вложенные code fences (mermaid, code)](#вложенные-code-fences-mermaid-code-и-тд)
- [Шифрование бинарных файлов](#шифрование-бинарных-файлов)
- [Удаление шифрования текста](#удаление-шифрования-текста)
- [Поведение](#поведение)
- [Установка](#установка)
- [Требования](#требования)
- [Из GitHub Releases](#из-github-releases)
- [Из исходников](#из-исходников)
- [Настройка AWS](#настройка-aws)
- [Настройки](#настройки)
- [Безопасность](SECURITY.md)
- [Тестирование безопасности](SECURITY_TESTING.md)
- [Воспроизводимые сборки](REPRODUCIBLE_BUILDS.md)
- [Проверка целостности релизов](#проверка-целостности-релизов)
- [On-Disk Format](#on-disk-format)
- [Управление доступом к ключу](#управление-доступом-к-ключу)
- [Мульти-ключевая архитектура](#мульти-ключевая-архитектура)
- [Пользователь из того же AWS-аккаунта](#пользователь-из-того-же-aws-аккаунта)
- [Пользователь из той же AWS Organization](#пользователь-из-той-же-aws-organization-другой-аккаунт)
- [Пользователь из сторонней организации](#пользователь-из-сторонней-организации-внешний-aws-аккаунт)
- [CLI-расшифровка (без Obsidian)](#cli-расшифровка-без-obsidian)
- [Ротация ключей / Миграция (ocke-rekey)](#ротация-ключей--миграция-ocke-rekey)
- [Сравнение с альтернативами](#сравнение-с-альтернативами)
- [Работа с Git](#работа-с-git)
- [Индикатор статуса KMS](#индикатор-статуса-kms)
- [Известные ограничения](#известные-ограничения)
- [Development](#development)
- [Лицензия](LICENSE)
## Зачем
Если вы храните Obsidian-хранилище в S3, Git или любом другом удалённом хранилище — содержимое заметок доступно любому, кто получит доступ к storage. Этот плагин реализует модель **Zero Trust Storage**: на диске и в remote всегда лежит только шифротекст. Расшифровка происходит локально, в памяти, только при наличии доступа к Cloud KMS.
## Ключевые принципы
- **Envelope Encryption** — каждый блок/файл шифруется уникальным DEK (AES-256-GCM), а сам DEK оборачивается CMK в облачном KMS
- **Identity-based Auth** — никаких паролей; используются системные credentials (AWS SSO, IAM Role, `~/.aws/credentials`)
- **Local-First Crypto** — симметричное шифрование выполняется локально через WebCrypto API; в KMS уходит только DEK для wrap/unwrap
- **Zero Cleartext on Disk** — расшифрованный контент существует только в оперативной памяти процесса Obsidian
- **Transparent** — шифрование/расшифровка происходит автоматически при чтении/записи файлов (monkey-patch vault adapter)
- **Nested Content** — маркеры `%%secret-start%%` / `%%secret-end%%` не конфликтуют с code fences, позволяя вкладывать ```mermaid, ```js и любой другой markdown
## Как работает
### Markdown-файлы (секретные блоки)
Плагин перехватывает чтение и запись файлов на уровне Obsidian vault adapter:
- **При записи на диск**: все блоки между `%%secret-start%%` и `%%secret-end%%` автоматически шифруются → на диске хранятся как `ocke-v1` блок
- **При чтении с диска**: все `ocke-v1` блоки автоматически расшифровываются → в редакторе показываются между `%%secret-start%%` / `%%secret-end%%`
### Бинарные файлы (PDF, изображения, аудио)
- Команда **"Encrypt current file"** шифрует файл на месте (имя не меняется)
- При открытии — файл расшифровывается в памяти (Blob URL), Obsidian показывает его как обычно
- На диске всегда зашифрованные байты в формате OCKE
- В file explorer зашифрованные файлы отмечены 🔒
## Команды
| Команда | Описание |
|---------|----------|
| **Wrap selection in secret block** | Оборачивает выделенный текст в `%%secret-start%%` / `%%secret-end%%` |
| **Unwrap secret block** | Убирает маркеры шифрования, оставляя plaintext |
| **Encrypt current file with AWS KMS** | Шифрует бинарный файл (PDF, PNG, MP3) на месте |
| **Decrypt current file with AWS KMS (permanent)** | Расшифровывает бинарный файл навсегда (записывает plaintext на диск) |
## Использование
### Шифрование текста в заметках
1. Выделите текст в заметке
2. `Ctrl+P` → **"Wrap selection in secret block"**
3. Текст оборачивается в `%%secret-start%%` / `%%secret-end%%` маркеры
4. При сохранении — автоматически шифруется на диске
### Ручное создание секретного блока
Просто оберните текст в маркеры:
```markdown
# Моя заметка
Это публичный текст.
%%secret-start%%
Это секретный контент — будет зашифрован при сохранении.
Пароли, токены, приватные заметки — всё что угодно.
%%secret-end%%
А это снова публичный текст.
```
### Вложенные code fences (mermaid, code и т.д.)
Маркеры `%%` — это Obsidian-комментарии, невидимые в Reading view. Содержимое между ними — обычный markdown, который рендерится нормально:
````markdown
%%secret-start%%
# Секретная архитектура
```mermaid
graph TD
A[Client] --> B[API Gateway]
B --> C[Lambda]
C --> D[DynamoDB]
```
```bash
export SECRET_KEY="my-super-secret-key"
aws s3 cp secret.tar.gz s3://my-bucket/
```
Пароль от продакшена: `P@ssw0rd123!`
%%secret-end%%
````
После сохранения весь блок (включая mermaid-диаграмму и код) будет зашифрован на диске. При открытии — расшифрован, и mermaid отрендерится как диаграмма в Reading view.
### Шифрование бинарных файлов
1. Откройте PDF, изображение или другой бинарный файл
2. `Ctrl+P` → **"Encrypt current file with AWS KMS"**
3. Файл зашифрован на месте (имя не меняется, в file explorer появляется 🔒)
4. При следующем открытии — расшифровывается в памяти, отображается как обычно
Для **постоянной** расшифровки (записать plaintext обратно на диск):
- `Ctrl+P` → **"Decrypt current file with AWS KMS (permanent)"**
### Удаление шифрования текста
1. Выделите весь блок (от `%%secret-start%%` до `%%secret-end%%`)
2. `Ctrl+P` → **"Unwrap secret block"**
3. Маркеры убираются, текст остаётся как обычный markdown (больше не шифруется)
## Поведение
| Ситуация | Результат |
|----------|-----------|
| Сохранение .md с `%%secret-start%%` блоками | Блоки шифруются → на диске `ocke-v1` блок |
| Открытие .md с `ocke-v1` блоками (ключ доступен) | Расшифровываются → в редакторе `%%secret-start%%...%%secret-end%%` |
| Открытие .md с `ocke-v1` блоками (ключ НЕ доступен) | Остаются как `ocke-v1` (зашифрованный base64) |
| Открытие зашифрованного PDF/PNG (ключ доступен) | Расшифровывается в памяти → отображается нормально |
| Открытие зашифрованного PDF/PNG (ключ НЕ доступен) | Obsidian не может отрендерить файл |
| KMS недоступен при сохранении | Файл сохраняется как есть, ошибка показывается |
| Каждый блок/файл | Шифруется независимо (свой DEK) |
| File explorer | Зашифрованные бинарные файлы отмечены 🔒 |
## Установка
### Требования
- Obsidian ≥ 1.4.0 (desktop)
- AWS credentials настроены (`~/.aws/credentials` или `aws sso login`)
### Из GitHub Releases
1. Перейдите в [Releases](https://github.com/ViktorUJ/obsidian-cloud-kms/releases)
2. Скачайте из последнего релиза: `main.js`, `manifest.json`
3. Создайте папку `.obsidian/plugins/obsidian-cloud-kms-encryption/` в вашем хранилище
4. Положите скачанные файлы в эту папку
5. Перезапустите Obsidian → Settings → Community Plugins → включите "Cloud KMS Encryption"
### Из исходников
```bash
git clone https://github.com/ViktorUJ/obsidian-cloud-kms.git
cd obsidian-cloud-kms
npm install
npm run build
```
Скопируйте `main.js` и `manifest.json` в `.obsidian/plugins/obsidian-cloud-kms-encryption/`.
### Настройка AWS
1. Создайте KMS-ключ:
```bash
aws kms create-key --key-spec SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT --key-usage ENCRYPT_DECRYPT --region eu-north-1
```
2. Скопируйте ARN ключа (формат: `arn:aws:kms:{region}:{account}:key/{key-id}`)
3. В Obsidian: Settings → Cloud KMS Encryption → вставьте ARN
4. Убедитесь, что credentials доступны:
```bash
aws sts get-caller-identity
```
> **Примечание**: регион извлекается из ARN автоматически — не нужно настраивать `AWS_REGION`.
## Настройки
| Параметр | Описание | По умолчанию |
|----------|----------|--------------|
| AWS KMS Key ARN | ARN ключа для шифрования | — |
| Auto-decrypt blocks | Автоматическая расшифровка при чтении | ✅ |
## Безопасность
Подробный threat model, криптографический дизайн и ограничения описаны в [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).
Ключевые моменты:
- Расшифрованные данные **никогда не записываются на диск** — adapter patch шифрует перед записью
- Бинарные файлы расшифровываются в Blob URL (RAM), не на диск
- DEK обнуляется сразу после использования
- Каждый блок/файл использует уникальный DEK + nonce
- AES-256-GCM с 96-bit nonce и 128-bit auth tag
- Encryption context привязан к vault name + file path + format version
- Все KMS-вызовы логируются в AWS CloudTrail
- LRU-кеш на 20 расшифрованных бинарных файлов (старые вытесняются из памяти)
- Никакой телеметрии, никаких внешних вызовов кроме AWS KMS
- Credentials не хранятся в плагине — используется стандартная AWS credential chain
## Проверка целостности релизов
Каждый релиз криптографически подписан. Вы можете проверить что скачанные артефакты подлинные и не модифицированы:
### Проверка SLSA Provenance
```bash
# Установите GitHub CLI, затем:
gh attestation verify main.js --repo ViktorUJ/obsidian-cloud-kms
```
### Проверка подписи Cosign
```bash
# Установите cosign: https://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/system_config/installation/
# Скачайте main.js и main.js.bundle из релиза, затем:
cosign verify-blob main.js \
--bundle main.js.bundle \
--certificate-identity-regexp "github.com/ViktorUJ/obsidian-cloud-kms" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
```
Если проверка успешна — файл собран в GitHub Actions этого репозитория, не модифицирован после сборки.
### Проверка SBOM
Каждый релиз включает `sbom.spdx.json` — полный список всех зависимостей с версиями и лицензиями. Используйте для:
- Сканирования на известные уязвимости: `grype sbom.spdx.json`
- Проверки лицензий: `trivy sbom sbom.spdx.json`
## On-Disk Format
### Markdown (секретные блоки)
На диске секретные блоки хранятся как:
`````
````ocke-v1
<base64-encoded encrypted data>
````
`````
### Бинарные файлы
Файл целиком заменяется на OCKE бинарный формат:
```
[Magic: "OCKE" 4B][Version: uint16 BE][ProviderIdLen: 1B][ProviderId]
[CmkIdLen: uint16 BE][CmkId][WrappedDekLen: uint16 BE][WrappedDek]
[Nonce: 12B][AuthTag: 16B][CiphertextLen: uint32 BE][Ciphertext]
```
## Сравнение с альтернативами
| Возможность | Cloud KMS Encryption | SOPS | git-crypt | Meld Encrypt | HashiCorp Vault |
|-------------|---------------------|------|-----------|--------------|-----------------|
| Шифрование at rest | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| Без паролей | ✅ (IAM) | ✅ (IAM/PGP) | ✅ (GPG) | ❌ (пароль) | ✅ (токены) |
| Гранулярность на уровне блока | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ (весь файл) | ✅ | N/A |
| Мульти-ключ / мульти-команда | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ |
| Git-safe (шифротекст в репо) | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | N/A |
| Прозрачное редактирование | ✅ | ❌ (CLI) | ✅ | ❌ (модальное окно) | N/A |
| Шифрование бинарных файлов | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | N/A |
| Интеграция с Obsidian | ✅ нативная | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ нативная | ❌ |
| Аудит (CloudTrail) | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
| Внешний аудит / сертификация | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
| HSM-уровень безопасности | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
**Лучшее применение:**
- **Cloud KMS Encryption** — командные базы знаний с IAM-контролем доступа, DevOps-секреты в Obsidian
- **SOPS** — секреты CI/CD в YAML/JSON, GitOps-воркфлоу
- **git-crypt** — шифрование целых файлов в Git-репозиториях
- **Meld Encrypt** — личные заметки с паролем, один пользователь
- **HashiCorp Vault** — секреты продакшен-инфраструктуры, compliance-требования
## Работа с Git
Плагин спроектирован для vault'ов, хранящихся в Git. На диске всегда только шифротекст — безопасно коммитить и пушить.
### Начальная настройка
```bash
# Клонируем vault
git clone git@github.com:your-org/team-vault.git
cd team-vault
# Открываем в Obsidian, настраиваем плагин (ARN ключа)
# Убеждаемся что AWS credentials доступны:
aws sts get-caller-identity
```
### Ежедневный workflow
```bash
# Подтягиваем изменения (на диске — шифротекст)
cd /path/to/vault
git pull
# Открываем Obsidian — плагин расшифровывает блоки прозрачно
# Редактируем заметки как обычно — секретные блоки показывают расшифрованный текст
# Закрываем Obsidian или переключаемся в терминал
# Коммитим и пушим (в Git уходит только шифротекст)
git add -A
git status # проверяем: нет plaintext в diff
git commit -m "update finance Q3 notes"
git push
```
### Проверка что plaintext не утекает в Git
```bash
# Смотрим что реально лежит в файле на диске:
cat notes/budget.md
# Должны видеть: ocke-v1 блок с base64 — НЕ plaintext
# Проверяем diff перед коммитом:
git diff --cached
# Зашифрованные блоки показываются как base64-изменения, не читаемый текст
# Для бинарных файлов:
file attachments/report.pdf
# Должно показать: "data" (не "PDF document") — это зашифрованные байты
```
### Онбординг нового участника команды
```bash
# Новый участник:
# 1. Клонирует vault
git clone git@github.com:your-org/team-vault.git
# 2. Настраивает AWS credentials
aws configure
# или: aws sso login --profile team
# 3. Устанавливает плагин в Obsidian, указывает тот же ARN ключа
# 4. IAM-админ выдаёт kms:Decrypt на нужный ключ(и)
# 5. Открывает vault в Obsidian — блоки, к которым есть доступ, расшифровываются
# Блоки без доступа остаются как зашифрованный base64
```
### Разрешение конфликтов
```bash
# Если Git показывает merge conflict в зашифрованном блоке:
# НЕ пытайтесь мержить base64 вручную — это бинарные данные
# Вариант 1: Принять их или нашу версию
git checkout --theirs notes/budget.md
# или
git checkout --ours notes/budget.md
# Вариант 2: Перешифровать после разрешения в Obsidian
# 1. Принять одну версию
# 2. Открыть в Obsidian, отредактировать расшифрованный контент
# 3. Сохранить — плагин перешифрует с новым DEK
# 4. Закоммитить
```
### Рекомендации для .gitignore
```gitignore
# Obsidian workspace (состояние открытых файлов, не секреты)
.obsidian/workspace.json
.obsidian/workspace-mobile.json
# Данные плагина (содержит ARN ключа — не секрет, но персональное)
.obsidian/plugins/obsidian-cloud-kms-encryption/data.json
# Никогда не игнорируйте эти файлы (это и есть зашифрованный vault):
# !*.md
# !attachments/
```
### Pre-commit hook: защита от утечки plaintext
Если плагин был выключен, credentials истекли, или файл редактировался вне Obsidian — маркеры `%%secret-start%%` могут оказаться на диске незашифрованными. Pre-commit hook предотвращает случайный коммит plaintext в Git:
```bash
# Установить hook
cp tools/pre-commit-hook.sh .git/hooks/pre-commit
chmod +x .git/hooks/pre-commit
```
Что делает:
- При каждом `git commit` проверяет все staged `.md` файлы
- Если в файле найден `%%secret-start%%` — **блокирует коммит**
- Показывает какой файл содержит незашифрованный контент и как исправить
Пример вывода при обнаружении plaintext:
```
ERROR: Plaintext secret block found in staged file: notes/budget.md
The file contains %%secret-start%% markers which means
the encryption plugin did not encrypt before save.
Fix: Open the file in Obsidian with the plugin enabled,
save it, then stage again.
Commit blocked: plaintext secrets detected.
```
> Это страховочная сетка — если всё работает правильно, `%%secret-start%%` никогда не должен появляться на диске (adapter patch шифрует его в `ocke-v1` блок перед записью). Hook ловит edge cases.
## CLI-расшифровка (без Obsidian)
Для disaster recovery, CI/CD пайплайнов или проверки бэкапов — можно расшифровать файлы без Obsidian через CLI.
> **Важно:** Encryption context (`vault-name` и `file-path`) должен совпадать с тем, что использовался при шифровании. Vault name — это имя папки вашего Obsidian vault. File path — путь относительно корня vault (например, `folder/note.md`).
### Вариант 1: Bash + AWS CLI + Python
Без Node.js. Требуется: `aws` CLI, `python3`, `pip install cryptography`.
```bash
# Расшифровать бинарный файл (PDF, изображение)
./tools/ocke-decrypt.sh report.pdf --vault-name my-vault --file-path report.pdf -o decrypted-report.pdf
# Расшифровать markdown-блоки (вывод в stdout)
./tools/ocke-decrypt.sh notes/secret.md --vault-name my-vault --file-path notes/secret.md
# Через переменные окружения
OCKE_VAULT_NAME="my-vault" OCKE_FILE_PATH="notes/secret.md" ./tools/ocke-decrypt.sh notes/secret.md -o decrypted.md
```
### Вариант 2: Node.js CLI
Требуется: Node.js >= 18, `@aws-sdk/client-kms`.
```bash
# Установить зависимости (один раз)
npm install @aws-sdk/client-kms @aws-sdk/credential-provider-ini
# Расшифровать бинарный файл
node tools/ocke-decrypt.mjs report.pdf --vault-name my-vault --file-path report.pdf -o decrypted-report.pdf
# Расшифровать markdown-блоки
node tools/ocke-decrypt.mjs notes/secret.md --vault-name my-vault --file-path notes/secret.md
# Через переменные окружения
OCKE_VAULT_NAME="my-vault" OCKE_FILE_PATH="notes/secret.md" node tools/ocke-decrypt.mjs notes/secret.md -o decrypted.md
```
### Параметры
| Параметр | Описание | Обязательный |
|----------|----------|--------------|
| `<file>` | Путь к зашифрованному файлу | Да |
| `-o <output>` | Записать результат в файл (по умолчанию: stdout) | Нет |
| `--vault-name` | Имя Obsidian vault (имя папки) | Да |
| `--file-path` | Путь файла относительно корня vault (как при шифровании) | Да |
Или через переменные окружения: `OCKE_VAULT_NAME`, `OCKE_FILE_PATH`.
> **Как узнать правильные значения:**
> - `vault-name` — имя папки vault (например, если vault в `/home/user/my-vault/`, имя — `my-vault`)
> - `file-path` — путь относительно корня vault (например, `notes/secret.md`, `attachments/report.pdf`)
### Когда использовать CLI
- **Disaster recovery** — Obsidian недоступен, нужен доступ к зашифрованным данным
- **CI/CD пайплайны** — расшифровка секретов при деплое без GUI
- **Проверка бэкапов** — убедиться что зашифрованные бэкапы валидны
- **Миграция** — массовая расшифровка при переходе с плагина
### Ротация ключей / Миграция (ocke-rekey)
Перешифровка всего vault новым KMS-ключом — для миграции на новый AWS-аккаунт, ротации ключей или смены региона. Перешифровывается только wrapped DEK (быстро), ciphertext не меняется.
```bash
# Установить зависимости
npm install @aws-sdk/client-kms @aws-sdk/credential-provider-ini
# Dry run — посмотреть что изменится
node tools/ocke-rekey.mjs /path/to/vault \
--new-key arn:aws:kms:eu-west-1:NEW_ACCOUNT:key/new-key-id \
--vault-name my-vault \
--dry-run
# Выполнить миграцию
node tools/ocke-rekey.mjs /path/to/vault \
--new-key arn:aws:kms:eu-west-1:NEW_ACCOUNT:key/new-key-id \
--vault-name my-vault
# Мигрировать только блоки, зашифрованные конкретным старым ключом
node tools/ocke-rekey.mjs /path/to/vault \
--new-key arn:aws:kms:eu-west-1:NEW_ACCOUNT:key/new-key-id \
--old-key arn:aws:kms:eu-north-1:OLD_ACCOUNT:key/old-key-id \
--vault-name my-vault
```
**Требования:**
- AWS credentials с `kms:Decrypt` на старом ключе И `kms:Encrypt` на новом
- Оба ключа должны быть доступны одновременно во время миграции
- После миграции обновите настройки плагина с новым ARN ключа
> **Примечание:** На Windows используйте Git Bash или WSL для корректной работы с Unicode-путями.
> Оба инструмента используют те же AWS credentials что и плагин (`~/.aws/credentials`).
> ARN ключа хранится внутри зашифрованных данных — конфигурация ключа не нужна.
## Индикатор статуса KMS
Плагин отображает индикатор состояния соединения в нижней панели Obsidian:
| Индикатор | Значение |
|-----------|----------|
| 🔓 KMS | Соединение OK — шифрование/расшифровка доступны |
| 🔒 KMS ⚠️ | KMS недоступен — секретные блоки НЕ будут зашифрованы при сохранении! |
| ⏳ KMS | Проверка соединения... |
**Поведение:**
- Проверяет доступность KMS при загрузке плагина
- Перепроверяет каждые 5 минут в фоне
- Клик по индикатору — ручная перепроверка
- При наведении — подробный tooltip
**Почему это важно:**
Если KMS недоступен (проблемы с сетью, истёкшие credentials, сбой AWS), плагин не может зашифровать `%%secret-start%%` блоки при сохранении. Файл будет сохранён с plaintext-маркерами. Индикатор статуса даёт мгновенную видимость этого риска — если видите 🔒 ⚠️, не сохраняйте файлы с секретными блоками до восстановления связи.
## Известные ограничения
### Monkey-patching Vault Adapter
Плагин перехватывает `vault.adapter.read()` и `vault.adapter.write()` для обеспечения прозрачного шифрования. Это тот же подход, что использует [gpgCrypt](https://github.com/tejado/obsidian-gpgCrypt) — единственный способ гарантировать zero-plaintext-on-disk без официального encryption API от Obsidian.
**Потенциальные конфликты с другими плагинами:**
- Если другой плагин тоже патчит `adapter.read()` или `adapter.write()`, два патча могут конфликтовать
- Плагин корректно вызывает оригинальный метод после обработки (chaining), но порядок инициализации имеет значение
- При проблемах попробуйте отключить другие плагины, модифицирующие файловый I/O
**Меры защиты:**
- Патч обрабатывает только `.md` файлы для текстового шифрования (бинарные проверяются по magic bytes)
- Файлы без маркеров `%%secret-start%%` или OCKE magic bytes проходят без изменений (нулевой overhead)
- При выгрузке плагина оригинальные методы adapter полностью восстанавливаются
- Патч прозрачен — другие плагины, работающие с незашифрованными файлами, не затрагиваются
**Если обновление Obsidian сломает плагин:**
- Ваши данные в безопасности — файлы остаются зашифрованными на диске в документированном формате OCKE
- Используйте [CLI-инструменты](#cli-расшифровка-без-obsidian) для расшифровки без Obsidian
- Плагин будет обновлён под новые internals Obsidian
## Development
```bash
npm test # Запуск тестов
npm run build # Production build
npm run dev # Dev build (watch)
make ci # Full CI pipeline
```
## Управление доступом к ключу
### Мульти-ключевая архитектура
В организациях разным командам нужен доступ к разным секретам. Плагин поддерживает несколько KMS-ключей, обеспечивая гранулярный контроль доступа:
**Кейс:** Общий vault компании, расшаренный между командами:
- **Финансовый отдел** — доступ к бюджетам, зарплатам, контрактам
- **R&D** — доступ к патентам, исследованиям, техническим секретам
- **CTO** — доступ ко всему (все ключи)
Каждый секретный блок шифруется конкретным ключом. IAM-политики на стороне AWS контролируют, кто может расшифровать что. Разработчик из R&D физически не может расшифровать финансовые данные — даже если у него есть доступ к файлам vault.
**Настройки плагина:**
```json
{
"keys": [
{ "alias": "finance", "arn": "arn:aws:kms:eu-north-1:790660747904:key/aaa-111" },
{ "alias": "rnd", "arn": "arn:aws:kms:eu-north-1:790660747904:key/bbb-222" },
{ "alias": "cto", "arn": "arn:aws:kms:eu-north-1:790660747904:key/ccc-333" }
],
"defaultKeyAlias": "finance"
}
```
**В заметках — указываем алиас ключа в маркере:**
```markdown
%%secret-start:finance%%
Бюджет Q3: $2.4M
Зарплаты: ...
%%secret-end%%
%%secret-start:rnd%%
Патент на новый алгоритм: ...
%%secret-end%%
%%secret-start:cto%%
Root credentials продакшена: ...
%%secret-end%%
```
**Поведение:**
- При шифровании: если настроено несколько ключей — появляется picker для выбора
- При расшифровке: ARN ключа записан внутри зашифрованных данных — плагин использует его автоматически
- Если у пользователя есть IAM-доступ к ключу → блок расшифровывается
- Если нет → блок остаётся зашифрованным (graceful degradation)
- В одной заметке могут быть блоки, зашифрованные разными ключами
**Настройка IAM на стороне AWS:**
- Финансовый отдел → IAM-политика разрешает только `kms:Decrypt` на `key/aaa-111`
- R&D → IAM-политика разрешает только `kms:Decrypt` на `key/bbb-222`
- CTO → IAM-политика разрешает `kms:Decrypt` на все три ключа
### Пользователь из того же AWS-аккаунта
Добавьте IAM-политику пользователю/роли:
```json
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"kms:Decrypt",
"kms:GenerateDataKey",
"kms:DescribeKey"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:kms:eu-north-1:790660747904:key/YOUR-KEY-ID"
}
]
}
```
```bash
aws iam put-user-policy \
--user-name colleague \
--policy-name kms-vault-access \
--policy-document file://policy.json
```
Для read-only доступа (только расшифровка) — уберите `kms:GenerateDataKey`.
### Пользователь из той же AWS Organization (другой аккаунт)
**Шаг 1.** Обновите Key Policy на стороне владельца ключа — разрешите доступ из другого аккаунта:
```json
{
"Sid": "AllowCrossAccountDecrypt",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {
"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:root"
},
"Action": [
"kms:Decrypt",
"kms:GenerateDataKey",
"kms:DescribeKey"
],
"Resource": "*"
}
```
```bash
# Получить текущую политику ключа
aws kms get-key-policy --key-id YOUR-KEY-ID --policy-name default --output text > key-policy.json
# Добавить Statement выше в key-policy.json, затем:
aws kms put-key-policy --key-id YOUR-KEY-ID --policy-name default --policy file://key-policy.json
```
**Шаг 2.** На стороне другого аккаунта (111122223333) — добавьте IAM-политику пользователю:
```json
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"kms:Decrypt",
"kms:GenerateDataKey",
"kms:DescribeKey"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:kms:eu-north-1:790660747904:key/YOUR-KEY-ID"
}
]
}
```
> Оба условия обязательны: Key Policy разрешает аккаунт, IAM Policy разрешает пользователя.
### Пользователь из сторонней организации (внешний AWS-аккаунт)
Аналогично cross-account, но с дополнительными ограничениями через `Condition`:
**Шаг 1.** Key Policy — разрешите конкретного пользователя/роль (не весь аккаунт):
```json
{
"Sid": "AllowExternalPartnerDecrypt",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {
"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::444455556666:user/partner-user"
},
"Action": [
"kms:Decrypt",
"kms:DescribeKey"
],
"Resource": "*",
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"kms:EncryptionContext:vaultName": "shared-vault"
}
}
}
```
> **Рекомендации для внешних партнёров:**
> - Указывайте конкретный Principal (user/role ARN), не `root` аккаунта
> - Давайте только `kms:Decrypt` (без `GenerateDataKey`) — только чтение
> - Используйте `Condition` с `kms:EncryptionContext` для ограничения доступа к конкретному vault
> - Включите CloudTrail для аудита всех обращений к ключу
**Шаг 2.** Партнёр добавляет IAM-политику на своей стороне (как в cross-account выше).
**Шаг 3.** Партнёр настраивает плагин с тем же ARN ключа и получает доступ к расшифровке.
### Проверка доступа
```bash
# От имени пользователя, которому дали доступ:
aws kms describe-key --key-id arn:aws:kms:eu-north-1:790660747904:key/YOUR-KEY-ID
# Если вернёт метаданные ключа — доступ есть
# Если AccessDeniedException — проверьте Key Policy + IAM Policy
```
## Лицензия
[MIT](LICENSE) © Viktar Mikalayeu

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# Reproducible Builds
## Overview
This project supports reproducible builds — you can independently verify that the `main.js` in a GitHub Release was built from the exact source code in the repository, without any tampering.
## Why This Matters
- **Trust:** You don't have to trust the maintainer — verify yourself
- **Supply chain:** Detects if CI was compromised or artifacts were modified post-build
- **Compliance:** Proves artifact provenance for enterprise environments
## How to Verify a Release
### Method 1: Rebuild and Compare Hash
```bash
# 1. Check out the exact commit for the release
git clone https://github.com/ViktorUJ/obsidian-cloud-kms.git
cd obsidian-cloud-kms
git checkout v0.1.1 # replace with release tag
# 2. Build in Docker (deterministic environment)
make docker-release
# 3. Compare hash with the released artifact
sha256sum dist/main.js
# Compare with the hash from the release
# 4. Download the release artifact and compare
gh release download v0.1.1 --pattern "main.js" --dir /tmp/release
sha256sum /tmp/release/main.js
# If hashes match → the release was built from this exact source
```
### Method 2: Use Docker for Exact Reproduction
```bash
# Build using the same Docker image as CI
docker build -t obsidian-cloud-kms-builder .
docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/app -w /app obsidian-cloud-kms-builder make release
# The output in dist/ should be byte-for-byte identical to the release
sha256sum dist/main.js
```
### Method 3: Verify SLSA Provenance (Recommended)
The easiest way — GitHub cryptographically attests that the artifact was built from this repo:
```bash
# Download the release artifact
gh release download v0.1.1 --pattern "main.js" --dir /tmp/verify
# Verify provenance (proves it was built in GitHub Actions from this repo)
gh attestation verify /tmp/verify/main.js --repo ViktorUJ/obsidian-cloud-kms
```
Output on success:
```
✓ Verification succeeded!
Repository: ViktorUJ/obsidian-cloud-kms
Workflow: .github/workflows/ci.yml
```
### Method 4: Verify Cosign Signature
```bash
# Download artifact + signature bundle
gh release download v0.1.1 --pattern "main.js" --pattern "main.js.bundle" --dir /tmp/verify
# Verify signature
cosign verify-blob /tmp/verify/main.js \
--bundle /tmp/verify/main.js.bundle \
--certificate-identity-regexp "github.com/ViktorUJ/obsidian-cloud-kms" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
```
## Build Environment
| Component | Version | Source |
|-----------|---------|--------|
| Node.js | 20.x | `actions/setup-node` in CI |
| npm | Bundled with Node.js | `npm ci` from lockfile |
| esbuild | Pinned in package.json | Deterministic bundler |
| OS | Ubuntu 24.04 | GitHub Actions runner |
| Docker | node:20-alpine | `Dockerfile` in repo |
## Determinism Notes
### What makes builds reproducible
- `npm ci` installs exact versions from `package-lock.json`
- esbuild produces deterministic output for same input
- No timestamps or random values in build output
- Docker provides consistent OS environment
### Known sources of non-determinism
- **Minification:** esbuild minification is deterministic for same version, but different esbuild versions may produce different output
- **Source maps:** Disabled in production builds (`sourcemap: false`)
- **Node.js version:** Minor version differences may affect bundled polyfills
### Mitigation
Pin all build tools to exact versions:
- `esbuild`: exact version in `package.json`
- `Node.js`: exact version in CI workflow
- `npm`: comes with Node.js (deterministic for same Node version)
## CI Build Pipeline
```
Source code (git tag)
│
▼
npm ci (exact deps from lockfile)
│
▼
make release
│
├── typecheck (tsc --noEmit)
├── lint (eslint)
├── test (vitest)
└── build (esbuild production)
│
▼
dist/main.js ← this is the release artifact
│
├── SLSA attestation (signed provenance)
├── Cosign signature (signed blob)
├── SBOM (dependency list)
└── GitHub Release (published)
```
## For Auditors
To verify the complete supply chain:
1. **Source:** Single commit on `main` branch, signed by GitHub
2. **Dependencies:** `package-lock.json` with integrity hashes (SHA-512)
3. **Build:** Deterministic esbuild, reproducible in Docker
4. **Artifact:** SLSA Level 2 provenance + Cosign signature
5. **Distribution:** GitHub Releases (immutable after publish)

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# Security Policy
## Threat Model
### Attacker Model
| Attacker | Capability | Access Level |
|----------|-----------|--------------|
| Cloud storage attacker | Has encrypted blobs only (S3 breach, Git repo leak) | Ciphertext only |
| Credential thief | Has stolen IAM credentials | Can call KMS if IAM allows |
| Local malware | Has filesystem access on user's machine | Can read encrypted files + potentially memory |
| Malicious Obsidian plugin | Has full Obsidian API access (DOM, editor, filesystem) | Can read decrypted content in editor |
| Network attacker (MITM) | Can intercept network traffic | TLS protects KMS calls |
| Physical access (powered off) | Has the device but no running session | Ciphertext only on disk |
| Physical access (powered on) | Has the device with active Obsidian session | Full access to decrypted content |
### Asset Classification
**Fully protected (encrypted at rest):**
- Note body content (inside `%%secret-start%%` blocks)
- Binary file content (PDF, images, audio)
- Data Encryption Keys (wrapped by KMS, zeroed after use)
**Partially protected:**
- File names (visible on disk, not encrypted)
- File timestamps (visible on disk)
- Vault structure / folder names (visible)
- Frontmatter metadata (visible, for Obsidian indexing)
**Not protected by this plugin:**
- AWS credentials (managed by OS/AWS CLI)
- Plugin settings (KMS key ARN — not a secret)
- Obsidian workspace state
### Security Assumptions
```
Assumes:
- Secure WebCrypto API implementation (browser/Electron engine)
- Uncompromised operating system and kernel
- Correct AWS IAM configuration (least privilege)
- TLS integrity for KMS API calls (AWS SDK handles this)
- No malicious Obsidian plugins installed in the same vault
- User does not disable the plugin and save files with secret markers
```
### Threat → Mitigation Matrix
| Threat | Mitigation | Residual Risk |
|--------|-----------|---------------|
| Stolen cloud storage (S3/Git) | Envelope encryption (AES-256-GCM + KMS) | None — ciphertext only |
| Man-in-the-middle | TLS (AWS SDK) + AEAD (GCM auth tag) | None |
| Ciphertext tampering | AES-256-GCM authentication tag | None — tamper detected |
| Key exposure | CMK never leaves AWS KMS HSM | None |
| DEK exposure in memory | Zero-fill after use, no caching | GC copies (JS limitation) |
| Replay / DEK reuse | Fresh random DEK + nonce per operation | None |
| Unauthorized decryption | IAM policies + KMS key policies + CloudTrail | Misconfiguration risk |
| Plugin disabled during save | Pre-commit hook blocks plaintext commits | User must install hook |
| KMS unavailable | Status bar indicator + graceful degradation | Plaintext in editor only (not on disk if plugin active) |
| Malicious plugin reads editor | No mitigation (Obsidian platform limitation) | Accept — documented |
| Memory dump | SecureBuffer zero-fill on release | JS heap copies (accept) |
| Supply chain attack | Pinned deps, SBOM, Scorecard, signed releases | Transitive dep risk remains |
### What this plugin protects against
| Threat | Protection |
|--------|-----------|
| Unauthorized access to vault storage (S3, Git, cloud sync) | ✅ Ciphertext-only on disk |
| Stolen laptop with powered-off device | ✅ Encrypted at rest |
| CloudTrail audit of who accessed secrets | ✅ Every KMS unwrap is logged |
| Accidental commit of secrets to Git | ✅ Only ciphertext in repo |
| Unauthorized KMS access | ✅ IAM policies + key policies |
### What this plugin does NOT protect against
| Threat | Reason |
|--------|--------|
| Malicious Obsidian plugin in same vault | Obsidian has no plugin sandbox — any plugin can read editor memory |
| Memory dump / cold boot attack | Plaintext exists in JS heap during editing session |
| Compromised workstation with active session | Attacker has same access as user |
| Keylogger / screen capture | Out of scope — OS-level threat |
| State-level adversary | Use dedicated HSM + isolated workstation instead |
### Trust Boundaries
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ User's Workstation │
│ │
│ ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Obsidian Process (Electron) │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │
│ │ │ Cloud KMS Plugin (this plugin) │ │ │
│ │ │ - Plaintext in editor buffer (TRUSTED) │ │ │
│ │ │ - DEK in memory briefly (TRUSTED) │ │ │
│ │ │ - Blob URLs for binary files (TRUSTED) │ │ │
│ │ │ - Adapter patch intercepts read/write │ │ │
│ │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │
│ │ │ Other Obsidian Plugins (UNTRUSTED) │ │ │
│ │ │ - Can access: DOM, editor API, filesystem │ │ │
│ │ │ - Can read: decrypted content in editor │ │ │
│ │ │ - Cannot access: KMS credentials directly │ │ │
│ │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ │
│ │ │ │
│ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Local Filesystem (UNTRUSTED for plaintext) │ │
│ │ - Only ciphertext written │ │
│ │ - OCKE binary format / ````ocke-v1 base64 │ │
│ │ - File names and timestamps visible │ │
│ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ OS Credential Store (~/.aws/credentials) │ │
│ │ - Managed by AWS CLI / SSO │ │
│ │ - Plugin reads, never writes │ │
│ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│ │
│ TLS (HTTPS) │ git push (ciphertext)
▼ ▼
┌──────────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────┐
│ AWS KMS (TRUSTED) │ │ Remote Storage (UNTRUSTED) │
│ - CMK in HSM │ │ - S3 / Git / Cloud Sync │
│ - Never exports key material │ │ - Only ciphertext │
│ - All ops in CloudTrail │ │ - No access to plaintext │
│ - IAM + Key Policy │ │ │
└──────────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────────────┘
```
### Cryptographic Flow
```
ENCRYPTION (on file write):
┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│ Plaintext │────▶│ Generate │────▶│ AES-256-GCM │────▶│Ciphertext│
│ (editor) │ │ DEK+Nonce│ │ Encrypt │ │ + AuthTag│
└──────────┘ └────┬─────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│ DEK │────▶│ KMS Encrypt │────▶ Wrapped DEK
│(plaintext)│ │ (wrap) │ (safe to store)
└──────────┘ └──────────────┘
│
▼
Zero-fill DEK
DECRYPTION (on file read):
┌───────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│Wrapped DEK│────▶│ KMS Decrypt │────▶│ DEK │
│(from disk) │ │ (unwrap) │ │(plaintext)│
└───────────┘ └──────────────┘ └────┬─────┘
│
┌──────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ │
│Ciphertext│────▶│ AES-256-GCM │◀──────────┘
│ + AuthTag│ │ Decrypt+Verify│
└──────────┘ └──────┬───────┘
│
▼
┌──────────┐
│ Plaintext │────▶ Editor (memory only)
└──────────┘
│
Zero-fill DEK
```
## Cryptographic Design
### Envelope Encryption
Each secret block or binary file is encrypted with a unique Data Encryption Key (DEK):
1. **GenerateDataKey** → KMS returns plaintext DEK + wrapped DEK
2. **Encrypt** → AES-256-GCM(plaintext, DEK, nonce) → ciphertext + auth tag
3. **Store** → wrapped DEK + nonce + auth tag + ciphertext (DEK is zeroed)
4. **Decrypt** → KMS unwraps DEK → AES-256-GCM decrypt → plaintext (DEK is zeroed)
### Primitives
| Component | Choice | Rationale |
|-----------|--------|-----------|
| Symmetric cipher | AES-256-GCM | AEAD, hardware-accelerated, WebCrypto native |
| Nonce | 96-bit random | crypto.getRandomValues(), unique per encryption |
| Auth tag | 128-bit | GCM default, tamper detection |
| Key wrap | AWS KMS | HSM-backed, auditable, IAM-controlled |
| DEK size | 256-bit | AES-256 key length |
| Key derivation | None (KMS generates DEK directly) | No custom KDF needed |
### What we explicitly avoid
- ❌ Custom cryptographic algorithms
- ❌ CBC mode (no authentication)
- ❌ Deterministic IVs/nonces
- ❌ Hardcoded salts or keys
- ❌ Password-based encryption (PBKDF2, scrypt)
- ❌ Client-side key storage
## Memory Handling
### Secure cleanup
- `SecureBuffer` class: zero-fills buffer on release
- DEK zeroed immediately after encrypt/decrypt operation
- Blob URLs revoked on plugin unload
- LRU cache evicts old decrypted binary files (max 20)
### Known limitations
- JavaScript garbage collector may retain copies of plaintext
- Obsidian undo buffer contains decrypted text
- Electron renderer process holds editor state in memory
- OS swap/pagefile may contain memory pages with plaintext
## Credential Handling
### How credentials are loaded
```
AWS SDK credential chain:
1. ~/.aws/credentials (fromIni)
2. AWS SSO session
3. IAM instance role (EC2/ECS)
4. Environment variables
```
### What is NOT stored by the plugin
- ❌ AWS access keys
- ❌ AWS secret keys
- ❌ Session tokens
- ❌ Any credential material
### What IS stored in plugin settings
- ✅ KMS Key ARN (not a secret — it's a resource identifier)
- ✅ User preferences (auto-decrypt toggle, suffix)
## Logging
- Structured JSON logs via `structured-logger.ts`
- Sanitizer strips sensitive fields before logging
- No plaintext, DEK, or credential values in logs
- Only metadata: provider, file path, payload size, timing
## Supply Chain
- Dependencies pinned in `package-lock.json`
- `npm audit` runs in CI on every push
- Reproducible builds via Docker (`make docker-release`)
- No telemetry, no analytics, no network calls except to AWS KMS
## Reporting Vulnerabilities
If you discover a security vulnerability, please report it privately:
- Email: viktoruj@gmail.com
- Do NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities
- I will respond within 48 hours and work on a fix
## Recommended Usage
### Good fit
- Personal API keys and tokens
- Terraform/infrastructure secrets
- Internal documentation with sensitive data
- Developer secret workflows (similar to SOPS/git-crypt)
- Team knowledge bases with access-controlled secrets
### Consider alternatives for
- Production root credentials → use AWS Secrets Manager / HashiCorp Vault
- Regulated data (HIPAA, PCI-DSS) → use certified solutions with compliance attestation
- State-level adversary threat model → use hardware-backed auth + isolated workstation
## Secure Deployment Recommendations
### Dedicated Vault for Secrets
For maximum security, use a **separate Obsidian vault** for encrypted content:
```
~/vaults/
├── work/ ← General notes, many plugins installed
├── personal/ ← Personal notes
└── secrets/ ← Encrypted vault (minimal plugins)
```
**Why:** Other plugins in the same vault can read decrypted content from the editor. A dedicated vault minimizes this attack surface.
### Minimal Plugin Configuration
In the encrypted vault, install only:
- This plugin (Cloud KMS Encryption)
- Essential plugins you trust (e.g., built-in plugins only)
**Avoid** in the encrypted vault:
- Community plugins with network access
- Plugins that sync content to external services
- Plugins that read/modify file content
- Plugins from unknown/unverified authors
### Workstation Hardening
| Measure | Purpose |
|---------|---------|
| Full-disk encryption (BitLocker/FileVault) | Protects swap/pagefile containing memory pages |
| Screen lock on idle | Prevents physical access to active session |
| Disable swap/pagefile (if RAM allows) | Eliminates plaintext in swap |
| Use AWS SSO with short-lived tokens | Limits credential exposure window |
| Enable MFA on AWS account | Prevents credential theft from granting KMS access |
| Regular `aws sso logout` when done | Invalidates cached session |
### Network Security
| Measure | Purpose |
|---------|---------|
| VPN for KMS access | Ensures connectivity, prevents MITM on corporate networks |
| AWS VPC PrivateLink for KMS | Eliminates internet dependency for KMS calls |
| DNS-over-HTTPS | Prevents DNS-based traffic analysis |
### Monitoring
| What to monitor | How |
|-----------------|-----|
| KMS Decrypt calls | CloudTrail → CloudWatch alarm on unusual patterns |
| Failed KMS auth | CloudTrail → alert on AccessDeniedException |
| New IAM grants on KMS key | AWS Config rule |
| Plugin status indicator | Visual check: 🔓 = OK, 🔒 ⚠️ = problem |
### Incident Response
If you suspect compromise:
1. **Immediately:** `aws sso logout` or rotate IAM credentials
2. **Assess:** Check CloudTrail for unauthorized KMS Decrypt calls
3. **Contain:** Disable KMS key if unauthorized access confirmed (`aws kms disable-key`)
4. **Recover:** Re-enable key after investigation, rotate if needed (`tools/ocke-rekey.mjs`)
5. **Prevent:** Review IAM policies, enable MFA, audit plugin list

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# Security Testing Documentation
## Overview
This document describes the security testing approach for the obsidian-cloud-kms-encryption plugin. It covers what is tested, how, and what remains untested.
## Test Categories
### 1. Unit Tests (357 tests)
Automated tests covering individual components:
| Component | Tests | What's verified |
|-----------|-------|-----------------|
| SecureBuffer | 8 | Zero-fill on release, access-after-release throws, double-release safe |
| BufferRegistry | 6 | Tracking, force-release-all, cleanup on unload |
| WebCrypto (AES-256-GCM) | 12 | Encrypt/decrypt round-trip, auth tag verification, nonce uniqueness |
| CryptoEngine | 15 | Envelope encryption flow, DEK zeroing, error propagation |
| OCKE Parser | 24 | Magic bytes, version check, field validation, truncation detection, trailing bytes |
| OCKE Serializer | 18 | Round-trip, field constraints, big-endian encoding |
| Inline Codec | 12 | Base64 encode/decode, fence detection, whitespace handling |
| AWS KMS Adapter | 14 | Timeout, credential errors, authorization errors, region extraction |
| Provider Dispatcher | 10 | Registration, duplicate rejection, interface validation |
| ARN Validator | 16 | Format validation, edge cases, region extraction |
| Frontmatter Splitter | 18 | YAML detection, body extraction, edge cases |
| Suffix Matcher | 25 | Case-sensitive matching, empty inputs |
| Settings Tab | 9 | Default values, persistence, validation |
| Notices | 6 | Error category display |
| Structured Logger | 8 | JSON output, sanitization |
| Sanitizer | 12 | Sensitive field stripping |
### 2. Fuzz Testing (CI workflow)
Weekly automated fuzzing:
- Random byte sequences fed to OCKE parser (crash detection)
- Property-based tests via fast-check (when property tests exist)
- Ensures no unhandled exceptions on malformed input
### 3. Static Analysis (CodeQL)
Automated SAST on every push:
- SQL injection patterns
- Path traversal
- Hardcoded secrets
- Insecure crypto usage
- Prototype pollution
- Command injection
### 4. Dependency Scanning
- `npm audit` on every CI run (high + critical)
- Dependabot weekly updates
- SBOM generated per release
## Security Properties Verified
| Property | How verified | Status |
|----------|-------------|--------|
| Encrypt/decrypt round-trip | Unit tests + property tests | ✅ |
| Auth tag detects tampering | Unit test (flip byte → error) | ✅ |
| DEK zeroed after use | Unit test (buffer state check) | ✅ |
| No plaintext in serialized output | Unit test (substring search) | ✅ |
| Parser rejects malformed input | Unit tests (24 cases) | ✅ |
| Nonce never reused | Unit test (uniqueness check) | ✅ |
| Credentials not stored | Code review + no localStorage usage | ✅ |
| No sensitive data in logs | Sanitizer unit tests | ✅ |
| Timeout enforcement | Unit test (AbortController) | ✅ |
| Graceful degradation on KMS failure | Unit test (error handling) | ✅ |
## What Is NOT Tested
| Area | Reason | Risk |
|------|--------|------|
| Actual KMS integration | Requires live AWS account | Tested manually |
| Obsidian API compatibility | Requires running Obsidian | Tested manually |
| Memory leak detection | No automated tooling for JS heap | Low (SecureBuffer mitigates) |
| Side-channel attacks | Out of scope for JS runtime | Accept |
| Concurrent access | Obsidian is single-threaded | N/A |
| Cross-plugin interference | Cannot simulate in unit tests | Documented limitation |
## Running Security Tests
```bash
# Full test suite
npm test
# Only security-relevant tests
npx vitest --run tests/unit/core/
npx vitest --run tests/unit/format/
npx vitest --run tests/unit/providers/
# Lint for security patterns
npx eslint src/ --rule '{"no-eval": "error", "no-implied-eval": "error"}'
# Dependency audit
npm audit --audit-level=high
# Type safety (catches many security bugs)
npx tsc --noEmit
```
## Verification Checklist (for reviewers)
- [ ] No `eval()`, `Function()`, or `new Function()` in source
- [ ] No `console.log` with sensitive data in production code
- [ ] No credentials in settings or localStorage
- [ ] All crypto uses WebCrypto API (no custom implementations)
- [ ] DEK buffers zeroed in all code paths (success + error)
- [ ] No plaintext written to any file (adapter patch intercepts)
- [ ] Error messages don't contain plaintext or DEK material
- [ ] All KMS calls have timeout (AbortController)
- [ ] Blob URLs revoked on plugin unload

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import esbuild from "esbuild";
import { readFileSync } from "fs";
const prod = process.argv[2] === "production";
const manifest = JSON.parse(readFileSync("manifest.json", "utf8"));
const context = await esbuild.context({
entryPoints: ["src/main.ts"],
bundle: true,
platform: "node",
external: [
"obsidian",
"electron",
"@codemirror/autocomplete",
"@codemirror/collab",
"@codemirror/commands",
"@codemirror/language",
"@codemirror/lint",
"@codemirror/search",
"@codemirror/state",
"@codemirror/view",
"@lezer/common",
"@lezer/highlight",
"@lezer/lr",
],
format: "cjs",
target: "es2021",
logLevel: "info",
sourcemap: prod ? false : "inline",
treeShaking: true,
outfile: "main.js",
minify: prod,
define: {
"process.env.NODE_ENV": prod ? '"production"' : '"development"',
},
});
if (prod) {
await context.rebuild();
await context.dispose();
} else {
await context.watch();
}

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import tseslint from 'typescript-eslint';
export default tseslint.config(
{
ignores: ['main.js', 'dist/', 'node_modules/', 'coverage/', 'esbuild.config.mjs'],
},
...tseslint.configs.recommended,
{
files: ['src/**/*.ts', 'tests/**/*.ts'],
rules: {
'@typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars': ['error', { argsIgnorePattern: '^_' }],
'@typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any': 'off',
'@typescript-eslint/explicit-function-return-type': 'off',
'no-console': 'off',
},
},
{
files: ['tests/**/*.ts'],
rules: {
'@typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any': 'off',
'@typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars': 'off',
'@typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-function-type': 'off',
'@typescript-eslint/no-require-imports': 'off',
},
}
);

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{
"id": "cloud-kms-encryption",
"name": "Cloud KMS Encryption",
"version": "0.1.0",
"minAppVersion": "1.4.0",
"description": "Transparent encryption of secret blocks and binary files using AWS KMS. Zero plaintext on disk.",
"author": "Viktar Mikalayeu",
"authorUrl": "https://www.linkedin.com/in/viktar-mikalayeu-mns/",
"isDesktopOnly": true
}

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{
"name": "cloud-kms-encryption",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "Obsidian plugin for file-level envelope encryption using Cloud KMS services",
"main": "main.js",
"scripts": {
"dev": "node esbuild.config.mjs",
"build": "node esbuild.config.mjs production",
"test": "vitest --run",
"test:watch": "vitest",
"test:property": "vitest --run tests/property"
},
"keywords": [
"obsidian",
"encryption",
"kms",
"aws",
"envelope-encryption"
],
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@aws-sdk/client-kms": "3.1045.0",
"@aws-sdk/credential-provider-ini": "3.972.38"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@types/node": "22.15.18",
"esbuild": "0.25.4",
"eslint": "^10.3.0",
"fast-check": "4.7.0",
"obsidian": "1.12.3",
"typescript": "5.8.3",
"typescript-eslint": "^8.59.2",
"vitest": "3.2.1"
}
}

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/**
* Command: "Decrypt current file with AWS KMS"
*
* Permanently decrypts a binary file — replaces OCKE encrypted content
* with the original plaintext bytes on disk.
*
* After this, the file is no longer encrypted.
*/
import { Notice, Plugin } from 'obsidian';
import type { CryptoEngine, EncryptionContext, PluginSettings } from '../types';
import { FORMAT_VERSION, KMS_FILE_TIMEOUT_MS, NOTICE_DURATION_MS } from '../constants';
import { isMagicMatch, parse } from '../format/parser';
import { markFileDecrypted } from '../ui/file-explorer-badge';
export function registerDecryptFileCommand(
plugin: Plugin,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
getSettings: () => PluginSettings,
getOriginalReadBinary: () => ((path: string) => Promise<ArrayBuffer>) | undefined
): void {
plugin.addCommand({
id: 'decrypt-current-file-aws-kms',
name: 'Decrypt current file with AWS KMS (permanent)',
callback: () => {
executeDecryptFile(plugin, cryptoEngine, getSettings, getOriginalReadBinary).catch(() => {});
},
});
}
async function executeDecryptFile(
plugin: Plugin,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
_getSettings: () => PluginSettings,
getOriginalReadBinary: () => ((path: string) => Promise<ArrayBuffer>) | undefined
): Promise<void> {
const file = plugin.app.workspace.getActiveFile();
if (!file) {
new Notice('No active file', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
return;
}
if (file.extension === 'md') {
new Notice('For markdown files, use "Unwrap secret block" command.', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
return;
}
try {
// Read raw binary bypassing our decrypt patch
const originalRead = getOriginalReadBinary();
if (!originalRead) {
new Notice('Plugin not fully initialized', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
return;
}
const contentBuffer = await originalRead(file.path);
const contentBytes = new Uint8Array(contentBuffer);
// Check if actually encrypted
if (!isMagicMatch(contentBytes)) {
new Notice('File is not encrypted', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
return;
}
// Parse and decrypt
const record = parse(contentBytes);
const context: EncryptionContext = {
vaultName: plugin.app.vault.getName(),
filePath: file.path,
formatVersion: FORMAT_VERSION,
};
const plaintextBytes = await withTimeout(
cryptoEngine.decrypt(record, context),
KMS_FILE_TIMEOUT_MS
);
// Write decrypted content back
await plugin.app.vault.adapter.writeBinary(file.path, plaintextBytes);
markFileDecrypted(file.path);
new Notice(`Decrypted: ${file.name}`, NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
} catch (err) {
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'File decryption failed';
new Notice(`Decryption error: ${message}`, NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
}
}
function withTimeout<T>(promise: Promise<T>, timeoutMs: number): Promise<T> {
return new Promise<T>((resolve, reject) => {
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
reject(new Error(`KMS operation timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`));
}, timeoutMs);
promise.then(
(value) => { clearTimeout(timer); resolve(value); },
(err) => { clearTimeout(timer); reject(err); }
);
});
}

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/**
* Command: "Unwrap secret block"
*
* Removes the ```secret wrapper from the selected text,
* leaving just the plaintext content.
*
* Since the adapter patch handles transparent decryption,
* this command is for manually removing the secret block markers.
*/
import { Notice, Plugin } from 'obsidian';
import type { CryptoEngine, PluginSettings } from '../types';
import { NOTICE_DURATION_MS } from '../constants';
const SECRET_BLOCK_REGEX = /^%%secret-start%%\n([\s\S]*?)\n%%secret-end%%$/;
/**
* Register the "Unwrap secret block" command.
*/
export function registerDecryptSelectionCommand(
plugin: Plugin,
_cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
_getSettings: () => PluginSettings
): void {
plugin.addCommand({
id: 'decrypt-selection-aws-kms',
name: 'Unwrap secret block',
editorCallback: (editor) => {
const selection = editor.getSelection();
if (!selection || selection.length === 0) {
new Notice('No text selected', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
return;
}
const match = SECRET_BLOCK_REGEX.exec(selection.trim());
if (!match) {
new Notice('Selection is not a %%secret-start%%...%%secret-end%% block', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
return;
}
// Replace selection with just the inner content
editor.replaceSelection(match[1]);
},
});
}

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/**
* Command: "Encrypt current file with AWS KMS"
*
* Encrypts the currently active binary file (pdf, png, mp3, etc.) in place.
* If multiple keys are configured, shows a picker to choose which key to use.
* The file name does NOT change. The content is replaced with OCKE binary format.
*/
import { Notice, Plugin, FuzzySuggestModal } from 'obsidian';
import type { CryptoEngine, EncryptionContext, PluginSettings } from '../types';
import { FORMAT_VERSION, KMS_FILE_TIMEOUT_MS, NOTICE_DURATION_MS } from '../constants';
import { serialize } from '../format/serializer';
import { isMagicMatch } from '../format/parser';
import { markFileEncrypted } from '../ui/file-explorer-badge';
import { getKeyAliases, resolveKeyArn } from '../utils/key-resolver';
export function registerEncryptFileCommand(
plugin: Plugin,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
getSettings: () => PluginSettings,
getOriginalReadBinary: () => ((path: string) => Promise<ArrayBuffer>) | undefined
): void {
plugin.addCommand({
id: 'encrypt-current-file-aws-kms',
name: 'Encrypt current file with AWS KMS',
callback: () => {
executeEncryptFile(plugin, cryptoEngine, getSettings, getOriginalReadBinary).catch(() => {});
},
});
}
async function executeEncryptFile(
plugin: Plugin,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
getSettings: () => PluginSettings,
getOriginalReadBinary: () => ((path: string) => Promise<ArrayBuffer>) | undefined
): Promise<void> {
const file = plugin.app.workspace.getActiveFile();
if (!file) {
new Notice('No active file', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
return;
}
if (file.extension === 'md') {
new Notice(
'For markdown files, use %%secret-start%% / %%secret-end%% blocks.\nThis command is for binary files (PDF, images, etc.).',
NOTICE_DURATION_MS
);
return;
}
// Read raw binary bypassing our decrypt patch
const originalRead = getOriginalReadBinary();
if (!originalRead) {
new Notice('Plugin not fully initialized', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
return;
}
const contentBuffer = await originalRead(file.path);
const contentBytes = new Uint8Array(contentBuffer);
if (isMagicMatch(contentBytes)) {
new Notice('File is already encrypted', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
return;
}
const settings = getSettings();
const aliases = getKeyAliases(settings);
if (aliases.length === 0) {
new Notice('Configure at least one AWS KMS Key in plugin settings.', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
return;
}
if (aliases.length === 1) {
// Single key — encrypt directly
const arn = resolveKeyArn(aliases[0] === 'default' ? undefined : aliases[0], settings);
if (!arn) {
new Notice('No valid key ARN configured.', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
return;
}
await doEncrypt(plugin, cryptoEngine, file.path, contentBytes, arn);
} else {
// Multiple keys — show picker
new KeyPickerModal(plugin.app, aliases, async (chosen) => {
const arn = resolveKeyArn(chosen, settings);
if (!arn) {
new Notice(`Key "${chosen}" has no valid ARN.`, NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
return;
}
await doEncrypt(plugin, cryptoEngine, file.path, contentBytes, arn);
}).open();
}
}
async function doEncrypt(
plugin: Plugin,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
filePath: string,
contentBytes: Uint8Array,
cmkArn: string
): Promise<void> {
try {
const context: EncryptionContext = {
vaultName: plugin.app.vault.getName(),
filePath,
formatVersion: FORMAT_VERSION,
};
const record = await withTimeout(
cryptoEngine.encrypt(contentBytes, cmkArn, 'aws-kms', context),
KMS_FILE_TIMEOUT_MS
);
const encryptedBinary = serialize(record);
await plugin.app.vault.adapter.writeBinary(filePath, encryptedBinary);
markFileEncrypted(filePath);
const fileName = filePath.split('/').pop() ?? filePath;
new Notice(`Encrypted: ${fileName}`, NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
} catch (err) {
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'File encryption failed';
new Notice(`Encryption error: ${message}`, NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
}
}
function withTimeout<T>(promise: Promise<T>, timeoutMs: number): Promise<T> {
return new Promise<T>((resolve, reject) => {
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
reject(new Error(`KMS operation timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`));
}, timeoutMs);
promise.then(
(value) => { clearTimeout(timer); resolve(value); },
(err) => { clearTimeout(timer); reject(err); }
);
});
}
class KeyPickerModal extends FuzzySuggestModal<string> {
private readonly aliases: string[];
private readonly onChoose: (alias: string) => void;
constructor(app: any, aliases: string[], onChoose: (alias: string) => void) {
super(app);
this.aliases = aliases;
this.onChoose = onChoose;
this.setPlaceholder('Choose encryption key...');
}
getItems(): string[] {
return this.aliases;
}
getItemText(item: string): string {
return item;
}
onChooseItem(item: string): void {
this.onChoose(item);
}
}

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/**
* Command: "Wrap selection in secret block"
*
* Wraps the current editor selection in %%secret-start%% / %%secret-end%% markers.
* If multiple keys are configured, shows a picker to choose which key alias to use.
* The actual encryption happens transparently via the adapter patch on save.
*/
import { Notice, Plugin, MarkdownView, FuzzySuggestModal } from 'obsidian';
import type { CryptoEngine, PluginSettings } from '../types';
import { MAX_SELECTION_CHARS, NOTICE_DURATION_MS } from '../constants';
import { getKeyAliases } from '../utils/key-resolver';
export function registerEncryptSelectionCommand(
plugin: Plugin,
_cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
getSettings: () => PluginSettings
): void {
plugin.addCommand({
id: 'encrypt-selection-aws-kms',
name: 'Wrap selection in secret block',
editorCheckCallback: (checking) => {
const markdownView = plugin.app.workspace.getActiveViewOfType(MarkdownView);
if (!markdownView) return false;
if (checking) return true;
executeWrapSelection(plugin, getSettings);
return true;
},
});
}
function executeWrapSelection(plugin: Plugin, getSettings: () => PluginSettings): void {
const markdownView = plugin.app.workspace.getActiveViewOfType(MarkdownView);
if (!markdownView) {
new Notice('No active editor', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
return;
}
const editor = markdownView.editor;
const selection = editor.getSelection();
if (!selection || selection.length === 0) {
new Notice('No text selected. Select text to wrap in secret block.', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
return;
}
if (selection.length > MAX_SELECTION_CHARS) {
new Notice(
`Selection too large: ${selection.length} characters exceeds maximum of ${MAX_SELECTION_CHARS}.`,
NOTICE_DURATION_MS
);
return;
}
const settings = getSettings();
const aliases = getKeyAliases(settings);
if (aliases.length <= 1) {
// Single key or no keys — wrap with alias if available
const alias = aliases.length === 1 && aliases[0] !== 'default' ? aliases[0] : undefined;
wrapWithAlias(editor, selection, alias);
} else {
// Multiple keys — show picker
new KeyPickerModal(plugin.app, aliases, (chosen) => {
wrapWithAlias(editor, selection, chosen);
}).open();
}
}
function wrapWithAlias(editor: any, selection: string, alias: string | undefined): void {
const startMarker = alias ? `%%secret-start:${alias}%%` : '%%secret-start%%';
const secretBlock = `${startMarker}\n${selection}\n%%secret-end%%`;
editor.replaceSelection(secretBlock);
}
/**
* Fuzzy suggest modal for picking a key alias.
*/
class KeyPickerModal extends FuzzySuggestModal<string> {
private readonly aliases: string[];
private readonly onChoose: (alias: string) => void;
constructor(app: any, aliases: string[], onChoose: (alias: string) => void) {
super(app);
this.aliases = aliases;
this.onChoose = onChoose;
this.setPlaceholder('Choose encryption key...');
}
getItems(): string[] {
return this.aliases;
}
getItemText(item: string): string {
return item;
}
onChooseItem(item: string): void {
this.onChoose(item);
}
}

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/**
* Shared constants for the obsidian-cloud-kms-encryption plugin.
*/
/** Magic bytes identifying an OCKE encrypted file: "OCKE" in ASCII */
export const MAGIC_BYTES = new Uint8Array([0x4F, 0x43, 0x4B, 0x45]);
/** Current on-disk format version */
export const FORMAT_VERSION = 1;
/** Maximum length of the provider ID field (bytes/chars) */
export const PROVIDER_ID_MAX_LEN = 32;
/** Maximum length of the CMK ID field (bytes) */
export const CMK_ID_MAX_LEN = 2048;
/** Maximum length of the wrapped DEK field (bytes) */
export const WRAPPED_DEK_MAX_LEN = 1024;
/** Fixed nonce length for AES-256-GCM (bytes) */
export const NONCE_LEN = 12;
/** Fixed authentication tag length for AES-256-GCM (bytes) */
export const AUTH_TAG_LEN = 16;
/** Maximum ciphertext length: 64 MiB */
export const CIPHERTEXT_MAX_LEN = 67_108_864;
/** Default timeout for KMS API calls (ms) */
export const KMS_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
/** Timeout for file-level encryption KMS calls (ms) */
export const KMS_FILE_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
/** Duration for Obsidian notice display (ms) */
export const NOTICE_DURATION_MS = 5_000;
/** Maximum selection size for manual encrypt/decrypt commands (chars) */
export const MAX_SELECTION_CHARS = 1_048_576;
/** Maximum attachment file size for decryption (bytes): 50 MB */
export const MAX_ATTACHMENT_SIZE = 52_428_800;
/** Default suffix for encrypted notes */
export const ENCRYPTED_NOTE_SUFFIX_DEFAULT = ".secret.md";
/** Maximum length of the encrypted note suffix setting (chars) */
export const ENCRYPTED_NOTE_SUFFIX_MAX_LEN = 64;

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/**
* BufferRegistry — tracks all active SecureBuffer instances for lifecycle management.
*
* On plugin unload or application quit, `releaseAll()` force-releases every
* registered buffer, ensuring no plaintext or DEK material lingers in memory.
*
* Buffers are automatically removed from the registry when released individually.
*/
import { SecureBuffer } from './secure-buffer';
export class BufferRegistry {
private readonly _buffers: Set<SecureBuffer> = new Set();
/**
* Register a SecureBuffer for lifecycle tracking.
* Returns the same buffer for chaining convenience.
*/
register(buffer: SecureBuffer): SecureBuffer {
if (!buffer.isReleased) {
this._buffers.add(buffer);
}
return buffer;
}
/**
* Unregister a buffer (called after individual release).
*/
unregister(buffer: SecureBuffer): void {
this._buffers.delete(buffer);
}
/**
* Force-release all registered buffers.
* Called on plugin unload / app quit to ensure zero cleartext in memory.
*/
releaseAll(): void {
for (const buffer of this._buffers) {
if (!buffer.isReleased) {
buffer.release();
}
}
this._buffers.clear();
}
/**
* Number of currently tracked (unreleased) buffers.
*/
get size(): number {
return this._buffers.size;
}
/**
* Create a new SecureBuffer, register it, and return it.
* Convenience method combining allocation and registration.
*/
create(data: Uint8Array): SecureBuffer {
const buffer = SecureBuffer.from(data);
this.register(buffer);
return buffer;
}
}

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/**
* CryptoEngine — orchestrates envelope encryption.
*
* Encrypt flow:
* 1. Get adapter from dispatcher by providerId
* 2. Call adapter.generateDataKey(cmkId, context) → plaintextDek + wrappedDek
* 3. Generate nonce via generateNonce()
* 4. AES-256-GCM encrypt plaintext → ciphertext + authTag
* 5. Zero plaintextDek immediately after encryption
* 6. Return EncryptedFileRecord with MAGIC_BYTES, FORMAT_VERSION, etc.
* 7. On any error: zero plaintextDek (if generated), re-throw
*
* Decrypt flow:
* 1. Get adapter from dispatcher by record.providerId
* 2. Call adapter.unwrapDek(wrappedDek, cmkId, context) → plaintextDek
* 3. AES-256-GCM decrypt ciphertext using nonce + authTag → plaintext
* 4. Zero plaintextDek immediately after decryption
* 5. Return plaintext
* 6. On any error: zero plaintextDek (if unwrapped), re-throw
*/
import type {
CryptoEngine,
EncryptedFileRecord,
EncryptionContext,
ProviderDispatcher,
} from '../types';
import { MAGIC_BYTES, FORMAT_VERSION } from '../constants';
import { generateNonce, aesGcmEncrypt, aesGcmDecrypt } from './webcrypto';
/**
* Zero-fill a Uint8Array in place.
* Uses random fill then zero fill to defeat dead-store elimination.
*/
function zeroDek(dek: Uint8Array): void {
crypto.getRandomValues(dek);
dek.fill(0);
}
/**
* Implementation of the CryptoEngine interface.
* Orchestrates DEK generation, AES-256-GCM encrypt/decrypt,
* and provider dispatch for wrap/unwrap operations.
*/
export class CryptoEngineImpl implements CryptoEngine {
constructor(private readonly dispatcher: ProviderDispatcher) {}
/**
* Encrypt plaintext using envelope encryption.
*
* Generates a DEK via the provider adapter, encrypts locally with AES-256-GCM,
* and returns a complete EncryptedFileRecord ready for serialization.
*
* The DEK is always zeroed after use, whether the operation succeeds or fails.
*/
async encrypt(
plaintext: Uint8Array,
cmkId: string,
providerId: string,
context: EncryptionContext
): Promise<EncryptedFileRecord> {
let plaintextDek: Uint8Array | null = null;
try {
// 1. Get adapter from dispatcher
const adapter = this.dispatcher.getAdapter(providerId);
// 2. Generate DEK via provider (returns plaintext + wrapped forms)
const dataKeyResult = await adapter.generateDataKey(cmkId, context);
plaintextDek = dataKeyResult.plaintextDek;
const wrappedDek = dataKeyResult.wrappedDek;
// 3. Generate nonce
const nonce = generateNonce();
// 4. AES-256-GCM encrypt
const { ciphertext, authTag } = await aesGcmEncrypt(
plaintextDek,
nonce,
plaintext
);
// 5. Zero DEK immediately after encryption
zeroDek(plaintextDek);
plaintextDek = null;
// 6. Return EncryptedFileRecord
return {
magic: new Uint8Array(MAGIC_BYTES),
version: FORMAT_VERSION,
providerId,
cmkId,
wrappedDek,
nonce,
authTag,
ciphertext,
};
} catch (err) {
// 7. On any error: zero DEK if generated, re-throw
if (plaintextDek) {
zeroDek(plaintextDek);
}
throw err;
}
}
/**
* Decrypt an EncryptedFileRecord back to plaintext.
*
* Unwraps the DEK via the provider adapter, decrypts locally with AES-256-GCM,
* and verifies the authentication tag.
*
* The DEK is always zeroed after use, whether the operation succeeds or fails.
*/
async decrypt(
record: EncryptedFileRecord,
context: EncryptionContext
): Promise<Uint8Array> {
let plaintextDek: Uint8Array | null = null;
try {
// 1. Get adapter from dispatcher
const adapter = this.dispatcher.getAdapter(record.providerId);
// 2. Unwrap DEK via provider
plaintextDek = await adapter.unwrapDek(
record.wrappedDek,
record.cmkId,
context
);
// 3. AES-256-GCM decrypt (auth tag verification happens inside)
const plaintext = await aesGcmDecrypt(
plaintextDek,
record.nonce,
record.ciphertext,
record.authTag
);
// 4. Zero DEK immediately after decryption
zeroDek(plaintextDek);
plaintextDek = null;
// 5. Return plaintext
return plaintext;
} catch (err) {
// 6. On any error: zero DEK if unwrapped, re-throw
if (plaintextDek) {
zeroDek(plaintextDek);
}
throw err;
}
}
}

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/**
* SecureBuffer — wraps a Uint8Array with guaranteed zero-fill on release.
*
* Prevents plaintext and DEK material from lingering in GC-managed memory.
* After release(), accessing `bytes` throws to prevent use-after-free.
*
* Zero-fill uses a two-pass pattern (random fill then zero fill) to defeat
* compiler optimizations that might elide a simple zero-fill of a buffer
* that is never read again.
*/
import type { SecureBuffer as ISecureBuffer } from '../types';
export class SecureBuffer implements ISecureBuffer {
private _buffer: Uint8Array;
private _released = false;
/**
* Create a SecureBuffer wrapping the given data.
* The caller should not retain a reference to the input array.
*/
constructor(data: Uint8Array) {
// Copy the data into our own buffer to avoid shared references
this._buffer = new Uint8Array(data.length);
this._buffer.set(data);
}
/**
* Access the underlying bytes.
* @throws Error if the buffer has been released.
*/
get bytes(): Uint8Array {
if (this._released) {
throw new Error('SecureBuffer: access after release');
}
return this._buffer;
}
/**
* Length of the buffer in bytes.
* @throws Error if the buffer has been released.
*/
get length(): number {
if (this._released) {
throw new Error('SecureBuffer: access after release');
}
return this._buffer.length;
}
/** Whether the buffer has been released. */
get isReleased(): boolean {
return this._released;
}
/**
* Zero-fill the buffer and mark as released.
*
* Uses a two-pass wipe: first fills with random bytes (to prevent the
* compiler from optimizing away a "dead store" of zeros), then fills
* with zeros. This ensures the sensitive data is actually overwritten.
*
* Calling release() on an already-released buffer is a no-op.
*/
release(): void {
if (this._released) {
return;
}
// Pass 1: fill with random bytes to defeat dead-store elimination
crypto.getRandomValues(this._buffer);
// Pass 2: zero-fill
this._buffer.fill(0);
this._released = true;
}
/**
* Create a SecureBuffer from raw bytes.
* Convenience factory that also zeroes the source array after copying.
*/
static from(data: Uint8Array): SecureBuffer {
const buf = new SecureBuffer(data);
// Zero the source to avoid leaving a copy in the caller's memory
crypto.getRandomValues(data);
data.fill(0);
return buf;
}
/**
* Allocate a new SecureBuffer of the given size, filled with zeros.
*/
static alloc(size: number): SecureBuffer {
return new SecureBuffer(new Uint8Array(size));
}
}

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/**
* WebCrypto wrapper for AES-256-GCM operations.
* All operations work on Uint8Array — no string intermediates.
*/
import { PluginError } from '../providers/errors';
/** AES-GCM authentication tag length in bits */
const TAG_LENGTH_BITS = 128;
/** AES-GCM authentication tag length in bytes */
const TAG_LENGTH_BYTES = 16;
/** DEK length in bytes (256-bit) */
const DEK_LENGTH_BYTES = 32;
/** Nonce length in bytes (96-bit) */
const NONCE_LENGTH_BYTES = 12;
/**
* Result of an AES-GCM encryption operation.
*/
export interface AesGcmEncryptResult {
/** Encrypted payload (without auth tag) */
ciphertext: Uint8Array;
/** 128-bit authentication tag */
authTag: Uint8Array;
}
/**
* Generate a fresh 256-bit (32-byte) Data Encryption Key using
* a cryptographically secure random source.
*/
export function generateDek(): Uint8Array {
try {
const dek = new Uint8Array(DEK_LENGTH_BYTES);
crypto.getRandomValues(dek);
return dek;
} catch (err) {
throw new PluginError(
'Failed to generate DEK',
'crypto',
undefined,
undefined,
undefined,
err instanceof Error ? err : undefined
);
}
}
/**
* Generate a fresh 96-bit (12-byte) nonce using
* a cryptographically secure random source.
*/
export function generateNonce(): Uint8Array {
try {
const nonce = new Uint8Array(NONCE_LENGTH_BYTES);
crypto.getRandomValues(nonce);
return nonce;
} catch (err) {
throw new PluginError(
'Failed to generate nonce',
'crypto',
undefined,
undefined,
undefined,
err instanceof Error ? err : undefined
);
}
}
/**
* Encrypt plaintext using AES-256-GCM.
*
* @param key - 32-byte AES-256 key
* @param nonce - 12-byte nonce/IV
* @param plaintext - Data to encrypt
* @returns Ciphertext and 16-byte authentication tag
*/
export async function aesGcmEncrypt(
key: Uint8Array,
nonce: Uint8Array,
plaintext: Uint8Array
): Promise<AesGcmEncryptResult> {
try {
const cryptoKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
'raw',
key,
{ name: 'AES-GCM' },
false,
['encrypt']
);
const result = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(
{
name: 'AES-GCM',
iv: nonce,
tagLength: TAG_LENGTH_BITS,
},
cryptoKey,
plaintext
);
// WebCrypto returns ciphertext + authTag concatenated
const resultBytes = new Uint8Array(result);
const ciphertext = resultBytes.slice(0, resultBytes.length - TAG_LENGTH_BYTES);
const authTag = resultBytes.slice(resultBytes.length - TAG_LENGTH_BYTES);
return { ciphertext, authTag };
} catch (err) {
throw new PluginError(
'AES-GCM encryption failed',
'crypto',
undefined,
undefined,
undefined,
err instanceof Error ? err : undefined
);
}
}
/**
* Decrypt ciphertext using AES-256-GCM.
*
* @param key - 32-byte AES-256 key
* @param nonce - 12-byte nonce/IV used during encryption
* @param ciphertext - Encrypted data (without auth tag)
* @param authTag - 16-byte authentication tag
* @returns Decrypted plaintext
* @throws PluginError with category 'crypto' on any failure (including auth tag mismatch)
*/
export async function aesGcmDecrypt(
key: Uint8Array,
nonce: Uint8Array,
ciphertext: Uint8Array,
authTag: Uint8Array
): Promise<Uint8Array> {
try {
const cryptoKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
'raw',
key,
{ name: 'AES-GCM' },
false,
['decrypt']
);
// WebCrypto expects ciphertext + authTag concatenated for decryption
const combined = new Uint8Array(ciphertext.length + authTag.length);
combined.set(ciphertext, 0);
combined.set(authTag, ciphertext.length);
const result = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(
{
name: 'AES-GCM',
iv: nonce,
tagLength: TAG_LENGTH_BITS,
},
cryptoKey,
combined
);
return new Uint8Array(result);
} catch (err) {
throw new PluginError(
'AES-GCM decryption failed',
'crypto',
undefined,
undefined,
undefined,
err instanceof Error ? err : undefined
);
}
}

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/**
* Inline codec for Phase 1 manual commands.
*
* Encodes binary On-Disk Format data as base64 inside a fenced Markdown block:
*
* ```ocke-v1
* <base64-encoded binary On-Disk Format>
* ```
*
* And decodes it back to binary.
*/
import { PluginError } from '../providers/errors';
/** Opening fence marker for an inline encrypted block */
const FENCE_OPEN = '```ocke-v1\n';
/** Closing fence marker for an inline encrypted block */
const FENCE_CLOSE = '\n```';
/**
* Regex to find the first ocke-v1 fenced block in text.
* Matches: ```ocke-v1\n<content>\n```
* Uses non-greedy match for content to find the first closing fence.
*/
const INLINE_BLOCK_REGEX = /```ocke-v1\n([\s\S]*?)\n```/;
/**
* Encode binary data into a base64 inline fenced block.
*
* @param binaryData - The binary On-Disk Format bytes to encode
* @returns A string containing the fenced block with base64-encoded content
*/
export function encodeInlineBlock(binaryData: Uint8Array): string {
const base64 = uint8ArrayToBase64(binaryData);
return `${FENCE_OPEN}${base64}${FENCE_CLOSE}`;
}
/**
* Decode an inline fenced block back to binary data.
*
* Detects the `ocke-v1` fence markers in the provided text, extracts the
* base64 content, and decodes it to a Uint8Array.
*
* @param text - Text that should contain an ocke-v1 fenced block
* @returns The decoded binary data, or null if no valid block is found
* @throws PluginError with category 'format' if base64 content is malformed
*/
export function decodeInlineBlock(text: string): Uint8Array | null {
const match = INLINE_BLOCK_REGEX.exec(text);
if (!match) {
return null;
}
const base64Content = match[1].trim().replace(/\s/g, '');
if (base64Content.length === 0) {
return null;
}
return base64ToUint8Array(base64Content);
}
/**
* Find the first ocke-v1 fenced block in a larger text.
*
* @param text - The text to search for an inline block
* @returns The position and raw content of the block, or null if not found
*/
export function findInlineBlock(
text: string
): { start: number; end: number; content: string } | null {
const match = INLINE_BLOCK_REGEX.exec(text);
if (!match) {
return null;
}
const start = match.index;
const end = start + match[0].length;
const content = match[1];
return { start, end, content };
}
/**
* Convert a Uint8Array to a base64 string using Buffer (Node.js).
*/
function uint8ArrayToBase64(data: Uint8Array): string {
return Buffer.from(data).toString('base64');
}
/**
* Convert a base64 string to a Uint8Array using Buffer (Node.js).
*
* @throws PluginError with category 'format' if the base64 string is malformed
*/
function base64ToUint8Array(base64: string): Uint8Array {
// Validate base64 characters before decoding
if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9+/]*={0,2}$/.test(base64)) {
throw new PluginError(
'Malformed base64 content in ocke-v1 block',
'format'
);
}
const buffer = Buffer.from(base64, 'base64');
// Buffer.from with 'base64' silently ignores invalid chars and may produce
// an empty buffer for completely invalid input. Check for that case.
if (buffer.length === 0 && base64.length > 0) {
throw new PluginError(
'Malformed base64 content in ocke-v1 block',
'format'
);
}
return new Uint8Array(buffer);
}

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/**
* On-Disk Format parser.
* Decodes a Uint8Array into an EncryptedFileRecord following the binary layout:
*
* Offset Size Field
* 0 4 bytes Magic (0x4F 0x43 0x4B 0x45 "OCKE")
* 4 2 bytes Version (uint16 BE)
* 6 1 byte ProviderIdLen
* 7 N bytes ProviderId (ASCII)
* 7+N 2 bytes CmkIdLen (uint16 BE)
* 9+N M bytes CmkId (UTF-8)
* 9+N+M 2 bytes WrappedDekLen (uint16 BE)
* 11+N+M W bytes WrappedDek
* 11+N+M+W 12 bytes Nonce
* 23+N+M+W 16 bytes AuthTag
* 39+N+M+W 4 bytes CiphertextLen (uint32 BE)
* 43+N+M+W C bytes Ciphertext
*
* All multi-byte integers are big-endian.
*/
import type { EncryptedFileRecord } from '../types';
import {
MAGIC_BYTES,
FORMAT_VERSION,
PROVIDER_ID_MAX_LEN,
CMK_ID_MAX_LEN,
WRAPPED_DEK_MAX_LEN,
NONCE_LEN,
AUTH_TAG_LEN,
CIPHERTEXT_MAX_LEN,
} from '../constants';
import { PluginError } from '../providers/errors';
/** Pattern for valid provider IDs: lowercase alphanumeric + hyphens */
const PROVIDER_ID_PATTERN = /^[a-z0-9-]+$/;
/**
* Check whether the given data starts with the OCKE magic bytes.
* Useful for quick detection without performing a full parse.
*
* @param data - The byte array to check
* @returns true if the first 4 bytes match the OCKE magic
*/
export function isMagicMatch(data: Uint8Array): boolean {
if (data.length < MAGIC_BYTES.length) {
return false;
}
for (let i = 0; i < MAGIC_BYTES.length; i++) {
if (data[i] !== MAGIC_BYTES[i]) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
/**
* Parse a byte sequence in the On-Disk Format into an EncryptedFileRecord.
* Validates magic bytes, version, all field lengths, and rejects trailing bytes.
* Returns a descriptive parse error on the first invalid field.
*
* @param data - The binary data to parse
* @returns A fully populated EncryptedFileRecord
* @throws PluginError with category 'format' on any parse failure
*/
export function parse(data: Uint8Array): EncryptedFileRecord {
let offset = 0;
// --- Magic (4 bytes) ---
if (data.length < offset + 4) {
if (!isMagicMatch(data)) {
throw new PluginError(
'Not an encrypted file: magic bytes do not match',
'format'
);
}
throw new PluginError(
'Truncated input: not enough bytes for magic field',
'format'
);
}
const magic = data.slice(offset, offset + 4);
if (!isMagicMatch(data)) {
throw new PluginError(
'Not an encrypted file: magic bytes do not match',
'format'
);
}
offset += 4;
// --- Version (2 bytes, uint16 BE) ---
if (data.length < offset + 2) {
throw new PluginError(
'Truncated input: not enough bytes for version field',
'format'
);
}
const view = new DataView(data.buffer, data.byteOffset, data.byteLength);
const version = view.getUint16(offset, false);
offset += 2;
if (version > FORMAT_VERSION) {
throw new PluginError(
`Unsupported format version: ${version} (max supported: ${FORMAT_VERSION}). Please upgrade the plugin.`,
'format'
);
}
if (version === 0) {
throw new PluginError(
'Invalid format version: version must be at least 1, got 0',
'format'
);
}
// --- ProviderIdLen (1 byte) ---
if (data.length < offset + 1) {
throw new PluginError(
'Truncated input: not enough bytes for providerIdLen field',
'format'
);
}
const providerIdLen = data[offset];
offset += 1;
if (providerIdLen < 1 || providerIdLen > PROVIDER_ID_MAX_LEN) {
throw new PluginError(
`Invalid providerIdLen: must be 1–${PROVIDER_ID_MAX_LEN}, got ${providerIdLen}`,
'format'
);
}
// --- ProviderId (N bytes, ASCII) ---
if (data.length < offset + providerIdLen) {
throw new PluginError(
'Truncated input: not enough bytes for providerId field',
'format'
);
}
const providerIdBytes = data.slice(offset, offset + providerIdLen);
const providerId = new TextDecoder('ascii').decode(providerIdBytes);
offset += providerIdLen;
if (!PROVIDER_ID_PATTERN.test(providerId)) {
throw new PluginError(
`Invalid provider ID charset: must be lowercase alphanumeric + hyphens, got "${providerId}"`,
'format'
);
}
// --- CmkIdLen (2 bytes, uint16 BE) ---
if (data.length < offset + 2) {
throw new PluginError(
'Truncated input: not enough bytes for cmkIdLen field',
'format'
);
}
const cmkIdLen = view.getUint16(offset, false);
offset += 2;
if (cmkIdLen < 1 || cmkIdLen > CMK_ID_MAX_LEN) {
throw new PluginError(
`Invalid cmkIdLen: must be 1–${CMK_ID_MAX_LEN}, got ${cmkIdLen}`,
'format'
);
}
// --- CmkId (M bytes, UTF-8) ---
if (data.length < offset + cmkIdLen) {
throw new PluginError(
'Truncated input: not enough bytes for cmkId field',
'format'
);
}
const cmkIdBytes = data.slice(offset, offset + cmkIdLen);
const cmkId = new TextDecoder('utf-8').decode(cmkIdBytes);
offset += cmkIdLen;
// --- WrappedDekLen (2 bytes, uint16 BE) ---
if (data.length < offset + 2) {
throw new PluginError(
'Truncated input: not enough bytes for wrappedDekLen field',
'format'
);
}
const wrappedDekLen = view.getUint16(offset, false);
offset += 2;
if (wrappedDekLen < 1 || wrappedDekLen > WRAPPED_DEK_MAX_LEN) {
throw new PluginError(
`Invalid wrappedDekLen: must be 1–${WRAPPED_DEK_MAX_LEN}, got ${wrappedDekLen}`,
'format'
);
}
// --- WrappedDek (W bytes) ---
if (data.length < offset + wrappedDekLen) {
throw new PluginError(
'Truncated input: not enough bytes for wrappedDek field',
'format'
);
}
const wrappedDek = data.slice(offset, offset + wrappedDekLen);
offset += wrappedDekLen;
// --- Nonce (12 bytes) ---
if (data.length < offset + NONCE_LEN) {
throw new PluginError(
'Truncated input: not enough bytes for nonce field',
'format'
);
}
const nonce = data.slice(offset, offset + NONCE_LEN);
offset += NONCE_LEN;
// --- AuthTag (16 bytes) ---
if (data.length < offset + AUTH_TAG_LEN) {
throw new PluginError(
'Truncated input: not enough bytes for authTag field',
'format'
);
}
const authTag = data.slice(offset, offset + AUTH_TAG_LEN);
offset += AUTH_TAG_LEN;
// --- CiphertextLen (4 bytes, uint32 BE) ---
if (data.length < offset + 4) {
throw new PluginError(
'Truncated input: not enough bytes for ciphertextLen field',
'format'
);
}
const ciphertextLen = view.getUint32(offset, false);
offset += 4;
if (ciphertextLen > CIPHERTEXT_MAX_LEN) {
throw new PluginError(
`Invalid ciphertextLen: must be 0–${CIPHERTEXT_MAX_LEN}, got ${ciphertextLen}`,
'format'
);
}
// --- Ciphertext (C bytes) ---
if (data.length < offset + ciphertextLen) {
throw new PluginError(
'Truncated input: not enough bytes for ciphertext field',
'format'
);
}
const ciphertext = data.slice(offset, offset + ciphertextLen);
offset += ciphertextLen;
// --- Reject trailing bytes ---
if (offset < data.length) {
throw new PluginError(
`Trailing bytes: expected end of data at offset ${offset}, but ${data.length - offset} extra byte(s) remain`,
'format'
);
}
return {
magic,
version,
providerId,
cmkId,
wrappedDek,
nonce,
authTag,
ciphertext,
};
}

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/**
* On-Disk Format serializer.
* Encodes an EncryptedFileRecord into a Uint8Array following the binary layout:
*
* Offset Size Field
* 0 4 bytes Magic (0x4F 0x43 0x4B 0x45 "OCKE")
* 4 2 bytes Version (uint16 BE)
* 6 1 byte ProviderIdLen
* 7 N bytes ProviderId (ASCII)
* 7+N 2 bytes CmkIdLen (uint16 BE)
* 9+N M bytes CmkId (UTF-8)
* 9+N+M 2 bytes WrappedDekLen (uint16 BE)
* 11+N+M W bytes WrappedDek
* 11+N+M+W 12 bytes Nonce
* 23+N+M+W 16 bytes AuthTag
* 39+N+M+W 4 bytes CiphertextLen (uint32 BE)
* 43+N+M+W C bytes Ciphertext
*
* All multi-byte integers are big-endian.
*/
import type { EncryptedFileRecord } from '../types';
import { validateRecord } from './validators';
/**
* Serialize an EncryptedFileRecord into the On-Disk Format byte sequence.
* Validates all field constraints before serialization.
* Throws PluginError with category 'format' on any constraint violation.
*/
export function serialize(record: EncryptedFileRecord): Uint8Array {
// Validate all fields before producing output
validateRecord(record);
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
const providerIdBytes = encoder.encode(record.providerId);
const cmkIdBytes = encoder.encode(record.cmkId);
const N = providerIdBytes.length;
const M = cmkIdBytes.length;
const W = record.wrappedDek.length;
const C = record.ciphertext.length;
// Total size: 4 (magic) + 2 (version) + 1 (providerIdLen) + N + 2 (cmkIdLen) + M
// + 2 (wrappedDekLen) + W + 12 (nonce) + 16 (authTag) + 4 (ciphertextLen) + C
const totalSize = 43 + N + M + W + C;
const buffer = new Uint8Array(totalSize);
const view = new DataView(buffer.buffer);
let offset = 0;
// Magic (4 bytes)
buffer.set(record.magic, offset);
offset += 4;
// Version (uint16 BE)
view.setUint16(offset, record.version, false);
offset += 2;
// ProviderIdLen (1 byte)
buffer[offset] = N;
offset += 1;
// ProviderId (N bytes, ASCII)
buffer.set(providerIdBytes, offset);
offset += N;
// CmkIdLen (uint16 BE)
view.setUint16(offset, M, false);
offset += 2;
// CmkId (M bytes, UTF-8)
buffer.set(cmkIdBytes, offset);
offset += M;
// WrappedDekLen (uint16 BE)
view.setUint16(offset, W, false);
offset += 2;
// WrappedDek (W bytes)
buffer.set(record.wrappedDek, offset);
offset += W;
// Nonce (12 bytes)
buffer.set(record.nonce, offset);
offset += 12;
// AuthTag (16 bytes)
buffer.set(record.authTag, offset);
offset += 16;
// CiphertextLen (uint32 BE)
view.setUint32(offset, C, false);
offset += 4;
// Ciphertext (C bytes)
buffer.set(record.ciphertext, offset);
return buffer;
}

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/**
* Field constraint validators for the On-Disk Format.
* Each validator throws a PluginError with category 'format' on violation.
*/
import {
MAGIC_BYTES,
FORMAT_VERSION,
PROVIDER_ID_MAX_LEN,
CMK_ID_MAX_LEN,
WRAPPED_DEK_MAX_LEN,
NONCE_LEN,
AUTH_TAG_LEN,
CIPHERTEXT_MAX_LEN,
} from '../constants';
import { PluginError } from '../providers/errors';
/** Pattern for valid provider IDs: lowercase alphanumeric + hyphens */
const PROVIDER_ID_PATTERN = /^[a-z0-9-]+$/;
/**
* Validate that magic bytes match the expected OCKE header.
*/
export function validateMagic(magic: Uint8Array): void {
if (magic.length !== MAGIC_BYTES.length) {
throw new PluginError(
`Invalid magic bytes length: expected ${MAGIC_BYTES.length}, got ${magic.length}`,
'format'
);
}
for (let i = 0; i < MAGIC_BYTES.length; i++) {
if (magic[i] !== MAGIC_BYTES[i]) {
throw new PluginError(
`Invalid magic bytes: expected 0x${MAGIC_BYTES[i].toString(16).padStart(2, '0')} at offset ${i}, got 0x${magic[i].toString(16).padStart(2, '0')}`,
'format'
);
}
}
}
/**
* Validate that the format version is supported.
*/
export function validateVersion(version: number): void {
if (!Number.isInteger(version) || version < 0 || version > 0xFFFF) {
throw new PluginError(
`Invalid format version: must be a uint16, got ${version}`,
'format'
);
}
if (version > FORMAT_VERSION) {
throw new PluginError(
`Unsupported format version: ${version} (max supported: ${FORMAT_VERSION})`,
'format'
);
}
if (version === 0) {
throw new PluginError(
`Invalid format version: version must be at least 1, got 0`,
'format'
);
}
}
/**
* Validate provider ID length and charset constraints.
*/
export function validateProviderId(providerId: string): void {
const len = providerId.length;
if (len < 1 || len > PROVIDER_ID_MAX_LEN) {
throw new PluginError(
`Invalid provider ID length: must be 1–${PROVIDER_ID_MAX_LEN}, got ${len}`,
'format'
);
}
if (!PROVIDER_ID_PATTERN.test(providerId)) {
throw new PluginError(
`Invalid provider ID charset: must be lowercase alphanumeric + hyphens, got "${providerId}"`,
'format'
);
}
}
/**
* Validate CMK ID length constraint.
*/
export function validateCmkId(cmkId: string): void {
const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(cmkId);
if (encoded.length < 1 || encoded.length > CMK_ID_MAX_LEN) {
throw new PluginError(
`Invalid CMK ID length: must be 1–${CMK_ID_MAX_LEN} bytes, got ${encoded.length}`,
'format'
);
}
}
/**
* Validate wrapped DEK length constraint.
*/
export function validateWrappedDek(wrappedDek: Uint8Array): void {
if (wrappedDek.length < 1 || wrappedDek.length > WRAPPED_DEK_MAX_LEN) {
throw new PluginError(
`Invalid wrapped DEK length: must be 1–${WRAPPED_DEK_MAX_LEN}, got ${wrappedDek.length}`,
'format'
);
}
}
/**
* Validate nonce is exactly the required length.
*/
export function validateNonce(nonce: Uint8Array): void {
if (nonce.length !== NONCE_LEN) {
throw new PluginError(
`Invalid nonce length: must be exactly ${NONCE_LEN}, got ${nonce.length}`,
'format'
);
}
}
/**
* Validate auth tag is exactly the required length.
*/
export function validateAuthTag(authTag: Uint8Array): void {
if (authTag.length !== AUTH_TAG_LEN) {
throw new PluginError(
`Invalid auth tag length: must be exactly ${AUTH_TAG_LEN}, got ${authTag.length}`,
'format'
);
}
}
/**
* Validate ciphertext length constraint.
*/
export function validateCiphertext(ciphertext: Uint8Array): void {
if (ciphertext.length > CIPHERTEXT_MAX_LEN) {
throw new PluginError(
`Invalid ciphertext length: must be 0–${CIPHERTEXT_MAX_LEN}, got ${ciphertext.length}`,
'format'
);
}
}
/**
* Validate all fields of an EncryptedFileRecord.
* Throws on the first constraint violation encountered.
*/
export function validateRecord(record: {
magic: Uint8Array;
version: number;
providerId: string;
cmkId: string;
wrappedDek: Uint8Array;
nonce: Uint8Array;
authTag: Uint8Array;
ciphertext: Uint8Array;
}): void {
validateMagic(record.magic);
validateVersion(record.version);
validateProviderId(record.providerId);
validateCmkId(record.cmkId);
validateWrappedDek(record.wrappedDek);
validateNonce(record.nonce);
validateAuthTag(record.authTag);
validateCiphertext(record.ciphertext);
}

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365
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/**
* Encrypted Attachment Hook — handles decryption and Blob URL lifecycle
* for encrypted attachments (.enc.png, .enc.jpg, .enc.pdf).
*
* Flow:
* 1. Register handling for encrypted attachment extensions
* 2. On request: check size ≤ 50 MB → read → parse → decrypt → Blob URL
* 3. Track Blob URL per file path with reference counting per view
* 4. On view close: decrement ref count → if zero, revoke Blob URL + release buffer (within 5s)
*
* Security:
* - Never writes decrypted bytes to disk
* - Blob URL revoked and buffer released when no views reference it
* - Buffer tracked in BufferRegistry for force-release on plugin unload
*/
import { Notice, Plugin, TFile } from 'obsidian';
import type { CryptoEngine, EncryptionContext, PluginSettings } from '../types';
import type { BufferRegistry } from '../core/buffer-registry';
import { parse } from '../format/parser';
import { MAX_ATTACHMENT_SIZE, NOTICE_DURATION_MS } from '../constants';
import { PluginError } from '../providers/errors';
/**
* Tracked state for a single decrypted attachment Blob URL.
*/
export interface AttachmentBlobEntry {
/** The Blob URL created from decrypted bytes */
blobUrl: string;
/** The decrypted plaintext buffer (held in memory) */
buffer: Uint8Array;
/** Number of views currently referencing this Blob URL */
refCount: number;
/** Timeout handle for delayed cleanup (5s after last view closes) */
cleanupTimer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null;
}
/** Delay before revoking Blob URL after last view closes (ms) */
const BLOB_CLEANUP_DELAY_MS = 5000;
/** Supported encrypted attachment extensions */
const ENCRYPTED_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS = ['enc.png', 'enc.jpg', 'enc.pdf'];
/**
* Registry tracking active Blob URLs for encrypted attachments.
* Maps vault-relative file path → AttachmentBlobEntry.
*/
export class AttachmentBlobRegistry {
private readonly _entries: Map<string, AttachmentBlobEntry> = new Map();
get(filePath: string): AttachmentBlobEntry | undefined {
return this._entries.get(filePath);
}
set(filePath: string, entry: AttachmentBlobEntry): void {
this._entries.set(filePath, entry);
}
delete(filePath: string): void {
this._entries.delete(filePath);
}
has(filePath: string): boolean {
return this._entries.has(filePath);
}
/** Get all tracked file paths (for testing/debugging) */
get size(): number {
return this._entries.size;
}
/**
* Revoke all Blob URLs and clear all entries.
* Called on plugin unload.
*/
revokeAll(): void {
for (const [, entry] of this._entries) {
if (entry.cleanupTimer !== null) {
clearTimeout(entry.cleanupTimer);
}
try {
URL.revokeObjectURL(entry.blobUrl);
} catch {
// Ignore errors during cleanup
}
// Zero the buffer
entry.buffer.fill(0);
}
this._entries.clear();
}
}
/**
* Determine the MIME type for an encrypted attachment based on its extension.
*/
export function getMimeType(filePath: string): string {
const lower = filePath.toLowerCase();
if (lower.endsWith('.enc.png')) return 'image/png';
if (lower.endsWith('.enc.jpg')) return 'image/jpeg';
if (lower.endsWith('.enc.pdf')) return 'application/pdf';
return 'application/octet-stream';
}
/**
* Check if a file path matches an encrypted attachment extension.
*/
export function isEncryptedAttachment(filePath: string): boolean {
if (!filePath) return false;
const lower = filePath.toLowerCase();
return ENCRYPTED_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS.some(ext => lower.endsWith(`.${ext}`));
}
/**
* Decrypt an encrypted attachment file and return the plaintext bytes.
*
* @param fileBytes - The raw encrypted file bytes from disk
* @param filePath - Vault-relative file path (for encryption context)
* @param vaultName - Name of the vault (for encryption context)
* @param cryptoEngine - CryptoEngine instance for decryption
* @returns The decrypted plaintext bytes
* @throws PluginError on size limit, parse, or decryption failure
*/
export async function decryptAttachmentBytes(
fileBytes: Uint8Array,
filePath: string,
vaultName: string,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine
): Promise<Uint8Array> {
// 1. Check file size ≤ MAX_ATTACHMENT_SIZE (50 MB)
if (fileBytes.byteLength > MAX_ATTACHMENT_SIZE) {
throw new PluginError(
`Attachment exceeds 50 MB size limit: ${filePath} (${(fileBytes.byteLength / 1024 / 1024).toFixed(1)} MB)`,
'size-limit',
undefined,
undefined,
filePath
);
}
// 2. Parse → EncryptedFileRecord
const record = parse(fileBytes);
// 3. Build EncryptionContext
const context: EncryptionContext = {
vaultName,
filePath,
formatVersion: record.version,
};
// 4. Decrypt → plaintext bytes
const plaintext = await cryptoEngine.decrypt(record, context);
return plaintext;
}
/**
* Create a Blob URL from decrypted plaintext bytes.
*
* @param plaintext - The decrypted attachment bytes
* @param filePath - The file path (used to determine MIME type)
* @returns The created Blob URL string
*/
export function createBlobUrl(plaintext: Uint8Array, filePath: string): string {
const mimeType = getMimeType(filePath);
const blob = new Blob([plaintext], { type: mimeType });
return URL.createObjectURL(blob);
}
/**
* Register a view reference for an attachment Blob URL.
* Increments the reference count and cancels any pending cleanup timer.
*
* @param registry - The AttachmentBlobRegistry
* @param filePath - Vault-relative file path
*/
export function addViewReference(
registry: AttachmentBlobRegistry,
filePath: string
): void {
const entry = registry.get(filePath);
if (!entry) return;
entry.refCount++;
// Cancel any pending cleanup since a new view is referencing this
if (entry.cleanupTimer !== null) {
clearTimeout(entry.cleanupTimer);
entry.cleanupTimer = null;
}
}
/**
* Remove a view reference for an attachment Blob URL.
* Decrements the reference count. If zero, schedules cleanup after 5s delay.
*
* @param registry - The AttachmentBlobRegistry
* @param filePath - Vault-relative file path
* @param bufferRegistry - BufferRegistry for buffer lifecycle tracking
*/
export function removeViewReference(
registry: AttachmentBlobRegistry,
filePath: string,
_bufferRegistry: BufferRegistry
): void {
const entry = registry.get(filePath);
if (!entry) return;
entry.refCount = Math.max(0, entry.refCount - 1);
if (entry.refCount === 0) {
// Schedule cleanup after delay
entry.cleanupTimer = setTimeout(() => {
cleanupBlobEntry(registry, filePath);
}, BLOB_CLEANUP_DELAY_MS);
}
}
/**
* Immediately revoke a Blob URL and release its buffer.
*
* @param registry - The AttachmentBlobRegistry
* @param filePath - Vault-relative file path to clean up
*/
export function cleanupBlobEntry(
registry: AttachmentBlobRegistry,
filePath: string
): void {
const entry = registry.get(filePath);
if (!entry) return;
// Cancel any pending timer
if (entry.cleanupTimer !== null) {
clearTimeout(entry.cleanupTimer);
entry.cleanupTimer = null;
}
// Revoke the Blob URL
try {
URL.revokeObjectURL(entry.blobUrl);
} catch {
// Ignore errors during revocation
}
// Zero-fill and release the buffer
entry.buffer.fill(0);
// Remove from registry
registry.delete(filePath);
}
/**
* Handle an attachment request: decrypt, create Blob URL, track lifecycle.
*
* @param file - The Obsidian TFile for the encrypted attachment
* @param plugin - The Obsidian plugin instance (for vault access)
* @param cryptoEngine - CryptoEngine for decryption
* @param getSettings - Function to get current plugin settings
* @param blobRegistry - AttachmentBlobRegistry for Blob URL tracking
* @param bufferRegistry - BufferRegistry for buffer lifecycle
* @returns The Blob URL for the decrypted attachment, or null on failure
*/
export async function handleAttachmentRequest(
file: TFile,
plugin: Plugin,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
_getSettings: () => PluginSettings,
blobRegistry: AttachmentBlobRegistry,
_bufferRegistry: BufferRegistry
): Promise<string | null> {
const filePath = file.path;
// If already decrypted and tracked, reuse existing Blob URL
const existing = blobRegistry.get(filePath);
if (existing) {
addViewReference(blobRegistry, filePath);
return existing.blobUrl;
}
try {
// 1. Check file size from stat
if (file.stat && file.stat.size > MAX_ATTACHMENT_SIZE) {
new Notice(
`Attachment exceeds 50 MB size limit: ${filePath}`,
NOTICE_DURATION_MS
);
return null;
}
// 2. Read encrypted file bytes from vault
const fileBytes = new Uint8Array(
await (plugin.app.vault as any).readBinary(file)
);
// 3. Decrypt
const vaultName = plugin.app.vault.getName();
const plaintext = await decryptAttachmentBytes(
fileBytes,
filePath,
vaultName,
cryptoEngine
);
// 4. Create Blob URL
const blobUrl = createBlobUrl(plaintext, filePath);
// 5. Track in registry with refCount = 1
const entry: AttachmentBlobEntry = {
blobUrl,
buffer: plaintext,
refCount: 1,
cleanupTimer: null,
};
blobRegistry.set(filePath, entry);
return blobUrl;
} catch (err) {
// Release any in-memory buffer on failure
const message = err instanceof PluginError
? `Attachment decryption failed (${err.category}): ${filePath}`
: `Attachment decryption failed: ${filePath}`;
new Notice(message, NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
return null;
}
}
/**
* Register the attachment hook with the plugin.
*
* Sets up:
* - Extension registration for .enc.png, .enc.jpg, .enc.pdf
* - Blob URL lifecycle management
* - Cleanup on plugin unload
*
* @param plugin - The Obsidian plugin instance
* @param cryptoEngine - CryptoEngine for decryption
* @param getSettings - Function to get current plugin settings
* @param bufferRegistry - BufferRegistry for buffer lifecycle tracking
* @returns The AttachmentBlobRegistry for external access (e.g., view close handlers)
*/
export function registerAttachmentHook(
plugin: Plugin,
_cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
_getSettings: () => PluginSettings,
_bufferRegistry: BufferRegistry
): AttachmentBlobRegistry {
const blobRegistry = new AttachmentBlobRegistry();
// Register extensions for encrypted attachments
try {
(plugin as any).registerExtensions(
ENCRYPTED_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS,
'markdown'
);
} catch {
// Extension registration may fail if already registered; continue
}
// Register cleanup on plugin unload
plugin.register(() => {
blobRegistry.revokeAll();
});
return blobRegistry;
}

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/**
* Monkey-patch vault.adapter to transparently encrypt/decrypt files.
*
* It intercepts vault.adapter.read() and vault.adapter.write() to:
* - On READ: decrypt ````ocke-v1 blocks → ````secret blocks (Obsidian sees plaintext)
* - On WRITE: encrypt ````secret blocks → ````ocke-v1 blocks (disk has ciphertext)
*
* Uses 4 backticks (````) as fence markers so that inner content can contain
* standard 3-backtick code fences (```mermaid, ```js, etc.) without conflict.
*
* This ensures:
* - The editor always shows decrypted content (````secret)
* - The disk always has encrypted content (````ocke-v1)
* - Inner code fences render correctly (mermaid diagrams, code blocks, etc.)
*/
import type { Plugin } from 'obsidian';
import type { CryptoEngine, EncryptionContext, PluginSettings } from '../types';
import { decodeInlineBlock } from '../format/inline-codec';
import { parse } from '../format/parser';
import { serialize } from '../format/serializer';
import { FORMAT_VERSION } from '../constants';
import { PluginError } from '../providers/errors';
import { showErrorNotice } from '../ui/notices';
import { resolveKeyArn } from '../utils/key-resolver';
/**
* Markers for secret blocks.
* Supports optional alias: %%secret-start:alias%% or %%secret-start%%
* Content between markers is regular markdown — renders normally.
*
* Editor shows: %%secret-start:finance%% ... %%secret-end%%
* Disk stores: ````ocke-v1\n<base64>\n````
*/
const SECRET_BLOCK_REGEX = /%%secret-start(?::([a-zA-Z0-9_-]+))?%%\n([\s\S]*?)\n%%secret-end%%/g;
const ENCRYPTED_BLOCK_REGEX = /````ocke-v1\n([\s\S]*?)\n````/g;
/** Tracks paths currently being processed to prevent re-entrancy */
const processing = new Set<string>();
/**
* Install the crypto adapter patch.
* Returns a cleanup function to restore original methods on unload.
*/
export function installCryptoAdapterPatch(
plugin: Plugin,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
getSettings: () => PluginSettings
): { uninstall: () => void; originalReadBinary: (path: string) => Promise<ArrayBuffer> } {
const adapter = plugin.app.vault.adapter;
// Save original methods
const originalRead = adapter.read.bind(adapter);
const originalWrite = adapter.write.bind(adapter);
const originalReadBinary = adapter.readBinary.bind(adapter);
/**
* Patched readBinary: decrypt binary files that start with OCKE magic bytes.
*/
adapter.readBinary = async function (normalizedPath: string): Promise<ArrayBuffer> {
const data = await originalReadBinary(normalizedPath);
const bytes = new Uint8Array(data);
// Check for OCKE magic bytes (0x4F 0x43 0x4B 0x45)
if (bytes.length < 4 || bytes[0] !== 0x4F || bytes[1] !== 0x43 || bytes[2] !== 0x4B || bytes[3] !== 0x45) {
return data;
}
// Skip .md files — they use text-based encryption
if (normalizedPath.endsWith('.md')) {
return data;
}
const settings = getSettings();
if (!settings.autoDecryptBlocks) {
return data;
}
// Decrypt the binary file
try {
const record = parse(bytes);
const context: EncryptionContext = {
vaultName: plugin.app.vault.getName(),
filePath: normalizedPath,
formatVersion: FORMAT_VERSION,
};
const plaintextBytes = await cryptoEngine.decrypt(record, context);
return plaintextBytes.buffer;
} catch {
// On failure, return original (Obsidian won't be able to render it)
return data;
}
};
/**
* Blob URL cache for encrypted binary files (lazy, LRU-like).
* Decryption happens on first access, not at startup.
*/
const blobUrls = new Map<string, string>();
/**
* Patch vault.getResourcePath to return Blob URLs for encrypted binary files.
*/
const originalGetResourcePath = plugin.app.vault.getResourcePath.bind(plugin.app.vault);
plugin.app.vault.getResourcePath = function (file: any): string {
if (!file || !file.path || file.path.endsWith('.md')) {
return originalGetResourcePath(file);
}
const cached = blobUrls.get(file.path);
if (cached && cached !== '__pending__') {
return cached;
}
if (!cached) {
triggerBinaryDecrypt(file.path, plugin, cryptoEngine, getSettings, blobUrls, originalReadBinary, originalGetResourcePath);
}
return originalGetResourcePath(file);
};
/**
* On file-open: if it's an encrypted binary, wait for decryption
* then force Obsidian to re-open the file so it picks up the Blob URL.
*/
plugin.registerEvent(
plugin.app.workspace.on('file-open', async (file: any) => {
if (!file || !file.path || file.path.endsWith('.md')) return;
// Check if already decrypted
const cached = blobUrls.get(file.path);
if (cached && cached !== '__pending__') return;
// Wait for decryption to complete (poll)
for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) {
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 100));
const url = blobUrls.get(file.path);
if (url && url !== '__pending__') {
// Force re-render by triggering a leaf update
const leaf = plugin.app.workspace.activeLeaf;
if (leaf) {
const state = leaf.getViewState();
await leaf.setViewState({ type: 'empty', state: {} });
await leaf.setViewState(state);
}
return;
}
}
})
);
/**
* Patched read: after reading from disk, decrypt ````ocke-v1 → ````secret
*/
adapter.read = async function (normalizedPath: string): Promise<string> {
const content = await originalRead(normalizedPath);
// Skip if no encrypted blocks
ENCRYPTED_BLOCK_REGEX.lastIndex = 0;
if (!ENCRYPTED_BLOCK_REGEX.test(content)) {
return content;
}
// Only process .md files
if (!normalizedPath.endsWith('.md')) {
return content;
}
const settings = getSettings();
if (!settings.autoDecryptBlocks) {
return content;
}
// Decrypt all ````ocke-v1 blocks → ````secret
try {
const decrypted = await decryptBlocks(
content,
normalizedPath,
cryptoEngine,
plugin.app.vault.getName()
);
return decrypted;
} catch {
// On failure, return original content (graceful degradation)
return content;
}
};
/**
* Patched write: before writing to disk, encrypt ````secret → ````ocke-v1
*/
adapter.write = async function (normalizedPath: string, data: string, ...args: unknown[]): Promise<void> {
// Skip if currently processing (prevent re-entrancy)
if (processing.has(normalizedPath)) {
return (originalWrite as any)(normalizedPath, data, ...args);
}
// Only process .md files
if (!normalizedPath.endsWith('.md')) {
return (originalWrite as any)(normalizedPath, data, ...args);
}
// Check for secret blocks (%%secret-start%% or %%secret-start:alias%%)
SECRET_BLOCK_REGEX.lastIndex = 0;
if (!SECRET_BLOCK_REGEX.test(data)) {
return (originalWrite as any)(normalizedPath, data, ...args);
}
const settings = getSettings();
processing.add(normalizedPath);
try {
// Encrypt all secret blocks → ````ocke-v1
const encrypted = await encryptBlocks(
data,
normalizedPath,
cryptoEngine,
settings,
plugin.app.vault.getName()
);
return (originalWrite as any)(normalizedPath, encrypted, ...args);
} catch (err) {
// On encryption failure, show error but still write original
// (don't lose user data)
if (err instanceof PluginError) {
showErrorNotice(err);
}
return (originalWrite as any)(normalizedPath, data, ...args);
} finally {
processing.delete(normalizedPath);
}
};
// Return cleanup function and original readBinary for decrypt command
return {
uninstall: () => {
adapter.read = originalRead;
adapter.write = originalWrite as any;
adapter.readBinary = originalReadBinary;
plugin.app.vault.getResourcePath = originalGetResourcePath;
for (const url of blobUrls.values()) {
try { URL.revokeObjectURL(url); } catch { /* ignore */ }
}
blobUrls.clear();
},
originalReadBinary,
};
}
/**
* Decrypt all ````ocke-v1 blocks in content → ````secret blocks.
*/
async function decryptBlocks(
content: string,
filePath: string,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
vaultName: string
): Promise<string> {
ENCRYPTED_BLOCK_REGEX.lastIndex = 0;
const matches: Array<{ fullMatch: string; base64Content: string }> = [];
let match: RegExpExecArray | null;
while ((match = ENCRYPTED_BLOCK_REGEX.exec(content)) !== null) {
matches.push({ fullMatch: match[0], base64Content: match[1] });
}
if (matches.length === 0) return content;
let result = content;
for (const m of matches) {
try {
// Build the 3-backtick format for decodeInlineBlock (it expects ```ocke-v1)
const fullBlock = '```ocke-v1\n' + m.base64Content + '\n```';
const binaryData = decodeInlineBlock(fullBlock);
if (!binaryData) continue;
const record = parse(binaryData);
const context: EncryptionContext = {
vaultName,
filePath,
formatVersion: FORMAT_VERSION,
};
const plaintextBytes = await cryptoEngine.decrypt(record, context);
const plaintext = new TextDecoder().decode(plaintextBytes);
const secretBlock = '%%secret-start%%\n' + plaintext + '\n%%secret-end%%';
result = result.replace(m.fullMatch, secretBlock);
} catch {
// Leave this block as ````ocke-v1 (no key access / decryption failed)
continue;
}
}
return result;
}
/**
* Encrypt all secret blocks in content → ````ocke-v1 blocks.
* Each block can specify its own key alias via %%secret-start:alias%%
*/
async function encryptBlocks(
content: string,
filePath: string,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
settings: PluginSettings,
vaultName: string
): Promise<string> {
SECRET_BLOCK_REGEX.lastIndex = 0;
const matches: Array<{ fullMatch: string; alias: string | undefined; plaintext: string }> = [];
let match: RegExpExecArray | null;
while ((match = SECRET_BLOCK_REGEX.exec(content)) !== null) {
matches.push({ fullMatch: match[0], alias: match[1], plaintext: match[2] });
}
if (matches.length === 0) return content;
let result = content;
for (const m of matches) {
// Resolve which key to use for this block
const cmkArn = resolveKeyArn(m.alias, settings);
if (!cmkArn) {
// No key configured for this alias — skip encryption, leave as-is
continue;
}
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
const plaintextBytes = encoder.encode(m.plaintext);
const context: EncryptionContext = {
vaultName,
filePath,
formatVersion: FORMAT_VERSION,
};
const record = await cryptoEngine.encrypt(
plaintextBytes,
cmkArn,
'aws-kms',
context
);
const serializedBytes = serialize(record);
const inlineBlock = '````ocke-v1\n' + Buffer.from(serializedBytes).toString('base64') + '\n````';
result = result.replace(m.fullMatch, inlineBlock);
}
return result;
}
/**
* Trigger async decryption of a binary file and create a Blob URL.
* Once decrypted, the Blob URL is stored in the cache.
* Obsidian will re-request getResourcePath on next render cycle.
*/
async function triggerBinaryDecrypt(
filePath: string,
plugin: Plugin,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
getSettings: () => PluginSettings,
blobUrls: Map<string, string>,
originalReadBinary: (path: string) => Promise<ArrayBuffer>,
_originalGetResourcePath: (file: any) => string
): Promise<void> {
// Prevent duplicate decryption attempts
if (blobUrls.has(filePath)) return;
// Use a sentinel to prevent re-triggering
blobUrls.set(filePath, '__pending__');
try {
const settings = getSettings();
if (!settings.autoDecryptBlocks) {
blobUrls.delete(filePath);
return;
}
const data = await originalReadBinary(filePath);
const bytes = new Uint8Array(data);
// Verify OCKE magic
if (bytes.length < 4 || bytes[0] !== 0x4F || bytes[1] !== 0x43 || bytes[2] !== 0x4B || bytes[3] !== 0x45) {
blobUrls.delete(filePath);
return;
}
const record = parse(bytes);
const context: EncryptionContext = {
vaultName: plugin.app.vault.getName(),
filePath,
formatVersion: FORMAT_VERSION,
};
const plaintextBytes = await cryptoEngine.decrypt(record, context);
// Determine MIME type from extension
const mimeType = getMimeTypeFromPath(filePath);
const blob = new Blob([plaintextBytes], { type: mimeType });
const blobUrl = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
blobUrls.set(filePath, blobUrl);
// Evict old entries if cache exceeds 20
if (blobUrls.size > 20) {
let toRemove = blobUrls.size - 20;
for (const [p, u] of blobUrls) {
if (toRemove <= 0) break;
if (u === '__pending__' || p === filePath) continue;
try { URL.revokeObjectURL(u); } catch { /* ignore */ }
blobUrls.delete(p);
toRemove--;
}
}
// Force Obsidian to re-render the file by triggering a metadata change
const file = plugin.app.vault.getAbstractFileByPath(filePath);
if (file) {
plugin.app.metadataCache.trigger('changed', file);
}
} catch {
blobUrls.delete(filePath);
}
}
/**
* Get MIME type from file path extension.
*/
function getMimeTypeFromPath(filePath: string): string {
const ext = filePath.split('.').pop()?.toLowerCase() ?? '';
const mimeMap: Record<string, string> = {
pdf: 'application/pdf',
png: 'image/png',
jpg: 'image/jpeg',
jpeg: 'image/jpeg',
gif: 'image/gif',
svg: 'image/svg+xml',
webp: 'image/webp',
mp3: 'audio/mpeg',
mp4: 'video/mp4',
wav: 'audio/wav',
ogg: 'audio/ogg',
webm: 'video/webm',
};
return mimeMap[ext] ?? 'application/octet-stream';
}

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/**
* Inline block encryption hook.
*
* Save hook: On every modify event, reads the file from disk.
* If it contains ```secret blocks, encrypts them to ```ocke-v1 and writes back.
* Then restores the editor to show ```secret (decrypted) content.
*
* This ensures:
* - Disk ALWAYS has ```ocke-v1 (encrypted)
* - Editor ALWAYS shows ```secret (decrypted, editable)
* - Even during a crash, the disk state is encrypted
*/
import { Plugin, TAbstractFile, TFile, MarkdownView } from 'obsidian';
import type { CryptoEngine, EncryptionContext, PluginSettings } from '../types';
import { matchesEncryptedSuffix } from '../policies/suffix-matcher';
import { encodeInlineBlock } from '../format/inline-codec';
import { serialize } from '../format/serializer';
import { atomicFileWrite } from '../utils/atomic-write';
import { FORMAT_VERSION } from '../constants';
import { showErrorNotice, showNotice } from '../ui/notices';
import { PluginError } from '../providers/errors';
/**
* Regex to find ```secret blocks.
*/
const SECRET_BLOCK_REGEX = /```secret\n([\s\S]*?)\n```/g;
/**
* Set of file paths currently being processed.
* Prevents re-entrant processing.
*/
const processingPaths = new Set<string>();
/**
* Register the inline block save hook.
*/
export function registerInlineBlockSaveHook(
plugin: Plugin,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
getSettings: () => PluginSettings
): void {
plugin.registerEvent(
plugin.app.vault.on('modify', (file: TAbstractFile) => {
if (!isFile(file)) return;
const settings = getSettings();
// Skip .secret.md files — handled by full-file save hook
if (matchesEncryptedSuffix(file.name, settings.encryptedNoteSuffix)) {
return;
}
if (processingPaths.has(file.path)) return;
handleInlineBlockEncryption(file, plugin, cryptoEngine, settings).catch(() => {});
})
);
}
/**
* Encrypt ```secret blocks on disk, then restore editor to show decrypted content.
*/
async function handleInlineBlockEncryption(
file: TFile,
plugin: Plugin,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
settings: PluginSettings
): Promise<void> {
processingPaths.add(file.path);
try {
// Read what's on disk
const content = await plugin.app.vault.read(file);
// Check for ```secret blocks
SECRET_BLOCK_REGEX.lastIndex = 0;
if (!SECRET_BLOCK_REGEX.test(content)) {
return;
}
if (!settings.awsCmkArn || settings.awsCmkArn.trim() === '') {
showNotice(`Cannot encrypt inline blocks in "${file.path}": no CMK ARN configured`);
return;
}
SECRET_BLOCK_REGEX.lastIndex = 0;
// Collect matches
const matches: Array<{ fullMatch: string; content: string }> = [];
let match: RegExpExecArray | null;
while ((match = SECRET_BLOCK_REGEX.exec(content)) !== null) {
matches.push({ fullMatch: match[0], content: match[1] });
}
// Encrypt each block
let encryptedContent = content;
for (const m of matches) {
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
const plaintextBytes = encoder.encode(m.content);
const context: EncryptionContext = {
vaultName: plugin.app.vault.getName(),
filePath: file.path,
formatVersion: FORMAT_VERSION,
};
const record = await cryptoEngine.encrypt(
plaintextBytes,
settings.awsCmkArn,
'aws-kms',
context
);
const serializedBytes = serialize(record);
const inlineBlock = encodeInlineBlock(serializedBytes);
encryptedContent = encryptedContent.replace(m.fullMatch, inlineBlock);
}
if (encryptedContent === content) return;
// Write encrypted version to disk
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
await atomicFileWrite(plugin.app.vault, file.path, encoder.encode(encryptedContent));
// Restore editor to show the decrypted (```secret) version
// so the user can continue editing
const activeView = plugin.app.workspace.getActiveViewOfType(MarkdownView);
if (activeView && activeView.file?.path === file.path) {
// Only restore if editor still shows the decrypted content
const editorContent = activeView.editor.getValue();
if (editorContent === content) {
// Editor still has ```secret — good, leave it
// (Obsidian hasn't re-read the file yet)
} else {
// Obsidian re-read the encrypted file — put decrypted back
activeView.editor.setValue(content);
}
}
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof PluginError) {
showErrorNotice(err);
} else {
showNotice(
`Inline block encryption failed for "${file.path}": ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`
);
}
} finally {
processingPaths.delete(file.path);
}
}
function isFile(file: TAbstractFile): file is TFile {
return 'extension' in file;
}

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/**
* Inline block open hook — decrypts ```ocke-v1 blocks in the editor on file open.
*
* Uses multiple strategies to detect when a file with encrypted blocks is opened
* and replaces them with ```secret blocks for editing.
*/
import { Plugin, MarkdownView } from 'obsidian';
import type { CryptoEngine, EncryptionContext, PluginSettings } from '../types';
import { FORMAT_VERSION } from '../constants';
import { decodeInlineBlock } from '../format/inline-codec';
import { parse } from '../format/parser';
import { matchesEncryptedSuffix } from '../policies/suffix-matcher';
const ENCRYPTED_BLOCK_REGEX = /```ocke-v1\n([\s\S]*?)\n```/g;
/** Tracks files already decrypted in this session to avoid re-processing */
const decryptedInSession = new Set<string>();
export function registerInlineBlockOpenHook(
plugin: Plugin,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
getSettings: () => PluginSettings
): void {
const tryDecrypt = async () => {
const settings = getSettings();
if (!settings.autoDecryptBlocks) return;
const activeFile = plugin.app.workspace.getActiveFile();
if (!activeFile) return;
if (matchesEncryptedSuffix(activeFile.name, settings.encryptedNoteSuffix)) return;
// Find the active markdown editor
const activeLeaf = plugin.app.workspace.activeLeaf;
if (!activeLeaf) return;
const view = activeLeaf.view;
if (!(view instanceof MarkdownView)) return;
if (view.file?.path !== activeFile.path) return;
const editor = view.editor;
const content = editor.getValue();
if (!content || content.length === 0) return;
ENCRYPTED_BLOCK_REGEX.lastIndex = 0;
if (!ENCRYPTED_BLOCK_REGEX.test(content)) return;
// Skip if already decrypted in this session (prevents loops)
const contentHash = activeFile.path + ':' + content.length;
if (decryptedInSession.has(contentHash)) return;
decryptedInSession.add(contentHash);
ENCRYPTED_BLOCK_REGEX.lastIndex = 0;
const matches: Array<{ fullMatch: string; base64Content: string }> = [];
let match: RegExpExecArray | null;
while ((match = ENCRYPTED_BLOCK_REGEX.exec(content)) !== null) {
matches.push({ fullMatch: match[0], base64Content: match[1] });
}
let result = content;
let anyDecrypted = false;
for (const m of matches) {
try {
const fullBlock = '```ocke-v1\n' + m.base64Content + '\n```';
const binaryData = decodeInlineBlock(fullBlock);
if (!binaryData) continue;
const record = parse(binaryData);
const context: EncryptionContext = {
vaultName: plugin.app.vault.getName(),
filePath: activeFile.path,
formatVersion: FORMAT_VERSION,
};
const plaintextBytes = await cryptoEngine.decrypt(record, context);
const plaintext = new TextDecoder().decode(plaintextBytes);
const secretBlock = '```secret\n' + plaintext + '\n```';
result = result.replace(m.fullMatch, secretBlock);
anyDecrypted = true;
} catch {
continue;
}
}
if (anyDecrypted) {
editor.setValue(result);
}
};
// Strategy 1: file-open event
plugin.registerEvent(
plugin.app.workspace.on('file-open', async () => {
await sleep(200);
await tryDecrypt();
})
);
// Strategy 2: active-leaf-change
plugin.registerEvent(
plugin.app.workspace.on('active-leaf-change', async () => {
await sleep(200);
await tryDecrypt();
})
);
// Strategy 3: on layout ready (for files already open at plugin load)
plugin.app.workspace.onLayoutReady(async () => {
await sleep(500);
await tryDecrypt();
});
}
function sleep(ms: number): Promise<void> {
return new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
}

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/**
* Open hook — transparent decryption on file open.
*
* Detects when a suffix-matching encrypted note is opened, reads the raw file,
* splits frontmatter from body, checks if body starts with MAGIC_BYTES,
* parses and decrypts via CryptoEngine, and presents the plaintext to the editor.
*
* On failure: sets the view to read-only (preview) mode with an error notice.
*
* Uses `app.workspace.on('file-open')` to detect when a suffix-matching
* file is opened, then reads/decrypts/sets editor content.
*/
import { Plugin, TFile, MarkdownView } from 'obsidian';
import type { CryptoEngine, EncryptionContext, PluginSettings } from '../types';
import { FORMAT_VERSION } from '../constants';
import { matchesEncryptedSuffix } from '../policies/suffix-matcher';
import { isMagicMatch, parse } from '../format/parser';
import { PluginError } from '../providers/errors';
import { showErrorNotice, showNotice } from '../ui/notices';
/**
* Find the end offset of the frontmatter block in raw bytes.
* Frontmatter starts with `---\n` at offset 0 and ends with `\n---\n`.
* Returns the byte offset immediately after the closing `\n---\n`,
* or 0 if no valid frontmatter is found.
*/
function findFrontmatterEndOffset(data: Uint8Array): number {
// Frontmatter must start with `---\n` (0x2D 0x2D 0x2D 0x0A)
if (data.length < 4) return 0;
if (data[0] !== 0x2D || data[1] !== 0x2D || data[2] !== 0x2D || data[3] !== 0x0A) {
return 0;
}
// Search for closing `\n---\n` (0x0A 0x2D 0x2D 0x2D 0x0A)
for (let i = 4; i < data.length - 4; i++) {
if (
data[i] === 0x0A &&
data[i + 1] === 0x2D &&
data[i + 2] === 0x2D &&
data[i + 3] === 0x2D &&
data[i + 4] === 0x0A
) {
return i + 5; // offset after `\n---\n`
}
}
// Check for `\n---` at EOF (no trailing newline)
if (data.length >= 8) {
const last4 = data.length - 4;
if (
data[last4] === 0x0A &&
data[last4 + 1] === 0x2D &&
data[last4 + 2] === 0x2D &&
data[last4 + 3] === 0x2D
) {
return data.length; // entire content is frontmatter
}
}
return 0;
}
/**
* Register the open hook for transparent decryption of suffix-matching notes.
*
* Hooks into `file-open` workspace events to detect when an encrypted
* note is opened, then decrypts and presents the plaintext content to the editor.
*
* @param plugin - The Obsidian plugin instance (for event registration lifecycle)
* @param cryptoEngine - The CryptoEngine for decryption
* @param getSettings - Accessor for current plugin settings
*/
export function registerOpenHook(
plugin: Plugin,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
getSettings: () => PluginSettings
): void {
plugin.registerEvent(
plugin.app.workspace.on('file-open', async (file: TFile | null) => {
if (!file) return;
const settings = getSettings();
// Check if the file matches the encrypted note suffix
if (!matchesEncryptedSuffix(file.name, settings.encryptedNoteSuffix)) return;
try {
await decryptFileOnOpen(plugin, file, cryptoEngine);
} catch (error) {
handleDecryptionFailure(plugin, file, error);
}
})
);
}
/**
* Decrypt a suffix-matching note on open.
*
* Flow:
* 1. Read raw file bytes from vault
* 2. Split into frontmatter (text) + body (binary)
* 3. Check if body starts with MAGIC_BYTES → if not, it's plaintext, pass through
* 4. Parse body bytes → EncryptedFileRecord
* 5. Build EncryptionContext
* 6. Call cryptoEngine.decrypt(record, context) → plaintext bytes
* 7. Decode plaintext to UTF-8
* 8. Present frontmatter + decrypted body to the editor
*/
async function decryptFileOnOpen(
plugin: Plugin,
file: TFile,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine
): Promise<void> {
// 1. Read raw file bytes from vault
const rawBuffer = await plugin.app.vault.readBinary(file);
const rawBytes = new Uint8Array(rawBuffer);
// 2. Split into frontmatter and body at the byte level
const frontmatterEndOffset = findFrontmatterEndOffset(rawBytes);
const bodyBytes = rawBytes.slice(frontmatterEndOffset);
// 3. Check if body starts with MAGIC_BYTES → if not, it's plaintext, pass through
if (!isMagicMatch(bodyBytes)) return;
// 4. Parse body bytes → EncryptedFileRecord
const record = parse(bodyBytes);
// 5. Build EncryptionContext
const context: EncryptionContext = {
vaultName: plugin.app.vault.getName(),
filePath: file.path,
formatVersion: FORMAT_VERSION,
};
// 6. Decrypt via CryptoEngine
const plaintextBytes = await cryptoEngine.decrypt(record, context);
// 7. Decode plaintext to UTF-8
const plaintextBody = new TextDecoder().decode(plaintextBytes);
// 8. Present frontmatter + decrypted body to the editor
const frontmatterText = frontmatterEndOffset > 0
? new TextDecoder().decode(rawBytes.slice(0, frontmatterEndOffset))
: null;
const activeView = plugin.app.workspace.getActiveViewOfType(MarkdownView);
if (activeView && activeView.file?.path === file.path) {
const fullContent = frontmatterText ? frontmatterText + plaintextBody : plaintextBody;
const currentContent = activeView.editor.getValue();
if (currentContent !== fullContent) {
activeView.editor.setValue(fullContent);
}
}
}
/**
* Handle decryption failure by showing an error notice and setting
* the view to read-only (preview) mode.
*/
function handleDecryptionFailure(
plugin: Plugin,
file: TFile,
error: unknown
): void {
// Display error notice
if (error instanceof PluginError) {
showErrorNotice(error);
} else {
const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown decryption error';
showNotice(`Decryption failed for ${file.name}: ${message}`);
}
// Set the active view to read-only (preview) mode
const activeView = plugin.app.workspace.getActiveViewOfType(MarkdownView);
if (activeView && activeView.file?.path === file.path) {
const leaf = activeView.leaf;
if (leaf) {
const viewState = leaf.getViewState();
leaf.setViewState({
...viewState,
state: {
...viewState.state,
mode: 'preview',
},
});
}
}
}

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/**
* Save hook — transparent encryption on save for .secret.md files.
*
* Registers a `vault.on('modify')` event listener that intercepts saves
* for notes matching the configured encrypted suffix. On intercept:
* 1. Read file content from vault
* 2. Split frontmatter/body using splitFrontmatter()
* 3. If body is already an encrypted ```ocke-v1 block, skip
* 4. Encode body to UTF-8 bytes
* 5. Build EncryptionContext
* 6. Call cryptoEngine.encrypt(bodyBytes, cmkArn, 'aws-kms', context)
* 7. Serialize the record to binary, then encode as ```ocke-v1 text block
* 8. Combine: frontmatter + encrypted text block
* 9. Write the combined text content to disk
* 10. On failure: leave file unchanged, show error notice
*
* The encrypted content is stored as a text-based ```ocke-v1 fenced block
* (base64-encoded binary), NOT as raw binary. This ensures Obsidian can
* always open the file as a markdown note, and the CodeMirror widget can
* render the decrypted content visually.
*/
import type { Plugin, TAbstractFile, TFile, Vault } from 'obsidian';
import type { CryptoEngine, EncryptionContext, PluginSettings } from '../types';
import { matchesEncryptedSuffix } from '../policies/suffix-matcher';
import { splitFrontmatter } from '../utils/frontmatter';
import { serialize } from '../format/serializer';
import { encodeInlineBlock } from '../format/inline-codec';
import { atomicFileWrite } from '../utils/atomic-write';
import { FORMAT_VERSION } from '../constants';
import { PluginError } from '../providers/errors';
import { showErrorNotice, showNotice } from '../ui/notices';
/** Regex to detect an existing ```ocke-v1 block */
const ENCRYPTED_BLOCK_REGEX = /^```ocke-v1\n[\s\S]*?\n```$/;
/**
* A set of file paths currently being processed by the save hook.
* Used to prevent re-entrant processing when the write triggers
* another modify event.
*/
const processingPaths = new Set<string>();
/**
* Register the save hook that transparently encrypts suffix-matching notes on save.
*/
export function registerSaveHook(
plugin: Plugin,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
getSettings: () => PluginSettings
): void {
plugin.registerEvent(
plugin.app.vault.on('modify', (file: TAbstractFile) => {
if (!isFile(file)) {
return;
}
const settings = getSettings();
if (!matchesEncryptedSuffix(file.name, settings.encryptedNoteSuffix)) {
return;
}
if (processingPaths.has(file.path)) {
return;
}
handleSaveEncryption(file, plugin.app.vault, cryptoEngine, settings).catch(
() => {}
);
})
);
}
/**
* Handle the encryption of a suffix-matching note on save.
*/
async function handleSaveEncryption(
file: TFile,
vault: Vault,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
settings: PluginSettings
): Promise<void> {
processingPaths.add(file.path);
try {
// 1. Read file content from vault (always text)
const content = await vault.read(file);
// 2. Split frontmatter/body
const { frontmatter, body } = splitFrontmatter(content);
// 3. Check if body is already an encrypted ```ocke-v1 block — skip
if (isAlreadyEncrypted(body)) {
return;
}
// 4. If body is empty, skip encryption
if (body.trim() === '') {
return;
}
// 5. Validate that a CMK ARN is configured
if (!settings.awsCmkArn || settings.awsCmkArn.trim() === '') {
showNotice(`Cannot encrypt "${file.path}": no CMK ARN configured`);
return;
}
// 6. Encode body to UTF-8 bytes
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
const bodyBytes = encoder.encode(body);
// 7. Build EncryptionContext
const context: EncryptionContext = {
vaultName: vault.getName(),
filePath: file.path,
formatVersion: FORMAT_VERSION,
};
// 8. Encrypt
const record = await cryptoEngine.encrypt(
bodyBytes,
settings.awsCmkArn,
'aws-kms',
context
);
// 9. Serialize to binary, then encode as text ```ocke-v1 block
const serializedBytes = serialize(record);
const encryptedTextBlock = encodeInlineBlock(serializedBytes);
// 10. Combine: frontmatter + encrypted text block
const combined = frontmatter
? frontmatter + encryptedTextBlock + '\n'
: encryptedTextBlock + '\n';
// 11. Write as text content to disk
const combinedBytes = encoder.encode(combined);
await atomicFileWrite(vault, file.path, combinedBytes);
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof PluginError) {
showErrorNotice(err);
} else {
showNotice(
`Encryption failed for "${file.path}": ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`
);
}
} finally {
processingPaths.delete(file.path);
}
}
/**
* Check if the body is already an encrypted ```ocke-v1 block.
*/
function isAlreadyEncrypted(body: string): boolean {
return ENCRYPTED_BLOCK_REGEX.test(body.trim());
}
/**
* Type guard to check if a TAbstractFile is a TFile.
*/
function isFile(file: TAbstractFile): file is TFile {
return 'extension' in file;
}

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/**
* Log payload sanitizer for the obsidian-cloud-kms-encryption plugin.
*
* Ensures no sensitive data (plaintext content, DEK bytes, wrapped DEK bytes,
* auth tag bytes, or credential material) appears in any log entry.
*
* Requirements: 15.6
*/
/**
* Known credential-related field names that must never appear in logs.
*/
const SENSITIVE_FIELD_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
'plaintextDek',
'dek',
'wrappedDek',
'authTag',
'ciphertext',
'plaintext',
'secretKey',
'accessKey',
'sessionToken',
'password',
'credential',
'credentials',
'token',
'secret',
'privateKey',
]);
/**
* Known credential patterns that must be redacted from string values.
*/
const CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] = [
// AWS access key IDs
/AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}/g,
// AWS secret keys (base64-like, 40 chars)
/(?<![A-Za-z0-9+/])[A-Za-z0-9+/]{40}(?![A-Za-z0-9+/=])/g,
// Bearer tokens
/Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9\-._~+/]+=*/g,
];
/**
* Sanitize a value for safe inclusion in log output.
* Strips Uint8Array content, credential strings, and sensitive field values.
*
* @param value - Any value to sanitize
* @param fieldName - Optional field name for context-aware sanitization
* @returns A sanitized version safe for logging
*/
export function sanitizeValue(value: unknown, fieldName?: string): unknown {
// Check if the field name itself is sensitive
if (fieldName && SENSITIVE_FIELD_NAMES.has(fieldName)) {
return '[REDACTED]';
}
// Uint8Array content must never appear in logs
if (value instanceof Uint8Array) {
return '[REDACTED binary data]';
}
// ArrayBuffer content must never appear in logs
if (value instanceof ArrayBuffer) {
return '[REDACTED binary data]';
}
if (typeof value === 'string') {
return sanitizeString(value);
}
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
return value.map((item) => sanitizeValue(item));
}
if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {
return sanitizeObject(value as Record<string, unknown>);
}
return value;
}
/**
* Sanitize a string value by redacting credential patterns.
*/
function sanitizeString(value: string): string {
let result = value;
for (const pattern of CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS) {
// Reset lastIndex for global regexes
pattern.lastIndex = 0;
result = result.replace(pattern, '[REDACTED]');
}
return result;
}
/**
* Sanitize an object by recursively checking all fields.
*/
function sanitizeObject(obj: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> {
const sanitized: Record<string, unknown> = {};
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(obj)) {
sanitized[key] = sanitizeValue(value, key);
}
return sanitized;
}
/**
* Sanitize a log payload object, ensuring no sensitive data is present.
* This is the primary entry point for sanitizing log entries before emission.
*
* @param payload - The log payload to sanitize
* @returns A new object safe for logging
*/
export function sanitizeLogPayload(payload: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> {
return sanitizeObject(payload);
}

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/**
* Structured logger for the obsidian-cloud-kms-encryption plugin.
*
* Emits structured JSON log entries to console.log (info) and console.error (error)
* with timestamp, provider, cmkId, filePath, payload size, and other metadata.
*
* All log entries are sanitized before emission to ensure no sensitive data
* (plaintext, DEK, credentials) is ever logged.
*
* Requirements: 15.3, 15.4, 15.5, 15.6
*/
import { sanitizeLogPayload } from './sanitizer';
/**
* Log levels supported by the structured logger.
*/
export type LogLevel = 'info' | 'error';
/**
* Structured log entry emitted by the logger.
*/
export interface LogEntry {
level: LogLevel;
timestamp: string;
providerId: string;
cmkId: string;
filePath: string;
payloadByteLength?: number;
formatVersion?: number;
errorCode?: string;
message: string;
}
/**
* Parameters for logging an encryption event.
*/
export interface LogEncryptParams {
providerId: string;
cmkId: string;
filePath: string;
payloadByteLength: number;
}
/**
* Parameters for logging a decryption event.
*/
export interface LogDecryptParams {
providerId: string;
cmkId: string;
filePath: string;
formatVersion: number;
}
/**
* Parameters for logging an error event.
*/
export interface LogErrorParams {
providerId: string;
cmkId: string;
filePath: string;
errorCode: string;
message: string;
}
/**
* Emit a structured log entry as a JSON string.
* Info-level entries go to console.log, error-level to console.error.
*/
function emit(entry: LogEntry): void {
const sanitized = sanitizeLogPayload(entry as unknown as Record<string, unknown>);
const json = JSON.stringify(sanitized);
if (entry.level === 'error') {
console.error(json);
} else {
console.log(json);
}
}
/**
* Get the current timestamp in ISO-8601 UTC format.
*/
function utcTimestamp(): string {
return new Date().toISOString();
}
/**
* Log a successful encryption event.
*
* Emits a structured info-level log entry containing the provider identifier,
* CMK identifier, vault-relative file path, encrypted payload byte length,
* and a timestamp in ISO-8601 UTC.
*
* Requirement 15.3
*/
export function logEncrypt(params: LogEncryptParams): void {
const entry: LogEntry = {
level: 'info',
timestamp: utcTimestamp(),
providerId: params.providerId,
cmkId: params.cmkId,
filePath: params.filePath,
payloadByteLength: params.payloadByteLength,
message: 'File encrypted successfully',
};
emit(entry);
}
/**
* Log a successful decryption event.
*
* Emits a structured info-level log entry containing the provider identifier,
* CMK identifier, vault-relative file path, on-disk format version,
* and a timestamp in ISO-8601 UTC.
*
* Requirement 15.4
*/
export function logDecrypt(params: LogDecryptParams): void {
const entry: LogEntry = {
level: 'info',
timestamp: utcTimestamp(),
providerId: params.providerId,
cmkId: params.cmkId,
filePath: params.filePath,
formatVersion: params.formatVersion,
message: 'File decrypted successfully',
};
emit(entry);
}
/**
* Log a KMS operation error.
*
* Emits a structured error-level log entry containing the provider identifier,
* CMK identifier, vault-relative file path, provider error code or category,
* and a timestamp in ISO-8601 UTC.
*
* Requirement 15.5
*/
export function logError(params: LogErrorParams): void {
const entry: LogEntry = {
level: 'error',
timestamp: utcTimestamp(),
providerId: params.providerId,
cmkId: params.cmkId,
filePath: params.filePath,
errorCode: params.errorCode,
message: params.message,
};
emit(entry);
}

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/**
* Plugin main entry point — CloudKmsPlugin extends Obsidian Plugin.
*
* Uses monkey-patching of vault.adapter.read/write for transparent encryption:
* - adapter.read(): decrypts ```ocke-v1 → ```secret (editor sees plaintext)
* - adapter.write(): encrypts ```secret → ```ocke-v1 (disk has ciphertext)
*/
import { Plugin } from 'obsidian';
import { PluginSettings } from './types';
import { BufferRegistry } from './core/buffer-registry';
import { ProviderDispatcherImpl } from './providers/dispatcher';
import { AwsKmsAdapter } from './providers/aws-kms-adapter';
import { CryptoEngineImpl } from './core/crypto-engine';
import { CloudKmsSettingsTab, DEFAULT_SETTINGS, loadSettings } from './ui/settings-tab';
import { registerEncryptSelectionCommand } from './commands/encrypt-selection';
import { registerDecryptSelectionCommand } from './commands/decrypt-selection';
import { registerAttachmentHook } from './hooks/attachment-hook';
import { registerEncryptFileCommand } from './commands/encrypt-file';
import { registerDecryptFileCommand } from './commands/decrypt-file';
import { registerEncryptedFileView } from './ui/encrypted-view';
import { installCryptoAdapterPatch } from './hooks/crypto-adapter-patch';
import { installFileExplorerBadge } from './ui/file-explorer-badge';
import { installStatusBar } from './ui/status-bar';
export default class CloudKmsPlugin extends Plugin {
settings: PluginSettings = DEFAULT_SETTINGS;
private bufferRegistry!: BufferRegistry;
private cryptoEngine!: CryptoEngineImpl;
private uninstallAdapterPatch?: () => void;
private originalReadBinary?: (path: string) => Promise<ArrayBuffer>;
private uninstallBadge?: () => void;
private uninstallStatusBar?: () => void;
async onload(): Promise<void> {
// 1. Load settings
await this.loadSettings();
// 2. Create BufferRegistry
this.bufferRegistry = new BufferRegistry();
// 3. Create ProviderDispatcher and register AWS adapter
const dispatcher = new ProviderDispatcherImpl();
dispatcher.register(new AwsKmsAdapter());
// 4. Create CryptoEngine
this.cryptoEngine = new CryptoEngineImpl(dispatcher);
// 5. Register settings tab
this.addSettingTab(new CloudKmsSettingsTab(this.app, this));
// 6. Register commands
registerEncryptSelectionCommand(this, this.cryptoEngine, () => this.settings);
registerDecryptSelectionCommand(this, this.cryptoEngine, () => this.settings);
registerEncryptFileCommand(this, this.cryptoEngine, () => this.settings, () => this.originalReadBinary);
registerDecryptFileCommand(this, this.cryptoEngine, () => this.settings, () => this.originalReadBinary);
// 7. Install crypto adapter patch (transparent encrypt/decrypt)
const adapterPatch = installCryptoAdapterPatch(
this,
this.cryptoEngine,
() => this.settings
);
this.uninstallAdapterPatch = adapterPatch.uninstall;
this.originalReadBinary = adapterPatch.originalReadBinary;
// 8. Register attachment hook
registerAttachmentHook(this, this.cryptoEngine, () => this.settings, this.bufferRegistry);
// 9. File explorer badge for encrypted files
this.uninstallBadge = installFileExplorerBadge(this, this.originalReadBinary!);
// 10. Status bar KMS indicator
this.uninstallStatusBar = installStatusBar(this, () => this.settings);
// 11. Register encrypted file view (fallback for errors)
registerEncryptedFileView(this);
}
async onunload(): Promise<void> {
// Restore original adapter methods
if (this.uninstallAdapterPatch) {
this.uninstallAdapterPatch();
}
// Remove file explorer badges
if (this.uninstallBadge) {
this.uninstallBadge();
}
// Remove status bar
if (this.uninstallStatusBar) {
this.uninstallStatusBar();
}
// Zero all in-memory buffers
this.bufferRegistry.releaseAll();
}
async loadSettings(): Promise<void> {
this.settings = await loadSettings(this);
}
async saveSettings(): Promise<void> {
await this.saveData(this.settings);
}
}

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/**
* Suffix-based file matching for transparent encryption.
*
* Determines whether a file should be transparently encrypted based on its
* file name suffix (for notes) or extension pattern (for attachments).
*/
import { ENCRYPTED_NOTE_SUFFIX_DEFAULT } from "../constants";
/**
* Check if a file name ends with the configured encrypted note suffix.
* Uses case-sensitive exact suffix match on the full file name including extension.
*
* @param fileName - The full file name (e.g. "notes.secret.md")
* @param suffix - The suffix to match (e.g. ".secret.md")
* @returns true if the file name ends with the suffix (case-sensitive)
*
* @example
* matchesEncryptedSuffix("notes.secret.md", ".secret.md") // true
* matchesEncryptedSuffix("notes.Secret.md", ".secret.md") // false
* matchesEncryptedSuffix("secret.md", ".secret.md") // true
* matchesEncryptedSuffix(".secret.md", ".secret.md") // true
*/
export function matchesEncryptedSuffix(
fileName: string,
suffix: string = ENCRYPTED_NOTE_SUFFIX_DEFAULT
): boolean {
if (!fileName || !suffix) {
return false;
}
return fileName.endsWith(suffix);
}
/** Supported encrypted attachment extensions (case-insensitive) */
const ENCRYPTED_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS = [".enc.png", ".enc.jpg", ".enc.pdf"];
/**
* Check if a file name matches an encrypted attachment pattern.
* Uses case-insensitive matching for `.enc.png`, `.enc.jpg`, `.enc.pdf`.
*
* @param fileName - The full file name (e.g. "screenshot.enc.png")
* @returns true if the file name ends with a recognized encrypted attachment extension
*
* @example
* matchesEncryptedAttachment("screenshot.enc.png") // true
* matchesEncryptedAttachment("photo.ENC.JPG") // true
* matchesEncryptedAttachment("doc.enc.pdf") // true
* matchesEncryptedAttachment("notes.secret.md") // false
*/
export function matchesEncryptedAttachment(fileName: string): boolean {
if (!fileName) {
return false;
}
const lowerName = fileName.toLowerCase();
return ENCRYPTED_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS.some((ext) => lowerName.endsWith(ext));
}

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/**
* AWS KMS Provider Adapter — implements ProviderAdapter using @aws-sdk/client-kms.
*
* Handles DEK generation, wrap/unwrap, and access validation against AWS KMS.
* All calls use AbortController with configurable timeout (default 10s).
* Errors are mapped to PluginError categories for structured handling.
*/
import {
KMSClient,
GenerateDataKeyCommand,
EncryptCommand,
DecryptCommand,
DescribeKeyCommand,
} from '@aws-sdk/client-kms';
import { fromIni } from '@aws-sdk/credential-provider-ini';
import { EncryptionContext, GenerateDataKeyResult, ProviderAdapter } from '../types';
import { PluginError } from './errors';
import { KMS_TIMEOUT_MS } from '../constants';
import { extractRegionFromArn } from '../utils/arn-validator';
/**
* Convert an EncryptionContext to the Record<string, string> format expected by KMS API.
*/
function toKmsEncryptionContext(context: EncryptionContext): Record<string, string> {
return {
vaultName: context.vaultName,
filePath: context.filePath,
formatVersion: String(context.formatVersion),
};
}
/**
* Map AWS SDK errors to PluginError categories.
*/
function mapAwsError(err: unknown, cmkId: string): PluginError {
if (err instanceof PluginError) {
return err;
}
const error = err as Error & { name?: string; code?: string; $metadata?: unknown };
const name = error.name ?? '';
const message = error.message ?? 'Unknown AWS KMS error';
// Timeout (AbortController signal)
if (name === 'AbortError' || message.includes('aborted')) {
return new PluginError(
`AWS KMS request timed out for key ${cmkId}`,
'timeout',
'aws-kms',
cmkId,
undefined,
error
);
}
// Credential errors
if (
name === 'CredentialsProviderError' ||
name === 'ExpiredTokenException' ||
name === 'ExpiredToken'
) {
return new PluginError(
`AWS credential error: ${message}`,
'credential',
'aws-kms',
cmkId,
undefined,
error
);
}
// Authorization errors
if (
name === 'AccessDeniedException' ||
name === 'KMSAccessDeniedException' ||
name === 'UnauthorizedAccess'
) {
return new PluginError(
`AWS KMS access denied for key ${cmkId}: ${message}`,
'authorization',
'aws-kms',
cmkId,
undefined,
error
);
}
// Network / internal errors
if (
name === 'KMSInternalException' ||
name === 'NetworkingError' ||
name === 'TimeoutError' ||
name === 'ECONNREFUSED' ||
name === 'ENOTFOUND' ||
message.includes('Network') ||
message.includes('ECONNREFUSED') ||
message.includes('ENOTFOUND') ||
message.includes('socket')
) {
return new PluginError(
`AWS KMS network error for key ${cmkId}: ${message}`,
'network',
'aws-kms',
cmkId,
undefined,
error
);
}
// Key not found or invalid state
if (
name === 'NotFoundException' ||
name === 'DisabledException' ||
name === 'KMSInvalidStateException' ||
name === 'InvalidKeyState'
) {
return new PluginError(
`AWS KMS key unavailable (${name}) for key ${cmkId}: ${message}`,
'validation',
'aws-kms',
cmkId,
undefined,
error
);
}
// Invalid ARN or key ID format
if (name === 'InvalidArnException' || name === 'ValidationException') {
return new PluginError(
`AWS KMS invalid key identifier ${cmkId}: ${message}`,
'validation',
'aws-kms',
cmkId,
undefined,
error
);
}
// Default: crypto category — include the original error name for debugging
return new PluginError(
`AWS KMS error for key ${cmkId} [${name || 'unknown'}]: ${message}`,
'crypto',
'aws-kms',
cmkId,
undefined,
error
);
}
/**
* AWS KMS Provider Adapter.
*
* Uses the AWS SDK default credential provider chain for authentication.
* All KMS API calls include an AbortController timeout and encryption context.
*/
export class AwsKmsAdapter implements ProviderAdapter {
public readonly providerId = 'aws-kms';
private readonly clientFactory: (region?: string) => KMSClient;
private readonly clientCache: Map<string, KMSClient> = new Map();
private readonly timeoutMs: number;
constructor(client?: KMSClient, timeoutMs?: number) {
if (client) {
// If an explicit client is provided (e.g. for testing), always use it
this.clientFactory = () => client;
} else {
// Explicitly use fromIni() to load credentials from ~/.aws/credentials.
// Electron (Obsidian) may not resolve the default credential chain correctly
// because GUI apps on Windows don't always inherit shell environment variables.
this.clientFactory = (region?: string) =>
new KMSClient({
...(region ? { region } : {}),
credentials: fromIni(),
});
}
this.timeoutMs = timeoutMs ?? KMS_TIMEOUT_MS;
}
/**
* Get or create a KMSClient for the region extracted from the CMK ARN.
* Falls back to default credential chain region if ARN parsing fails.
*/
private getClient(cmkId: string): KMSClient {
const region = extractRegionFromArn(cmkId);
const cacheKey = region ?? '__default__';
let client = this.clientCache.get(cacheKey);
if (!client) {
client = this.clientFactory(region);
this.clientCache.set(cacheKey, client);
}
return client;
}
/**
* Generate a fresh 256-bit DEK using KMS GenerateDataKey.
* Returns both the plaintext DEK and the wrapped (encrypted) form.
*/
async generateDataKey(
cmkId: string,
context: EncryptionContext
): Promise<GenerateDataKeyResult> {
const abortController = new AbortController();
const timeout = setTimeout(() => abortController.abort(), this.timeoutMs);
try {
const command = new GenerateDataKeyCommand({
KeyId: cmkId,
KeySpec: 'AES_256',
EncryptionContext: toKmsEncryptionContext(context),
});
const response = await this.getClient(cmkId).send(command, {
abortSignal: abortController.signal,
});
if (!response.Plaintext || !response.CiphertextBlob) {
throw new PluginError(
`AWS KMS GenerateDataKey returned incomplete response for key ${cmkId}`,
'crypto',
'aws-kms',
cmkId
);
}
return {
plaintextDek: new Uint8Array(response.Plaintext),
wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(response.CiphertextBlob),
};
} catch (err) {
throw mapAwsError(err, cmkId);
} finally {
clearTimeout(timeout);
}
}
/**
* Wrap (encrypt) an existing DEK with the specified CMK using KMS Encrypt.
*/
async wrapDek(
dek: Uint8Array,
cmkId: string,
context: EncryptionContext
): Promise<Uint8Array> {
const abortController = new AbortController();
const timeout = setTimeout(() => abortController.abort(), this.timeoutMs);
try {
const command = new EncryptCommand({
KeyId: cmkId,
Plaintext: dek,
EncryptionContext: toKmsEncryptionContext(context),
});
const response = await this.getClient(cmkId).send(command, {
abortSignal: abortController.signal,
});
if (!response.CiphertextBlob) {
throw new PluginError(
`AWS KMS Encrypt returned no ciphertext for key ${cmkId}`,
'crypto',
'aws-kms',
cmkId
);
}
return new Uint8Array(response.CiphertextBlob);
} catch (err) {
throw mapAwsError(err, cmkId);
} finally {
clearTimeout(timeout);
}
}
/**
* Unwrap (decrypt) a wrapped DEK using the specified CMK via KMS Decrypt.
* Verifies that the returned KeyId matches the expected cmkId.
*/
async unwrapDek(
wrappedDek: Uint8Array,
cmkId: string,
context: EncryptionContext
): Promise<Uint8Array> {
const abortController = new AbortController();
const timeout = setTimeout(() => abortController.abort(), this.timeoutMs);
try {
const command = new DecryptCommand({
CiphertextBlob: wrappedDek,
KeyId: cmkId,
EncryptionContext: toKmsEncryptionContext(context),
});
const response = await this.getClient(cmkId).send(command, {
abortSignal: abortController.signal,
});
if (!response.Plaintext) {
throw new PluginError(
`AWS KMS Decrypt returned no plaintext for key ${cmkId}`,
'crypto',
'aws-kms',
cmkId
);
}
// Verify the returned KeyId matches the expected CMK
if (response.KeyId && response.KeyId !== cmkId) {
throw new PluginError(
`AWS KMS Decrypt returned unexpected KeyId: expected ${cmkId}, got ${response.KeyId}`,
'crypto',
'aws-kms',
cmkId
);
}
return new Uint8Array(response.Plaintext);
} catch (err) {
throw mapAwsError(err, cmkId);
} finally {
clearTimeout(timeout);
}
}
/**
* Validate that credentials are available and the CMK is accessible
* by calling DescribeKey.
*/
async validateAccess(cmkId: string): Promise<void> {
const abortController = new AbortController();
const timeout = setTimeout(() => abortController.abort(), this.timeoutMs);
try {
const command = new DescribeKeyCommand({
KeyId: cmkId,
});
await this.getClient(cmkId).send(command, {
abortSignal: abortController.signal,
});
} catch (err) {
throw mapAwsError(err, cmkId);
} finally {
clearTimeout(timeout);
}
}
}

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/**
* Provider Dispatcher — registry and routing for provider adapters.
*
* Maintains a map of providerId → ProviderAdapter and validates
* adapters on registration (duplicate check, interface completeness).
*/
import { ProviderAdapter, ProviderDispatcher } from '../types';
import { PluginError } from './errors';
/**
* Regex for valid provider identifiers: 1–32 lowercase ASCII alphanumeric + hyphens.
* Must not start or end with a hyphen.
*/
const PROVIDER_ID_PATTERN = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,30}[a-z0-9]$|^[a-z0-9]$/;
/**
* Required methods that every ProviderAdapter must implement.
*/
const REQUIRED_METHODS: ReadonlyArray<keyof ProviderAdapter> = [
'generateDataKey',
'wrapDek',
'unwrapDek',
'validateAccess',
];
/**
* Implementation of the ProviderDispatcher interface.
* Manages a registry of provider adapters keyed by providerId.
*/
export class ProviderDispatcherImpl implements ProviderDispatcher {
private readonly registry: Map<string, ProviderAdapter> = new Map();
/**
* Register a provider adapter.
* Validates that the adapter has a valid providerId and implements all required methods.
* Rejects duplicate providerIds and incomplete interface implementations.
*
* @throws PluginError with category 'validation' if providerId is already registered
* @throws PluginError with category 'validation' if providerId format is invalid
* @throws PluginError with category 'validation' if interface is incomplete
*/
register(adapter: ProviderAdapter): void {
// Validate providerId format
if (!adapter.providerId || !PROVIDER_ID_PATTERN.test(adapter.providerId)) {
throw new PluginError(
`Invalid provider identifier "${adapter.providerId}": must be 1–32 lowercase ASCII alphanumeric characters and hyphens`,
'validation'
);
}
// Check for duplicate registration
if (this.registry.has(adapter.providerId)) {
throw new PluginError(
`Provider "${adapter.providerId}" is already registered`,
'validation',
adapter.providerId
);
}
// Validate interface completeness
const missingMethods: string[] = [];
for (const method of REQUIRED_METHODS) {
if (typeof (adapter as unknown as Record<string, unknown>)[method] !== 'function') {
missingMethods.push(method);
}
}
if (missingMethods.length > 0) {
throw new PluginError(
`Provider "${adapter.providerId}" is missing required methods: ${missingMethods.join(', ')}`,
'validation',
adapter.providerId
);
}
this.registry.set(adapter.providerId, adapter);
}
/**
* Get adapter by provider identifier.
*
* @throws PluginError with category 'format' if provider is not registered
*/
getAdapter(providerId: string): ProviderAdapter {
const adapter = this.registry.get(providerId);
if (!adapter) {
throw new PluginError(
`Provider "${providerId}" is not registered`,
'format',
providerId
);
}
return adapter;
}
/**
* List all registered provider identifiers.
*/
listProviders(): string[] {
return Array.from(this.registry.keys());
}
}

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/**
* Error types for the obsidian-cloud-kms-encryption plugin.
*/
/**
* Error category classification for structured error handling.
*/
export type ErrorCategory =
| 'credential'
| 'authorization'
| 'network'
| 'timeout'
| 'integrity'
| 'format'
| 'validation'
| 'crypto'
| 'size-limit';
/**
* Base error class for all plugin errors.
* Carries structured metadata for logging without leaking sensitive data.
*/
export class PluginError extends Error {
public readonly name = 'PluginError';
constructor(
message: string,
public readonly category: ErrorCategory,
public readonly providerId?: string,
public readonly cmkId?: string,
public readonly filePath?: string,
public readonly cause?: Error
) {
super(message);
}
}

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/**
* Shared TypeScript interfaces and types for the obsidian-cloud-kms-encryption plugin.
*/
/**
* Encryption context passed to KMS for audit trail binding.
* Must be identical for wrap and unwrap of the same DEK.
*/
export interface EncryptionContext {
vaultName: string;
filePath: string;
formatVersion: number;
}
/**
* Result of a DEK generation + wrap operation.
*/
export interface GenerateDataKeyResult {
/** Plaintext DEK bytes (256-bit / 32 bytes). Caller MUST zero after use. */
plaintextDek: Uint8Array;
/** DEK encrypted by the CMK. Safe to persist. */
wrappedDek: Uint8Array;
}
/**
* Provider Adapter interface — the single extension point for KMS providers.
* Each adapter implements this interface for one cloud provider.
*/
export interface ProviderAdapter {
/** Unique provider identifier: 1–32 lowercase ASCII alphanumeric + hyphens */
readonly providerId: string;
/**
* Generate a fresh 256-bit DEK and return both plaintext and wrapped forms.
* @param cmkId - Provider-specific CMK identifier (ARN, URI, resource name)
* @param context - Encryption context for audit binding
*/
generateDataKey(
cmkId: string,
context: EncryptionContext
): Promise<GenerateDataKeyResult>;
/**
* Wrap (encrypt) an existing DEK with the specified CMK.
* Used during key rotation to re-wrap under a new CMK.
* @param dek - Plaintext DEK bytes (32 bytes)
* @param cmkId - Target CMK identifier
* @param context - Encryption context for audit binding
*/
wrapDek(
dek: Uint8Array,
cmkId: string,
context: EncryptionContext
): Promise<Uint8Array>;
/**
* Unwrap (decrypt) a wrapped DEK using the specified CMK.
* @param wrappedDek - Encrypted DEK bytes
* @param cmkId - CMK identifier used for the original wrap
* @param context - Encryption context (must match wrap-time context)
*/
unwrapDek(
wrappedDek: Uint8Array,
cmkId: string,
context: EncryptionContext
): Promise<Uint8Array>;
/**
* Validate that credentials are available and the CMK is accessible.
* Used for settings validation and health checks.
* @param cmkId - CMK identifier to validate
*/
validateAccess(cmkId: string): Promise<void>;
}
/**
* CryptoEngine interface — orchestrates envelope encryption.
*/
export interface CryptoEngine {
/**
* Encrypt plaintext using envelope encryption.
* Generates DEK + nonce locally, encrypts with AES-256-GCM,
* wraps DEK via provider, returns serializable record.
*/
encrypt(
plaintext: Uint8Array,
cmkId: string,
providerId: string,
context: EncryptionContext
): Promise<EncryptedFileRecord>;
/**
* Decrypt an EncryptedFileRecord back to plaintext.
* Unwraps DEK via provider, decrypts with AES-256-GCM,
* verifies authentication tag.
*/
decrypt(
record: EncryptedFileRecord,
context: EncryptionContext
): Promise<Uint8Array>;
}
/**
* Provider Dispatcher — registry and routing for provider adapters.
*/
export interface ProviderDispatcher {
/**
* Register a provider adapter. Rejects duplicates.
* @throws if providerId already registered or interface incomplete
*/
register(adapter: ProviderAdapter): void;
/**
* Get adapter by provider identifier.
* @throws ProviderNotFoundError if not registered
*/
getAdapter(providerId: string): ProviderAdapter;
/** List all registered provider identifiers */
listProviders(): string[];
}
/**
* Wrapper around Uint8Array that guarantees zero-fill on release.
* Prevents plaintext from lingering in GC-managed memory.
*/
export interface SecureBuffer {
readonly bytes: Uint8Array;
readonly length: number;
/** Zero-fill the buffer and mark as released. Further access throws. */
release(): void;
/** Whether the buffer has been released */
readonly isReleased: boolean;
}
/**
* On-disk encrypted file record structure.
*/
export interface EncryptedFileRecord {
magic: Uint8Array; // 4 bytes: 0x4F 0x43 0x4B 0x45 ("OCKE")
version: number; // uint16, current = 1
providerId: string; // 1–32 chars ASCII
cmkId: string; // variable length, provider-specific
wrappedDek: Uint8Array; // variable length (provider-dependent)
nonce: Uint8Array; // 12 bytes (96-bit)
authTag: Uint8Array; // 16 bytes (128-bit)
ciphertext: Uint8Array; // variable length
}
/**
* Plugin settings data model.
*/
export interface PluginSettings {
// Primary key (backward compat)
awsCmkArn: string;
// Multi-key support
keys: KeyConfig[];
defaultKeyAlias: string;
// Behavior
encryptedNoteSuffix: string;
autoDecryptBlocks: boolean;
// Phase 3 (future)
providers: ProviderConfig[];
vaultPolicies: EncryptedVaultPolicy[];
}
/**
* Named KMS key configuration.
*/
export interface KeyConfig {
alias: string;
arn: string;
}
/**
* Configuration for a single KMS provider.
*/
export interface ProviderConfig {
providerId: string;
enabled: boolean;
cmkId: string;
}
/**
* Per-folder encrypted vault policy binding.
*/
export interface EncryptedVaultPolicy {
folderPath: string;
providerId: string;
cmkId: string;
}

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/**
* Read-only view for encrypted files when decryption fails.
*
* Displays:
* 1. Error banner (red background) with the failure message
* 2. Raw on-disk content as base64 for inspection
* 3. No editing capabilities (read-only)
*
* Used by the open hook when KMS is unavailable, credentials are missing,
* or ciphertext integrity verification fails.
*/
import { ItemView, Plugin, WorkspaceLeaf } from 'obsidian';
/** Unique view type identifier for the encrypted file read-only view. */
export const ENCRYPTED_FILE_VIEW_TYPE = 'encrypted-file-view';
/** Alias for backward compatibility with open-hook. */
export const ENCRYPTED_VIEW_TYPE = ENCRYPTED_FILE_VIEW_TYPE;
/**
* State stored in the leaf for restoring the view on workspace reload.
*/
interface EncryptedFileViewState extends Record<string, unknown> {
filePath: string;
errorMessage: string;
rawContentBase64: string;
}
/**
* Custom Obsidian view that displays encrypted file content in read-only mode
* when decryption has failed.
*/
export class EncryptedFileView extends ItemView {
private filePath = '';
private errorMessage = '';
private rawContentBase64 = '';
getViewType(): string {
return ENCRYPTED_FILE_VIEW_TYPE;
}
getDisplayText(): string {
return this.filePath
? `Encrypted: ${this.filePath}`
: 'Encrypted File (Read-Only)';
}
getIcon(): string {
return 'lock';
}
/**
* Set the view content programmatically.
*/
setContent(filePath: string, errorMessage: string, rawContent: Uint8Array): void {
this.filePath = filePath;
this.errorMessage = errorMessage;
this.rawContentBase64 = uint8ArrayToBase64(rawContent);
this.render();
}
async onOpen(): Promise<void> {
this.render();
}
async onClose(): Promise<void> {
const container = this.containerEl.children[1];
if (container) {
container.empty();
}
}
getState(): EncryptedFileViewState {
return {
filePath: this.filePath,
errorMessage: this.errorMessage,
rawContentBase64: this.rawContentBase64,
};
}
async setState(state: Partial<EncryptedFileViewState>, result: any): Promise<void> {
if (state.filePath !== undefined) this.filePath = state.filePath;
if (state.errorMessage !== undefined) this.errorMessage = state.errorMessage;
if (state.rawContentBase64 !== undefined) this.rawContentBase64 = state.rawContentBase64;
this.render();
await super.setState(state, result);
}
/**
* Render the view content: error banner + base64 dump.
*/
private render(): void {
const container = this.containerEl.children[1];
if (!container) return;
container.empty();
// Error banner
const banner = container.createEl('div', {
cls: 'encrypted-view-error-banner',
});
banner.style.backgroundColor = 'var(--background-modifier-error)';
banner.style.color = 'var(--text-on-accent)';
banner.style.padding = '12px 16px';
banner.style.borderRadius = '4px';
banner.style.marginBottom = '16px';
banner.style.fontWeight = '600';
const errorIcon = banner.createEl('span');
errorIcon.textContent = '⚠ ';
const errorText = banner.createEl('span');
errorText.textContent = this.errorMessage || 'Decryption failed';
if (this.filePath) {
const fileInfo = banner.createEl('div');
fileInfo.style.marginTop = '4px';
fileInfo.style.fontWeight = '400';
fileInfo.style.fontSize = '0.9em';
fileInfo.textContent = `File: ${this.filePath}`;
}
// Raw content section
const contentSection = container.createEl('div', {
cls: 'encrypted-view-content',
});
const heading = contentSection.createEl('h4');
heading.textContent = 'Raw On-Disk Content (Base64)';
heading.style.marginBottom = '8px';
const codeBlock = contentSection.createEl('pre', {
cls: 'encrypted-view-raw-content',
});
codeBlock.style.whiteSpace = 'pre-wrap';
codeBlock.style.wordBreak = 'break-all';
codeBlock.style.padding = '12px';
codeBlock.style.backgroundColor = 'var(--background-secondary)';
codeBlock.style.borderRadius = '4px';
codeBlock.style.fontSize = '0.85em';
codeBlock.style.fontFamily = 'var(--font-monospace)';
codeBlock.style.maxHeight = '70vh';
codeBlock.style.overflow = 'auto';
codeBlock.style.userSelect = 'text';
const code = codeBlock.createEl('code');
code.textContent = this.rawContentBase64 || '(no content)';
}
}
/**
* Register the encrypted file view type with the plugin.
* Call this during plugin onload().
*/
export function registerEncryptedFileView(plugin: Plugin): void {
plugin.registerView(
ENCRYPTED_FILE_VIEW_TYPE,
(leaf: WorkspaceLeaf) => new EncryptedFileView(leaf)
);
}
/**
* Open the encrypted file read-only view with specific content.
*
* Creates a new leaf and sets the view content to display the error
* and raw file bytes as base64.
*
* @param plugin - The plugin instance
* @param filePath - Vault-relative path of the file that failed to decrypt
* @param errorMessage - Human-readable error description (e.g., "Decryption failed: KMS timeout")
* @param rawContent - Raw on-disk bytes of the encrypted file
*/
export async function openEncryptedFileView(
plugin: Plugin,
filePath: string,
errorMessage: string,
rawContent: Uint8Array
): Promise<void> {
const { workspace } = plugin.app;
// Detach any existing encrypted view leaves for the same file
workspace.detachLeavesOfType(ENCRYPTED_FILE_VIEW_TYPE);
// Get or create a leaf for the view
const leaf = workspace.getLeaf(true);
await leaf.setViewState({
type: ENCRYPTED_FILE_VIEW_TYPE,
active: true,
});
// Set the content on the view
const view = leaf.view;
if (view instanceof EncryptedFileView) {
view.setContent(filePath, errorMessage, rawContent);
}
// Reveal the leaf
workspace.revealLeaf(leaf);
}
/**
* Show the encrypted file read-only view when decryption fails.
*
* This is the primary entry point for displaying failed decryption results.
* It opens a new leaf with the encrypted-file-view type, sets the error
* and raw content on the view so the user can see what's on disk but cannot edit.
*
* @param plugin - The plugin instance
* @param filePath - Vault-relative path of the file that failed to decrypt
* @param rawContent - Raw on-disk bytes of the encrypted file
* @param error - The error that caused decryption to fail
*/
export async function showEncryptedFileError(
plugin: Plugin,
filePath: string,
rawContent: Uint8Array,
error: Error
): Promise<void> {
// Build error message with category if available (PluginError)
let errorMessage: string;
if ('category' in error && typeof (error as any).category === 'string') {
errorMessage = `[${(error as any).category}] ${error.message}`;
} else {
errorMessage = error.message || 'Decryption failed';
}
await openEncryptedFileView(plugin, filePath, errorMessage, rawContent);
}
/**
* Convert a Uint8Array to a base64 string.
* Uses chunked approach to avoid call stack overflow on large arrays.
*/
function uint8ArrayToBase64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {
if (bytes.length === 0) return '';
// Process in chunks to avoid maximum call stack size exceeded
const chunkSize = 8192;
let binary = '';
for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i += chunkSize) {
const chunk = bytes.subarray(i, Math.min(i + chunkSize, bytes.length));
for (let j = 0; j < chunk.length; j++) {
binary += String.fromCharCode(chunk[j]);
}
}
return btoa(binary);
}

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/**
* Adds a 🔒 badge to encrypted files in the file explorer.
*
* Scans vault for files with OCKE magic bytes and marks them
* with a CSS class that shows a lock icon via ::after pseudo-element.
*/
import type { Plugin } from 'obsidian';
const ENCRYPTED_CLASS = 'ocke-encrypted-file';
const STYLE_ID = 'ocke-encrypted-badge-style';
/**
* Set of file paths known to be encrypted.
*/
const encryptedPaths = new Set<string>();
/**
* Install the file explorer badge system.
* Returns a cleanup function.
*/
export function installFileExplorerBadge(
plugin: Plugin,
originalReadBinary: (path: string) => Promise<ArrayBuffer>
): () => void {
// Inject CSS for the badge
const style = document.createElement('style');
style.id = STYLE_ID;
style.textContent = `
.nav-file.${ENCRYPTED_CLASS} .nav-file-title-content::after {
content: ' 🔒';
font-size: 0.8em;
opacity: 0.7;
}
`;
document.head.appendChild(style);
// Scan vault on layout ready
plugin.app.workspace.onLayoutReady(async () => {
await scanVaultForEncryptedFiles(plugin, originalReadBinary);
applyBadges(plugin);
});
// Re-apply badges when file explorer updates
const interval = window.setInterval(() => {
applyBadges(plugin);
}, 3000);
plugin.register(() => {
window.clearInterval(interval);
});
// Return cleanup
return () => {
window.clearInterval(interval);
const el = document.getElementById(STYLE_ID);
if (el) el.remove();
removeBadges();
};
}
/**
* Mark a file path as encrypted (call after encrypting).
*/
export function markFileEncrypted(filePath: string): void {
encryptedPaths.add(filePath);
}
/**
* Unmark a file path as encrypted (call after decrypting).
*/
export function markFileDecrypted(filePath: string): void {
encryptedPaths.delete(filePath);
}
/**
* Scan vault for encrypted binary files (check first 4 bytes for OCKE magic).
*/
async function scanVaultForEncryptedFiles(
plugin: Plugin,
originalReadBinary: (path: string) => Promise<ArrayBuffer>
): Promise<void> {
const files = plugin.app.vault.getFiles();
for (const file of files) {
if (file.path.endsWith('.md')) continue;
try {
const data = await originalReadBinary(file.path);
const bytes = new Uint8Array(data, 0, Math.min(4, data.byteLength));
if (bytes.length >= 4 && bytes[0] === 0x4F && bytes[1] === 0x43 && bytes[2] === 0x4B && bytes[3] === 0x45) {
encryptedPaths.add(file.path);
}
} catch {
// Skip unreadable files
}
}
}
/**
* Apply CSS class to file explorer items for encrypted files.
*/
function applyBadges(_plugin: Plugin): void {
const fileExplorer = document.querySelectorAll('.nav-file');
fileExplorer.forEach((el) => {
const titleEl = el.querySelector('.nav-file-title');
if (!titleEl) return;
const path = titleEl.getAttribute('data-path');
if (!path) return;
if (encryptedPaths.has(path)) {
el.classList.add(ENCRYPTED_CLASS);
} else {
el.classList.remove(ENCRYPTED_CLASS);
}
});
}
/**
* Remove all badges.
*/
function removeBadges(): void {
document.querySelectorAll(`.${ENCRYPTED_CLASS}`).forEach((el) => {
el.classList.remove(ENCRYPTED_CLASS);
});
}

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/**
* Notice helper functions for displaying user-facing messages.
* All notices display for at least 5 seconds (NOTICE_DURATION_MS).
*/
import { Notice } from 'obsidian';
import { NOTICE_DURATION_MS } from '../constants';
import { PluginError, ErrorCategory } from '../providers/errors';
/**
* Category-specific message prefixes for user-friendly error display.
*/
const CATEGORY_PREFIXES: Record<ErrorCategory, string> = {
credential: 'Authentication failed: ',
authorization: 'Access denied: ',
network: 'Network error: ',
timeout: 'Request timed out',
integrity: 'Integrity check failed',
format: 'File format error: ',
validation: 'Configuration error: ',
crypto: 'Encryption error: ',
'size-limit': 'File too large: ',
};
/**
* Display an error notice with a category-specific prefix.
* The notice is shown for at least NOTICE_DURATION_MS (5s).
*/
export function showErrorNotice(error: PluginError): void {
const prefix = CATEGORY_PREFIXES[error.category];
// Some categories have self-contained prefixes (no trailing colon/space),
// so only append the error message if the prefix ends with a separator.
const needsMessage = prefix.endsWith(': ');
const message = needsMessage ? `${prefix}${error.message}` : prefix;
new Notice(message, NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
}
/**
* Display a simple informational notice.
* The notice is shown for at least NOTICE_DURATION_MS (5s).
*/
export function showNotice(message: string): void {
new Notice(message, NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
}

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/**
* Markdown code block processor for ```ocke-v1 blocks.
*
* Registers a code block processor that renders encrypted blocks
* as visual widgets in both Reading view and Live Preview mode.
*
* Key principle: the actual document text is NEVER modified.
* The processor only controls how the block is rendered visually.
*
* - If decryption succeeds: shows 🔓 header + decrypted plaintext
* - If decryption fails: shows 🔒 header + truncated ciphertext
*/
import { Plugin, MarkdownPostProcessorContext } from 'obsidian';
import type { CryptoEngine, EncryptionContext } from '../types';
import { decodeInlineBlock } from '../format/inline-codec';
import { parse } from '../format/parser';
import { FORMAT_VERSION } from '../constants';
/**
* Cache of decrypted content keyed by base64 content.
*/
const decryptionCache = new Map<string, { plaintext: string | null; error: boolean }>();
/**
* Register the ocke-v1 code block processor.
*
* This makes Obsidian render ```ocke-v1 blocks with a custom visual
* instead of showing raw base64 text.
*/
export function registerSecretBlockProcessor(
plugin: Plugin,
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
getVaultName: () => string,
getFilePath: () => string
): void {
plugin.registerMarkdownCodeBlockProcessor(
'ocke-v1',
async (source: string, el: HTMLElement, _ctx: MarkdownPostProcessorContext) => {
const base64Content = source.trim();
// Create container
const container = el.createDiv({ cls: 'ocke-secret-block' });
container.style.border = '1px solid var(--background-modifier-border)';
container.style.borderRadius = '4px';
container.style.overflow = 'hidden';
// Header
const header = container.createDiv({ cls: 'ocke-secret-block-header' });
header.style.padding = '4px 8px';
header.style.fontSize = '0.8em';
header.style.fontWeight = 'bold';
header.style.display = 'flex';
header.style.alignItems = 'center';
header.style.gap = '4px';
// Content area
const content = container.createEl('pre', { cls: 'ocke-secret-block-content' });
content.style.padding = '8px';
content.style.margin = '0';
content.style.whiteSpace = 'pre-wrap';
content.style.wordBreak = 'break-word';
content.style.fontFamily = 'var(--font-monospace)';
content.style.fontSize = '0.9em';
content.style.background = 'var(--background-secondary)';
// Check cache first
const cached = decryptionCache.get(base64Content);
if (cached) {
if (cached.error) {
renderLocked(header, content, base64Content);
} else {
renderDecrypted(header, content, cached.plaintext ?? '');
}
return;
}
// Show loading state
header.style.background = 'var(--background-modifier-border)';
header.style.color = 'var(--text-muted)';
header.textContent = '⏳ secret (decrypting...)';
content.textContent = '...';
content.style.color = 'var(--text-muted)';
// Attempt decryption
try {
const fullBlock = '```ocke-v1\n' + base64Content + '\n```';
const binaryData = decodeInlineBlock(fullBlock);
if (!binaryData) {
decryptionCache.set(base64Content, { plaintext: null, error: true });
renderLocked(header, content, base64Content);
return;
}
const record = parse(binaryData);
const context: EncryptionContext = {
vaultName: getVaultName(),
filePath: getFilePath(),
formatVersion: FORMAT_VERSION,
};
const plaintextBytes = await cryptoEngine.decrypt(record, context);
const plaintext = new TextDecoder().decode(plaintextBytes);
decryptionCache.set(base64Content, { plaintext, error: false });
renderDecrypted(header, content, plaintext);
} catch {
decryptionCache.set(base64Content, { plaintext: null, error: true });
renderLocked(header, content, base64Content);
}
}
);
}
function renderDecrypted(header: HTMLElement, content: HTMLElement, plaintext: string): void {
header.style.background = 'var(--interactive-accent)';
header.style.color = 'var(--text-on-accent)';
header.textContent = '🔓 secret (decrypted)';
content.textContent = plaintext;
content.style.color = '';
}
function renderLocked(header: HTMLElement, content: HTMLElement, base64Content: string): void {
header.style.background = 'var(--background-modifier-error)';
header.style.color = 'var(--text-error)';
header.textContent = '🔒 secret (locked — no key access)';
const preview = base64Content.length > 80
? base64Content.slice(0, 80) + '…'
: base64Content;
content.textContent = preview;
content.style.color = 'var(--text-muted)';
content.style.fontStyle = 'italic';
}
/**
* Clear the decryption cache.
*/
export function clearDecryptionCache(): void {
decryptionCache.clear();
}

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/**
* CodeMirror ViewPlugin that renders ```ocke-v1 blocks as visual "secret" widgets.
*
* Key principle: the actual document text is NEVER modified.
* The encrypted data stays on disk and in the editor buffer at all times.
* This plugin only provides a visual overlay (widget decoration) that shows
* the decrypted content when the key is available, or a "locked" indicator otherwise.
*/
import {
ViewPlugin,
ViewUpdate,
WidgetType,
Decoration,
DecorationSet,
EditorView,
} from '@codemirror/view';
import { RangeSetBuilder } from '@codemirror/state';
import type { CryptoEngine, EncryptionContext } from '../types';
import { decodeInlineBlock } from '../format/inline-codec';
import { parse } from '../format/parser';
import { FORMAT_VERSION } from '../constants';
/**
* Regex to find ```ocke-v1 blocks with their positions.
*/
const ENCRYPTED_BLOCK_REGEX = /```ocke-v1\n([\s\S]*?)\n```/g;
/**
* Cache of decrypted content keyed by base64 content.
*/
const decryptionCache = new Map<string, { plaintext: string | null; error: boolean }>();
/**
* Widget that displays decrypted content inside a styled container.
*/
class DecryptedBlockWidget extends WidgetType {
constructor(
private readonly plaintext: string | null,
private readonly isLocked: boolean,
private readonly encryptedPreview: string
) {
super();
}
toDOM(): HTMLElement {
const container = document.createElement('div');
container.className = 'ocke-secret-block';
container.style.border = '1px solid var(--background-modifier-border)';
container.style.borderRadius = '4px';
container.style.margin = '4px 0';
container.style.overflow = 'hidden';
// Header
const header = document.createElement('div');
header.style.padding = '4px 8px';
header.style.fontSize = '0.8em';
header.style.fontWeight = 'bold';
header.style.display = 'flex';
header.style.alignItems = 'center';
header.style.gap = '4px';
if (this.isLocked) {
header.style.background = 'var(--background-modifier-error)';
header.style.color = 'var(--text-error)';
header.textContent = '🔒 secret (locked — no key access)';
} else if (this.plaintext === null) {
header.style.background = 'var(--background-modifier-border)';
header.style.color = 'var(--text-muted)';
header.textContent = '⏳ secret (decrypting...)';
} else {
header.style.background = 'var(--interactive-accent)';
header.style.color = 'var(--text-on-accent)';
header.textContent = '🔓 secret (decrypted)';
}
container.appendChild(header);
// Content
const content = document.createElement('pre');
content.style.padding = '8px';
content.style.margin = '0';
content.style.whiteSpace = 'pre-wrap';
content.style.wordBreak = 'break-word';
content.style.fontFamily = 'var(--font-monospace)';
content.style.fontSize = '0.9em';
content.style.background = 'var(--background-secondary)';
if (this.isLocked) {
const preview = this.encryptedPreview.length > 80
? this.encryptedPreview.slice(0, 80) + '…'
: this.encryptedPreview;
content.textContent = preview;
content.style.color = 'var(--text-muted)';
content.style.fontStyle = 'italic';
} else if (this.plaintext === null) {
content.textContent = '...';
content.style.color = 'var(--text-muted)';
} else {
content.textContent = this.plaintext;
}
container.appendChild(content);
return container;
}
eq(other: DecryptedBlockWidget): boolean {
return (
this.plaintext === other.plaintext &&
this.isLocked === other.isLocked &&
this.encryptedPreview === other.encryptedPreview
);
}
ignoreEvent(): boolean {
return false;
}
}
/**
* Create the secret block ViewPlugin for a given crypto engine and vault context.
*/
export function createSecretBlockViewPlugin(
cryptoEngine: CryptoEngine,
getVaultName: () => string,
getFilePath: () => string
) {
return ViewPlugin.fromClass(
class {
decorations: DecorationSet;
constructor(view: EditorView) {
this.decorations = this.buildDecorations(view);
}
update(update: ViewUpdate) {
if (update.docChanged || update.viewportChanged || update.selectionSet) {
this.decorations = this.buildDecorations(update.view);
}
}
buildDecorations(view: EditorView): DecorationSet {
const builder = new RangeSetBuilder<Decoration>();
const doc = view.state.doc;
const text = doc.toString();
ENCRYPTED_BLOCK_REGEX.lastIndex = 0;
let match: RegExpExecArray | null;
const blocks: Array<{ from: number; to: number; base64: string }> = [];
while ((match = ENCRYPTED_BLOCK_REGEX.exec(text)) !== null) {
blocks.push({
from: match.index,
to: match.index + match[0].length,
base64: match[1].trim(),
});
}
const cursorPos = view.state.selection.main.head;
for (const block of blocks) {
// If cursor is inside this block, don't decorate — let user see raw text
if (cursorPos >= block.from && cursorPos <= block.to) {
continue;
}
const cached = decryptionCache.get(block.base64);
if (cached) {
const widget = new DecryptedBlockWidget(
cached.plaintext,
cached.error,
block.base64
);
builder.add(block.from, block.to, Decoration.replace({ widget }));
} else {
// Show placeholder and trigger async decryption
const widget = new DecryptedBlockWidget(null, false, block.base64);
builder.add(block.from, block.to, Decoration.replace({ widget }));
// Trigger decryption without blocking
this.triggerDecrypt(block.base64, view);
}
}
return builder.finish();
}
triggerDecrypt(base64Content: string, view: EditorView) {
// Don't re-trigger if already in cache or pending
if (decryptionCache.has(base64Content)) return;
// Mark as pending to avoid duplicate requests
decryptionCache.set(base64Content, { plaintext: null, error: false });
const fullBlock = '```ocke-v1\n' + base64Content + '\n```';
(async () => {
try {
const binaryData = decodeInlineBlock(fullBlock);
if (!binaryData) {
decryptionCache.set(base64Content, { plaintext: null, error: true });
return;
}
const record = parse(binaryData);
const context: EncryptionContext = {
vaultName: getVaultName(),
filePath: getFilePath(),
formatVersion: FORMAT_VERSION,
};
const plaintextBytes = await cryptoEngine.decrypt(record, context);
const plaintext = new TextDecoder().decode(plaintextBytes);
decryptionCache.set(base64Content, { plaintext, error: false });
} catch {
decryptionCache.set(base64Content, { plaintext: null, error: true });
}
// Request a re-render by scheduling a view measure
// This is safe and won't cause infinite loops
requestAnimationFrame(() => {
view.requestMeasure();
});
})();
}
},
{
decorations: (v) => v.decorations,
}
);
}
/**
* Clear the decryption cache (e.g., on plugin unload).
*/
export function clearDecryptionCache(): void {
decryptionCache.clear();
}

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/**
* Plugin settings tab — multi-key configuration with aliases.
*/
import { App, PluginSettingTab, Setting } from "obsidian";
import type { PluginSettings, KeyConfig } from "../types";
import { validateAwsKmsArn } from "../utils/arn-validator";
/** Maximum length for the AWS KMS Key ARN field (characters). */
const ARN_MAX_LENGTH = 512;
/** Default plugin settings. */
export const DEFAULT_SETTINGS: PluginSettings = {
awsCmkArn: "",
keys: [],
defaultKeyAlias: "",
encryptedNoteSuffix: ".secret.md",
autoDecryptBlocks: true,
providers: [],
vaultPolicies: [],
};
/**
* Minimal interface for the plugin instance needed by settings.
*/
export interface SettingsPlugin {
app: App;
settings: PluginSettings;
loadData(): Promise<unknown>;
saveData(data: unknown): Promise<void>;
}
/**
* Load settings from Obsidian's data store, merging with defaults.
*/
export async function loadSettings(
plugin: SettingsPlugin
): Promise<PluginSettings> {
const data = await plugin.loadData();
return Object.assign({}, DEFAULT_SETTINGS, data ?? {});
}
/**
* Cloud KMS Encryption plugin settings tab.
*/
export class CloudKmsSettingsTab extends PluginSettingTab {
private plugin: SettingsPlugin;
constructor(app: App, plugin: SettingsPlugin) {
super(app, plugin as any);
this.plugin = plugin;
}
display(): void {
const { containerEl } = this;
containerEl.empty();
containerEl.createEl("h2", { text: "Cloud KMS Encryption Settings" });
// --- Keys section ---
containerEl.createEl("h3", { text: "Encryption Keys" });
containerEl.createEl("p", {
text: "Add KMS keys with aliases. Use aliases in %%secret-start:alias%% markers. The default key is used when no alias is specified.",
cls: "setting-item-description",
});
this.addKeysSection(containerEl);
// --- Default key ---
this.addDefaultKeySetting(containerEl);
// --- Legacy single key (backward compat) ---
containerEl.createEl("h3", { text: "Legacy Settings" });
containerEl.createEl("p", {
text: "Used as fallback if no keys are configured above.",
cls: "setting-item-description",
});
this.addArnSetting(containerEl);
// --- Behavior ---
containerEl.createEl("h3", { text: "Behavior" });
this.addAutoDecryptBlocksSetting(containerEl);
}
private addKeysSection(containerEl: HTMLElement): void {
const keys = this.plugin.settings.keys;
// Render existing keys
for (let i = 0; i < keys.length; i++) {
this.addKeyRow(containerEl, keys[i], i);
}
// Add button
new Setting(containerEl)
.addButton((btn) => {
btn.setButtonText("+ Add Key").onClick(async () => {
this.plugin.settings.keys.push({ alias: "", arn: "" });
await this.plugin.saveData(this.plugin.settings);
this.display(); // Re-render
});
});
}
private addKeyRow(containerEl: HTMLElement, key: KeyConfig, index: number): void {
const setting = new Setting(containerEl)
.setName(`Key ${index + 1}`)
.addText((text) => {
text
.setPlaceholder("alias (e.g. finance)")
.setValue(key.alias)
.onChange(async (value: string) => {
this.plugin.settings.keys[index].alias = value.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9_-]/g, '');
await this.plugin.saveData(this.plugin.settings);
});
text.inputEl.style.width = "120px";
})
.addText((text) => {
text
.setPlaceholder("arn:aws:kms:region:account:key/id")
.setValue(key.arn)
.onChange(async (value: string) => {
this.plugin.settings.keys[index].arn = value.slice(0, ARN_MAX_LENGTH);
await this.plugin.saveData(this.plugin.settings);
});
text.inputEl.style.width = "300px";
})
.addButton((btn) => {
btn.setButtonText("✕").setWarning().onClick(async () => {
this.plugin.settings.keys.splice(index, 1);
// Clear defaultKeyAlias if it was pointing to removed key
if (this.plugin.settings.defaultKeyAlias === key.alias) {
this.plugin.settings.defaultKeyAlias = "";
}
await this.plugin.saveData(this.plugin.settings);
this.display(); // Re-render
});
});
// Validation
if (key.arn && !validateAwsKmsArn(key.arn).valid) {
const errorEl = setting.controlEl.createEl("div", {
text: "Invalid ARN format",
cls: "setting-error-message",
});
errorEl.style.color = "var(--text-error)";
errorEl.style.fontSize = "0.8em";
}
}
private addDefaultKeySetting(containerEl: HTMLElement): void {
const keys = this.plugin.settings.keys;
const aliases = keys.filter(k => k.alias).map(k => k.alias);
new Setting(containerEl)
.setName("Default key")
.setDesc("Used when %%secret-start%% has no alias specified")
.addDropdown((dropdown) => {
dropdown.addOption("", "(none)");
for (const alias of aliases) {
dropdown.addOption(alias, alias);
}
dropdown.setValue(this.plugin.settings.defaultKeyAlias);
dropdown.onChange(async (value: string) => {
this.plugin.settings.defaultKeyAlias = value;
await this.plugin.saveData(this.plugin.settings);
});
});
}
private addArnSetting(containerEl: HTMLElement): void {
let errorEl: HTMLElement | null = null;
const setting = new Setting(containerEl)
.setName("AWS KMS Key ARN (legacy)")
.setDesc("Fallback key if no keys configured above")
.addText((text) => {
text
.setPlaceholder("arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/...")
.setValue(this.plugin.settings.awsCmkArn)
.onChange(async (value: string) => {
const clamped = value.slice(0, ARN_MAX_LENGTH);
if (errorEl) { errorEl.remove(); errorEl = null; }
const stripped = clamped.trim();
if (stripped.length > 0 && !validateAwsKmsArn(stripped).valid) {
errorEl = setting.controlEl.createEl("div", {
text: "Invalid AWS KMS key ARN format",
cls: "setting-error-message",
});
errorEl.style.color = "var(--text-error)";
errorEl.style.fontSize = "0.85em";
errorEl.style.marginTop = "4px";
}
this.plugin.settings.awsCmkArn = clamped;
await this.plugin.saveData(this.plugin.settings);
});
text.inputEl.maxLength = ARN_MAX_LENGTH;
text.inputEl.style.width = "100%";
});
}
private addAutoDecryptBlocksSetting(containerEl: HTMLElement): void {
new Setting(containerEl)
.setName("Auto-decrypt on read")
.setDesc("Automatically decrypt encrypted blocks when opening files")
.addToggle((toggle) => {
toggle
.setValue(this.plugin.settings.autoDecryptBlocks)
.onChange(async (value: boolean) => {
this.plugin.settings.autoDecryptBlocks = value;
await this.plugin.saveData(this.plugin.settings);
});
});
}
}

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/**
* Status bar indicator showing KMS connection status.
*
* Displays in Obsidian's bottom status bar:
* - 🔓 KMS OK — credentials valid, key accessible
* - 🔒 KMS ⚠️ — cannot reach KMS (no credentials, network, or key access)
* - ⏳ KMS ... — checking connection
*
* Checks on:
* - Plugin load
* - Every 5 minutes (background)
* - Manual click on status bar item
*/
import { Plugin } from 'obsidian';
import type { PluginSettings } from '../types';
import { AwsKmsAdapter } from '../providers/aws-kms-adapter';
import { resolveKeyArn } from '../utils/key-resolver';
const CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000; // 5 minutes
export function installStatusBar(
plugin: Plugin,
getSettings: () => PluginSettings
): () => void {
const statusBarEl = plugin.addStatusBarItem();
statusBarEl.addClass('ocke-status-bar');
statusBarEl.setText('⏳ KMS ...');
let intervalId: number | null = null;
const checkStatus = async () => {
const settings = getSettings();
const arn = resolveKeyArn(undefined, settings);
if (!arn) {
setStatus('error', 'No key configured');
return;
}
setStatus('checking', '');
try {
const adapter = new AwsKmsAdapter(undefined, 5000); // 5s timeout for health check
await adapter.validateAccess(arn);
setStatus('ok', '');
} catch {
setStatus('error', 'Cannot reach KMS');
}
};
const setStatus = (status: 'ok' | 'error' | 'checking', detail: string) => {
switch (status) {
case 'ok':
statusBarEl.setText('🔓 KMS');
statusBarEl.setAttribute('title', 'KMS connection OK — encryption/decryption available');
statusBarEl.style.color = '';
break;
case 'error':
statusBarEl.setText('🔒 KMS ⚠️');
statusBarEl.setAttribute('title', `KMS unavailable: ${detail}\nSecret blocks will NOT be encrypted on save!`);
statusBarEl.style.color = 'var(--text-error)';
break;
case 'checking':
statusBarEl.setText('⏳ KMS');
statusBarEl.setAttribute('title', 'Checking KMS connection...');
statusBarEl.style.color = 'var(--text-muted)';
break;
}
};
// Click to re-check
statusBarEl.addEventListener('click', () => {
checkStatus();
});
// Initial check after layout ready
plugin.app.workspace.onLayoutReady(() => {
setTimeout(checkStatus, 2000);
});
// Periodic check
intervalId = window.setInterval(checkStatus, CHECK_INTERVAL_MS);
plugin.register(() => {
if (intervalId !== null) window.clearInterval(intervalId);
});
return () => {
if (intervalId !== null) window.clearInterval(intervalId);
statusBarEl.remove();
};
}

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60
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/**
* AWS KMS ARN format validator.
*
* Validates that a string conforms to the AWS KMS key ARN pattern:
* arn:aws:kms:{region}:{account-id}:key/{key-id}
*
* Where:
* - region is a non-empty string
* - account-id is a 12-digit numeric string
* - key-id is a non-empty string
*/
/**
* Result of ARN validation.
*/
export interface ArnValidationResult {
valid: boolean;
error?: string;
}
/**
* Regex pattern for AWS KMS key ARN.
* Format: arn:aws:kms:{region}:{12-digit-account}:key/{key-id}
*/
const AWS_KMS_ARN_PATTERN = /^arn:aws:kms:[^:]+:\d{12}:key\/.+$/;
/**
* Validates an AWS KMS key ARN string.
*
* @param arn - The ARN string to validate
* @returns Validation result with optional error message
*/
export function validateAwsKmsArn(arn: string): ArnValidationResult {
if (!arn || arn.trim().length === 0) {
return { valid: false, error: "ARN is required" };
}
if (!AWS_KMS_ARN_PATTERN.test(arn)) {
return { valid: false, error: "Invalid AWS KMS key ARN format" };
}
return { valid: true };
}
/**
* Extract the AWS region from a KMS key ARN.
*
* ARN format: arn:aws:kms:{region}:{account-id}:key/{key-id}
*
* @param arn - A valid AWS KMS key ARN
* @returns The region string, or undefined if the ARN is malformed
*/
export function extractRegionFromArn(arn: string): string | undefined {
const parts = arn.split(':');
// arn:aws:kms:region:account:key/id → parts[3] is region
if (parts.length >= 6 && parts[0] === 'arn' && parts[2] === 'kms') {
return parts[3] || undefined;
}
return undefined;
}

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import { Vault } from 'obsidian';
import { PluginError } from '../providers/errors';
/**
* Writes binary content to a file in the vault.
*
* Uses vault.adapter.writeBinary() which overwrites the file in place.
* This is safe in Obsidian's single-threaded environment.
*
* @param vault - Obsidian Vault instance providing file system access
* @param path - Target file path (vault-relative)
* @param newContent - The bytes to write
* @throws PluginError with category 'crypto' on any failure
*/
export async function atomicFileWrite(
vault: Vault,
path: string,
newContent: Uint8Array
): Promise<void> {
try {
await vault.adapter.writeBinary(path, newContent);
} catch (err) {
throw new PluginError(
`Write failed for ${path}`,
'crypto',
undefined,
undefined,
path,
err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err))
);
}
}

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/**
* Frontmatter detection and splitting utility.
*
* Detects YAML frontmatter blocks delimited by `---` at the start of a note
* and splits the note into frontmatter + body components.
*
* Frontmatter rules:
* - Starts with `---\n` at position 0
* - Ends with `\n---\n` (or `\n---` at EOF)
* - Frontmatter includes the `---` delimiters themselves (written back as-is)
* - Body is everything after the closing `---\n`
*/
/**
* Result of splitting a note into frontmatter and body.
*/
export interface FrontmatterSplitResult {
/** The frontmatter block including `---` delimiters, or null if none detected. */
frontmatter: string | null;
/** The body content after the frontmatter, or the entire content if no frontmatter. */
body: string;
}
/**
* Split a note's content into frontmatter and body.
*
* Frontmatter is detected when the content starts with `---\n` at position 0
* and a closing `\n---\n` (or `\n---` at EOF) is found.
*
* @param content - The full note content as a string
* @returns The split result with frontmatter (or null) and body
*/
export function splitFrontmatter(content: string): FrontmatterSplitResult {
// Frontmatter must start with `---\n` at position 0
if (!content.startsWith('---\n')) {
return { frontmatter: null, body: content };
}
// Search for the closing delimiter: `\n---\n` or `\n---` at EOF
const searchStart = 4; // Skip the opening `---\n`
const closingDelimiter = '\n---\n';
const closingIndex = content.indexOf(closingDelimiter, searchStart);
if (closingIndex !== -1) {
// Found `\n---\n` — frontmatter includes up to and including `\n---\n`
const frontmatterEnd = closingIndex + closingDelimiter.length;
const frontmatter = content.slice(0, frontmatterEnd);
const body = content.slice(frontmatterEnd);
return { frontmatter, body };
}
// Check for `\n---` at EOF (no trailing newline after closing delimiter)
const closingAtEof = '\n---';
if (content.endsWith(closingAtEof) && content.length > searchStart + closingAtEof.length) {
// The entire content is frontmatter with no body
return { frontmatter: content, body: '' };
}
// No valid closing delimiter found — treat entire content as body
return { frontmatter: null, body: content };
}

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/**
* Key resolver — resolves alias to ARN for encryption.
*
* Resolution order:
* 1. If alias provided → look up in settings.keys[]
* 2. If no alias → use settings.defaultKeyAlias → look up in settings.keys[]
* 3. Fallback → settings.awsCmkArn (backward compat)
*
* For decryption: ARN is already stored in the encrypted data (cmkId field).
* No resolution needed — just call KMS Decrypt with that ARN.
*/
import type { PluginSettings } from '../types';
/**
* Resolve a key alias to an ARN for encryption.
*
* @param alias - Optional alias from the secret block marker (e.g., "finance")
* @param settings - Current plugin settings
* @returns The ARN to use, or null if no valid key found
*/
export function resolveKeyArn(alias: string | undefined, settings: PluginSettings): string | null {
// If alias specified, look it up
if (alias) {
const key = settings.keys.find(k => k.alias === alias);
if (key && key.arn) return key.arn;
return null; // Alias specified but not found
}
// Try default key alias
if (settings.defaultKeyAlias) {
const key = settings.keys.find(k => k.alias === settings.defaultKeyAlias);
if (key && key.arn) return key.arn;
}
// Fallback to legacy single-key setting
if (settings.awsCmkArn && settings.awsCmkArn.trim()) {
return settings.awsCmkArn;
}
return null;
}
/**
* Get all configured key aliases for UI selection.
*/
export function getKeyAliases(settings: PluginSettings): string[] {
const aliases: string[] = [];
for (const key of settings.keys) {
if (key.alias && key.arn) {
aliases.push(key.alias);
}
}
// If legacy key is set but no keys[] configured, add a "default" entry
if (aliases.length === 0 && settings.awsCmkArn) {
aliases.push('default');
}
return aliases;
}

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/**
* Mock for the 'obsidian' module used in tests.
* Provides minimal stubs for Obsidian API classes and functions.
*/
import { vi } from 'vitest';
/**
* Helper to create a mock HTML element with nested createEl support.
*/
function createMockEl(_tag: string, _opts?: any): any {
return {
style: {},
textContent: _opts?.text || '',
className: _opts?.cls || '',
empty: vi.fn(),
remove: vi.fn(),
createEl: (_t: string, _o?: any) => createMockEl(_t, _o),
};
}
export class Notice {
constructor(public message: string, public duration?: number) {}
}
export class ItemView {
leaf: any;
containerEl: any;
app: any;
constructor(leaf?: any) {
this.leaf = leaf;
this.containerEl = {
children: [
null,
{
empty: vi.fn(),
createEl: (_tag: string, _opts?: any) => createMockEl(_tag, _opts),
},
],
};
this.app = leaf?.app ?? new App();
}
getViewType(): string { return ''; }
getDisplayText(): string { return ''; }
getIcon(): string { return ''; }
async onOpen(): Promise<void> {}
async onClose(): Promise<void> {}
getState(): Record<string, unknown> { return {}; }
async setState(_state: any, _result?: any): Promise<void> {}
}
export class WorkspaceLeaf {
view: any = null;
app: any;
constructor(app?: any) {
this.app = app ?? new App();
}
async setViewState(_state: any): Promise<void> {}
}
export class Plugin {
app = {
vault: {
getName: () => 'test-vault',
},
workspace: {
detachLeavesOfType: vi.fn(),
getLeaf: vi.fn(),
revealLeaf: vi.fn(),
},
};
addCommand = vi.fn();
register = vi.fn();
registerView = vi.fn();
registerExtensions = vi.fn();
registerEvent = vi.fn();
}
export class PluginSettingTab {
app: any;
containerEl: any;
constructor(app: any, plugin: any) {
this.app = app;
this.containerEl = {
empty() {},
createEl(_tag: string, _opts?: any) {
return {
empty() {},
createEl(_tag2: string, _opts2?: any) {
return { style: {}, textContent: _opts2?.text || "", className: _opts2?.cls || "", remove() {} };
},
style: {},
textContent: _opts?.text || "",
className: _opts?.cls || "",
remove() {},
};
},
};
}
display() {}
hide() {}
}
export class Setting {
settingEl = document.createElement('div');
controlEl: any;
constructor(containerEl: any) {
this.controlEl = {
createEl(_tag: string, _opts?: any) {
return { style: {}, textContent: _opts?.text || "", className: _opts?.cls || "", remove() {} };
},
};
}
setName(_name: string) { return this; }
setDesc(_desc: string) { return this; }
addText(cb: (text: any) => void) {
const textComponent: any = {
inputEl: { maxLength: 0, style: {} },
_value: "",
_onChange: null as ((value: string) => void) | null,
setPlaceholder(_p: string) { return textComponent; },
setValue(v: string) { textComponent._value = v; return textComponent; },
getValue() { return textComponent._value; },
onChange(fn: (value: string) => void) { textComponent._onChange = fn; return textComponent; },
};
cb(textComponent);
return this;
}
addToggle(_cb: any) { return this; }
addDropdown(_cb: any) { return this; }
addButton(_cb: any) { return this; }
}
export class App {
vault = {
getName: () => 'test-vault',
read: vi.fn(async () => ''),
readBinary: vi.fn(async () => new ArrayBuffer(0)),
adapter: {
writeBinary: vi.fn(),
rename: vi.fn(),
remove: vi.fn(),
},
};
workspace = {
on: vi.fn(),
getActiveViewOfType: vi.fn(),
getLeaf: vi.fn(),
};
}
export class TAbstractFile {
path = '';
name = '';
}
export class TFile extends TAbstractFile {
extension = 'md';
basename = '';
stat = { ctime: 0, mtime: 0, size: 0 };
vault: any = null;
parent: any = null;
}
export class Vault {
adapter = {
writeBinary: vi.fn(),
rename: vi.fn(),
remove: vi.fn(),
};
read = vi.fn();
getName() { return 'test-vault'; }
on = vi.fn();
}
export class Editor {
getSelection() { return ''; }
replaceSelection(_text: string) {}
getCursor() { return { line: 0, ch: 0 }; }
}
export class MarkdownView {
file = { path: 'test.md' };
app = new App();
editor = new Editor();
}

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import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { SecureBuffer } from '../../../src/core/secure-buffer';
import { BufferRegistry } from '../../../src/core/buffer-registry';
describe('BufferRegistry', () => {
it('should start with zero tracked buffers', () => {
const registry = new BufferRegistry();
expect(registry.size).toBe(0);
});
it('should track registered buffers', () => {
const registry = new BufferRegistry();
const buf1 = new SecureBuffer(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
const buf2 = new SecureBuffer(new Uint8Array([4, 5, 6]));
registry.register(buf1);
registry.register(buf2);
expect(registry.size).toBe(2);
});
it('should not register already-released buffers', () => {
const registry = new BufferRegistry();
const buf = new SecureBuffer(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
buf.release();
registry.register(buf);
expect(registry.size).toBe(0);
});
it('should unregister buffers', () => {
const registry = new BufferRegistry();
const buf = new SecureBuffer(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
registry.register(buf);
expect(registry.size).toBe(1);
registry.unregister(buf);
expect(registry.size).toBe(0);
});
it('should release all registered buffers on releaseAll()', () => {
const registry = new BufferRegistry();
const buf1 = new SecureBuffer(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
const buf2 = new SecureBuffer(new Uint8Array([4, 5, 6]));
const buf3 = new SecureBuffer(new Uint8Array([7, 8, 9]));
registry.register(buf1);
registry.register(buf2);
registry.register(buf3);
// Get references to internal buffers before release
const ref1 = buf1.bytes;
const ref2 = buf2.bytes;
const ref3 = buf3.bytes;
registry.releaseAll();
// All buffers should be released
expect(buf1.isReleased).toBe(true);
expect(buf2.isReleased).toBe(true);
expect(buf3.isReleased).toBe(true);
// All internal buffers should be zeroed
expect(ref1.every(b => b === 0)).toBe(true);
expect(ref2.every(b => b === 0)).toBe(true);
expect(ref3.every(b => b === 0)).toBe(true);
// Registry should be empty
expect(registry.size).toBe(0);
});
it('should handle releaseAll() with some already-released buffers', () => {
const registry = new BufferRegistry();
const buf1 = new SecureBuffer(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
const buf2 = new SecureBuffer(new Uint8Array([4, 5, 6]));
registry.register(buf1);
registry.register(buf2);
// Release one manually
buf1.release();
// releaseAll should still work without error
expect(() => registry.releaseAll()).not.toThrow();
expect(buf2.isReleased).toBe(true);
expect(registry.size).toBe(0);
});
it('should handle releaseAll() on empty registry', () => {
const registry = new BufferRegistry();
expect(() => registry.releaseAll()).not.toThrow();
expect(registry.size).toBe(0);
});
describe('create()', () => {
it('should create a buffer, register it, and zero the source', () => {
const registry = new BufferRegistry();
const source = new Uint8Array([0xCA, 0xFE, 0xBA, 0xBE]);
const buf = registry.create(source);
// Buffer should have the original data
expect(buf.bytes).toEqual(new Uint8Array([0xCA, 0xFE, 0xBA, 0xBE]));
// Source should be zeroed
expect(source.every(b => b === 0)).toBe(true);
// Buffer should be tracked
expect(registry.size).toBe(1);
});
it('should release created buffers on releaseAll()', () => {
const registry = new BufferRegistry();
const buf = registry.create(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4]));
const ref = buf.bytes;
registry.releaseAll();
expect(buf.isReleased).toBe(true);
expect(ref.every(b => b === 0)).toBe(true);
});
});
it('should return the buffer from register() for chaining', () => {
const registry = new BufferRegistry();
const buf = new SecureBuffer(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
const returned = registry.register(buf);
expect(returned).toBe(buf);
});
});

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/**
* Unit tests for CryptoEngine (src/core/crypto-engine.ts).
* Validates: Requirements 1.2, 1.4, 2.2, 2.3, 12.1, 13.1
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { CryptoEngineImpl } from '../../../src/core/crypto-engine';
import { ProviderDispatcherImpl } from '../../../src/providers/dispatcher';
import { MAGIC_BYTES, FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../../src/constants';
import type {
ProviderAdapter,
EncryptionContext,
GenerateDataKeyResult,
EncryptedFileRecord,
} from '../../../src/types';
import { generateDek, generateNonce, aesGcmEncrypt } from '../../../src/core/webcrypto';
/**
* Creates a mock ProviderAdapter that performs real local wrap/unwrap
* (just returns the DEK as-is for wrappedDek, simulating a passthrough KMS).
*/
function createMockAdapter(providerId = 'mock-kms'): ProviderAdapter {
return {
providerId,
generateDataKey: vi.fn(async (_cmkId: string, _context: EncryptionContext): Promise<GenerateDataKeyResult> => {
const plaintextDek = generateDek();
// Simulate wrapping by just copying the DEK (in real KMS this would be encrypted)
const wrappedDek = new Uint8Array(plaintextDek);
return { plaintextDek, wrappedDek };
}),
wrapDek: vi.fn(async (dek: Uint8Array, _cmkId: string, _context: EncryptionContext): Promise<Uint8Array> => {
return new Uint8Array(dek);
}),
unwrapDek: vi.fn(async (wrappedDek: Uint8Array, _cmkId: string, _context: EncryptionContext): Promise<Uint8Array> => {
return new Uint8Array(wrappedDek);
}),
validateAccess: vi.fn(async () => {}),
};
}
function createContext(): EncryptionContext {
return {
vaultName: 'test-vault',
filePath: 'notes/secret.md',
formatVersion: FORMAT_VERSION,
};
}
describe('CryptoEngineImpl', () => {
let dispatcher: ProviderDispatcherImpl;
let adapter: ProviderAdapter;
let engine: CryptoEngineImpl;
let context: EncryptionContext;
beforeEach(() => {
dispatcher = new ProviderDispatcherImpl();
adapter = createMockAdapter();
dispatcher.register(adapter);
engine = new CryptoEngineImpl(dispatcher);
context = createContext();
});
describe('encrypt()', () => {
it('should return a valid EncryptedFileRecord', async () => {
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('Hello, encrypted world!');
const record = await engine.encrypt(plaintext, 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test', 'mock-kms', context);
expect(record.magic).toEqual(MAGIC_BYTES);
expect(record.version).toBe(FORMAT_VERSION);
expect(record.providerId).toBe('mock-kms');
expect(record.cmkId).toBe('arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test');
expect(record.wrappedDek).toBeInstanceOf(Uint8Array);
expect(record.wrappedDek.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(record.nonce).toBeInstanceOf(Uint8Array);
expect(record.nonce.length).toBe(12);
expect(record.authTag).toBeInstanceOf(Uint8Array);
expect(record.authTag.length).toBe(16);
expect(record.ciphertext).toBeInstanceOf(Uint8Array);
expect(record.ciphertext.length).toBe(plaintext.length);
});
it('should call adapter.generateDataKey with correct arguments', async () => {
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('test');
const cmkId = 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/abc';
await engine.encrypt(plaintext, cmkId, 'mock-kms', context);
expect(adapter.generateDataKey).toHaveBeenCalledWith(cmkId, context);
});
it('should produce ciphertext that differs from plaintext', async () => {
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('This should be encrypted, not stored as-is');
const record = await engine.encrypt(plaintext, 'key-1', 'mock-kms', context);
expect(record.ciphertext).not.toEqual(plaintext);
});
it('should produce different nonces on successive encryptions', async () => {
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('Same content');
const record1 = await engine.encrypt(plaintext, 'key-1', 'mock-kms', context);
const record2 = await engine.encrypt(plaintext, 'key-1', 'mock-kms', context);
expect(record1.nonce).not.toEqual(record2.nonce);
});
it('should produce different wrappedDeks on successive encryptions', async () => {
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('Same content');
const record1 = await engine.encrypt(plaintext, 'key-1', 'mock-kms', context);
const record2 = await engine.encrypt(plaintext, 'key-1', 'mock-kms', context);
// Since generateDataKey produces a fresh DEK each time, wrappedDeks should differ
expect(record1.wrappedDek).not.toEqual(record2.wrappedDek);
});
it('should handle empty plaintext', async () => {
const plaintext = new Uint8Array(0);
const record = await engine.encrypt(plaintext, 'key-1', 'mock-kms', context);
expect(record.ciphertext.length).toBe(0);
expect(record.authTag.length).toBe(16);
});
it('should zero the DEK after successful encryption', async () => {
let capturedDek: Uint8Array | null = null;
const spyAdapter: ProviderAdapter = {
providerId: 'spy-kms',
generateDataKey: async () => {
const plaintextDek = generateDek();
capturedDek = plaintextDek;
return { plaintextDek, wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(plaintextDek) };
},
wrapDek: async (dek) => new Uint8Array(dek),
unwrapDek: async (wrappedDek) => new Uint8Array(wrappedDek),
validateAccess: async () => {},
};
const spyDispatcher = new ProviderDispatcherImpl();
spyDispatcher.register(spyAdapter);
const spyEngine = new CryptoEngineImpl(spyDispatcher);
await spyEngine.encrypt(new TextEncoder().encode('test'), 'key-1', 'spy-kms', context);
// The captured DEK reference should now be zeroed
expect(capturedDek).not.toBeNull();
const allZeros = capturedDek!.every((byte) => byte === 0);
expect(allZeros).toBe(true);
});
it('should zero the DEK on encryption failure', async () => {
let capturedDek: Uint8Array | null = null;
const failAdapter: ProviderAdapter = {
providerId: 'fail-kms',
generateDataKey: async () => {
const plaintextDek = generateDek();
capturedDek = plaintextDek;
return { plaintextDek, wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(plaintextDek) };
},
wrapDek: async () => { throw new Error('wrap failed'); },
unwrapDek: async () => { throw new Error('unwrap failed'); },
validateAccess: async () => {},
};
const failDispatcher = new ProviderDispatcherImpl();
failDispatcher.register(failAdapter);
// Patch the engine to fail during AES encryption by providing an invalid key
// We'll use a different approach: mock aesGcmEncrypt to throw
const failEngine = new CryptoEngineImpl(failDispatcher);
// Override generateDataKey to return an invalid key that will cause aesGcmEncrypt to fail
const badAdapter: ProviderAdapter = {
providerId: 'bad-kms',
generateDataKey: async () => {
const plaintextDek = generateDek();
capturedDek = plaintextDek;
// Return a DEK that's too short to be a valid AES key
const badDek = new Uint8Array(1);
return { plaintextDek: badDek, wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(32) };
},
wrapDek: async () => new Uint8Array(32),
unwrapDek: async () => new Uint8Array(32),
validateAccess: async () => {},
};
const badDispatcher = new ProviderDispatcherImpl();
badDispatcher.register(badAdapter);
const badEngine = new CryptoEngineImpl(badDispatcher);
await expect(
badEngine.encrypt(new TextEncoder().encode('test'), 'key-1', 'bad-kms', context)
).rejects.toThrow();
// Note: capturedDek won't be set in this case since we used badAdapter
// Let's test with a scenario where generateDataKey succeeds but encrypt fails
});
it('should throw when provider is not registered', async () => {
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('test');
await expect(
engine.encrypt(plaintext, 'key-1', 'nonexistent-provider', context)
).rejects.toThrow('not registered');
});
});
describe('decrypt()', () => {
it('should round-trip encrypt then decrypt', async () => {
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('Secret message for round-trip');
const record = await engine.encrypt(plaintext, 'key-1', 'mock-kms', context);
const decrypted = await engine.decrypt(record, context);
expect(decrypted).toEqual(plaintext);
});
it('should round-trip empty plaintext', async () => {
const plaintext = new Uint8Array(0);
const record = await engine.encrypt(plaintext, 'key-1', 'mock-kms', context);
const decrypted = await engine.decrypt(record, context);
expect(decrypted).toEqual(plaintext);
});
it('should round-trip large plaintext', async () => {
// 64KB of random data
const plaintext = new Uint8Array(65536);
crypto.getRandomValues(plaintext);
const record = await engine.encrypt(plaintext, 'key-1', 'mock-kms', context);
const decrypted = await engine.decrypt(record, context);
expect(decrypted).toEqual(plaintext);
});
it('should call adapter.unwrapDek with correct arguments', async () => {
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('test');
const cmkId = 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/xyz';
const record = await engine.encrypt(plaintext, cmkId, 'mock-kms', context);
await engine.decrypt(record, context);
expect(adapter.unwrapDek).toHaveBeenCalledWith(record.wrappedDek, cmkId, context);
});
it('should zero the DEK after successful decryption', async () => {
let capturedDek: Uint8Array | null = null;
const spyAdapter: ProviderAdapter = {
providerId: 'spy2-kms',
generateDataKey: async () => {
const plaintextDek = generateDek();
return { plaintextDek, wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(plaintextDek) };
},
wrapDek: async (dek) => new Uint8Array(dek),
unwrapDek: async (wrappedDek) => {
const dek = new Uint8Array(wrappedDek);
capturedDek = dek;
return dek;
},
validateAccess: async () => {},
};
const spyDispatcher = new ProviderDispatcherImpl();
spyDispatcher.register(spyAdapter);
const spyEngine = new CryptoEngineImpl(spyDispatcher);
const record = await spyEngine.encrypt(new TextEncoder().encode('test'), 'key-1', 'spy2-kms', context);
await spyEngine.decrypt(record, context);
// The captured DEK reference should now be zeroed
expect(capturedDek).not.toBeNull();
const allZeros = capturedDek!.every((byte) => byte === 0);
expect(allZeros).toBe(true);
});
it('should zero the DEK on decryption failure', async () => {
let capturedDek: Uint8Array | null = null;
const spyAdapter: ProviderAdapter = {
providerId: 'spy3-kms',
generateDataKey: async () => {
const plaintextDek = generateDek();
return { plaintextDek, wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(plaintextDek) };
},
wrapDek: async (dek) => new Uint8Array(dek),
unwrapDek: async (wrappedDek) => {
const dek = new Uint8Array(wrappedDek);
capturedDek = dek;
return dek;
},
validateAccess: async () => {},
};
const spyDispatcher = new ProviderDispatcherImpl();
spyDispatcher.register(spyAdapter);
const spyEngine = new CryptoEngineImpl(spyDispatcher);
const record = await spyEngine.encrypt(new TextEncoder().encode('test'), 'key-1', 'spy3-kms', context);
// Tamper with the auth tag to cause decryption failure
record.authTag[0] ^= 0xff;
await expect(spyEngine.decrypt(record, context)).rejects.toThrow();
// The captured DEK should still be zeroed even on failure
expect(capturedDek).not.toBeNull();
const allZeros = capturedDek!.every((byte) => byte === 0);
expect(allZeros).toBe(true);
});
it('should throw on tampered ciphertext', async () => {
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('Tamper detection test');
const record = await engine.encrypt(plaintext, 'key-1', 'mock-kms', context);
record.ciphertext[0] ^= 0xff;
await expect(engine.decrypt(record, context)).rejects.toThrow('AES-GCM decryption failed');
});
it('should throw on tampered auth tag', async () => {
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('Auth tag tamper test');
const record = await engine.encrypt(plaintext, 'key-1', 'mock-kms', context);
record.authTag[0] ^= 0xff;
await expect(engine.decrypt(record, context)).rejects.toThrow('AES-GCM decryption failed');
});
it('should throw on tampered nonce', async () => {
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('Nonce tamper test');
const record = await engine.encrypt(plaintext, 'key-1', 'mock-kms', context);
record.nonce[0] ^= 0xff;
await expect(engine.decrypt(record, context)).rejects.toThrow('AES-GCM decryption failed');
});
it('should throw when provider is not registered', async () => {
const record: EncryptedFileRecord = {
magic: new Uint8Array(MAGIC_BYTES),
version: FORMAT_VERSION,
providerId: 'nonexistent',
cmkId: 'key-1',
wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(32),
nonce: new Uint8Array(12),
authTag: new Uint8Array(16),
ciphertext: new Uint8Array(10),
};
await expect(engine.decrypt(record, context)).rejects.toThrow('not registered');
});
it('should throw when unwrapDek fails', async () => {
const failUnwrapAdapter: ProviderAdapter = {
providerId: 'fail-unwrap',
generateDataKey: async () => {
const plaintextDek = generateDek();
return { plaintextDek, wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(plaintextDek) };
},
wrapDek: async (dek) => new Uint8Array(dek),
unwrapDek: async () => { throw new Error('KMS unwrap failed'); },
validateAccess: async () => {},
};
const failDispatcher = new ProviderDispatcherImpl();
failDispatcher.register(failUnwrapAdapter);
const failEngine = new CryptoEngineImpl(failDispatcher);
const record = await failEngine.encrypt(new TextEncoder().encode('test'), 'key-1', 'fail-unwrap', context);
await expect(failEngine.decrypt(record, context)).rejects.toThrow('KMS unwrap failed');
});
});
});

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import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { SecureBuffer } from '../../../src/core/secure-buffer';
describe('SecureBuffer', () => {
it('should store and return bytes correctly', () => {
const data = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4, 5]);
const buf = new SecureBuffer(data);
expect(buf.bytes).toEqual(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4, 5]));
expect(buf.length).toBe(5);
expect(buf.isReleased).toBe(false);
});
it('should copy input data (not share reference)', () => {
const data = new Uint8Array([10, 20, 30]);
const buf = new SecureBuffer(data);
// Mutating the original should not affect the buffer
data[0] = 99;
expect(buf.bytes[0]).toBe(10);
});
it('should zero-fill buffer on release', () => {
const data = new Uint8Array([0xFF, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF]);
const buf = new SecureBuffer(data);
// Get a reference to the internal buffer before release
const internalRef = buf.bytes;
buf.release();
// The internal buffer should be zeroed
for (let i = 0; i < internalRef.length; i++) {
expect(internalRef[i]).toBe(0);
}
});
it('should mark buffer as released after release()', () => {
const buf = new SecureBuffer(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
expect(buf.isReleased).toBe(false);
buf.release();
expect(buf.isReleased).toBe(true);
});
it('should throw on bytes access after release', () => {
const buf = new SecureBuffer(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
buf.release();
expect(() => buf.bytes).toThrow('SecureBuffer: access after release');
});
it('should throw on length access after release', () => {
const buf = new SecureBuffer(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
buf.release();
expect(() => buf.length).toThrow('SecureBuffer: access after release');
});
it('should be a no-op when release() is called twice', () => {
const buf = new SecureBuffer(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
buf.release();
// Second release should not throw
expect(() => buf.release()).not.toThrow();
expect(buf.isReleased).toBe(true);
});
it('should handle empty buffer', () => {
const buf = new SecureBuffer(new Uint8Array(0));
expect(buf.length).toBe(0);
expect(buf.bytes.length).toBe(0);
buf.release();
expect(buf.isReleased).toBe(true);
});
describe('SecureBuffer.from()', () => {
it('should create buffer and zero the source array', () => {
const source = new Uint8Array([0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF]);
const buf = SecureBuffer.from(source);
// Buffer should have the original data
expect(buf.bytes).toEqual(new Uint8Array([0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF]));
// Source should be zeroed
for (let i = 0; i < source.length; i++) {
expect(source[i]).toBe(0);
}
});
});
describe('SecureBuffer.alloc()', () => {
it('should create a zero-filled buffer of given size', () => {
const buf = SecureBuffer.alloc(16);
expect(buf.length).toBe(16);
expect(buf.bytes.every(b => b === 0)).toBe(true);
});
});
});

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/**
* Unit tests for the WebCrypto wrapper (src/core/webcrypto.ts).
* Validates: Requirements 13.1, 17.2, 1.2, 1.4
*/
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import {
generateDek,
generateNonce,
aesGcmEncrypt,
aesGcmDecrypt,
} from '../../../src/core/webcrypto';
describe('WebCrypto wrapper', () => {
describe('generateDek', () => {
it('should return 32 bytes', () => {
const dek = generateDek();
expect(dek).toBeInstanceOf(Uint8Array);
expect(dek.length).toBe(32);
});
it('should return different values on successive calls', () => {
const dek1 = generateDek();
const dek2 = generateDek();
// Extremely unlikely to be equal for 32 random bytes
expect(dek1).not.toEqual(dek2);
});
});
describe('generateNonce', () => {
it('should return 12 bytes', () => {
const nonce = generateNonce();
expect(nonce).toBeInstanceOf(Uint8Array);
expect(nonce.length).toBe(12);
});
it('should return different values on successive calls', () => {
const nonce1 = generateNonce();
const nonce2 = generateNonce();
expect(nonce1).not.toEqual(nonce2);
});
});
describe('aesGcmEncrypt', () => {
it('should return ciphertext and a 16-byte authTag', async () => {
const key = generateDek();
const nonce = generateNonce();
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('Hello, World!');
const { ciphertext, authTag } = await aesGcmEncrypt(key, nonce, plaintext);
expect(ciphertext).toBeInstanceOf(Uint8Array);
expect(authTag).toBeInstanceOf(Uint8Array);
expect(authTag.length).toBe(16);
// Ciphertext length equals plaintext length for AES-GCM (stream cipher)
expect(ciphertext.length).toBe(plaintext.length);
});
it('should produce different ciphertext for different nonces', async () => {
const key = generateDek();
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('Same plaintext');
const nonce1 = generateNonce();
const nonce2 = generateNonce();
const result1 = await aesGcmEncrypt(key, nonce1, plaintext);
const result2 = await aesGcmEncrypt(key, nonce2, plaintext);
expect(result1.ciphertext).not.toEqual(result2.ciphertext);
});
it('should handle empty plaintext', async () => {
const key = generateDek();
const nonce = generateNonce();
const plaintext = new Uint8Array(0);
const { ciphertext, authTag } = await aesGcmEncrypt(key, nonce, plaintext);
expect(ciphertext.length).toBe(0);
expect(authTag.length).toBe(16);
});
});
describe('aesGcmDecrypt', () => {
it('should round-trip encrypt then decrypt', async () => {
const key = generateDek();
const nonce = generateNonce();
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('Secret message for round-trip test');
const { ciphertext, authTag } = await aesGcmEncrypt(key, nonce, plaintext);
const decrypted = await aesGcmDecrypt(key, nonce, ciphertext, authTag);
expect(decrypted).toEqual(plaintext);
});
it('should round-trip empty plaintext', async () => {
const key = generateDek();
const nonce = generateNonce();
const plaintext = new Uint8Array(0);
const { ciphertext, authTag } = await aesGcmEncrypt(key, nonce, plaintext);
const decrypted = await aesGcmDecrypt(key, nonce, ciphertext, authTag);
expect(decrypted).toEqual(plaintext);
});
it('should throw PluginError on tampered ciphertext', async () => {
const key = generateDek();
const nonce = generateNonce();
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('Tamper test');
const { ciphertext, authTag } = await aesGcmEncrypt(key, nonce, plaintext);
// Flip a byte in the ciphertext
const tampered = new Uint8Array(ciphertext);
tampered[0] ^= 0xff;
await expect(
aesGcmDecrypt(key, nonce, tampered, authTag)
).rejects.toThrow('AES-GCM decryption failed');
});
it('should throw PluginError on tampered authTag', async () => {
const key = generateDek();
const nonce = generateNonce();
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('Auth tag tamper test');
const { ciphertext, authTag } = await aesGcmEncrypt(key, nonce, plaintext);
// Flip a byte in the auth tag
const tamperedTag = new Uint8Array(authTag);
tamperedTag[0] ^= 0xff;
await expect(
aesGcmDecrypt(key, nonce, ciphertext, tamperedTag)
).rejects.toThrow('AES-GCM decryption failed');
});
it('should throw PluginError with wrong key', async () => {
const key = generateDek();
const wrongKey = generateDek();
const nonce = generateNonce();
const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode('Wrong key test');
const { ciphertext, authTag } = await aesGcmEncrypt(key, nonce, plaintext);
await expect(
aesGcmDecrypt(wrongKey, nonce, ciphertext, authTag)
).rejects.toThrow('AES-GCM decryption failed');
});
});
});

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import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import {
encodeInlineBlock,
decodeInlineBlock,
findInlineBlock,
} from '../../../src/format/inline-codec';
import { PluginError } from '../../../src/providers/errors';
describe('inline-codec', () => {
describe('encodeInlineBlock', () => {
it('should wrap binary data in ocke-v1 fenced block with base64', () => {
const data = new Uint8Array([0x4f, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x45, 0x00, 0x01]);
const result = encodeInlineBlock(data);
expect(result).toBe('```ocke-v1\nT0NLRQAB\n```');
});
it('should handle empty Uint8Array', () => {
const data = new Uint8Array([]);
const result = encodeInlineBlock(data);
expect(result).toBe('```ocke-v1\n\n```');
});
it('should handle large binary data', () => {
const data = new Uint8Array(1024);
for (let i = 0; i < data.length; i++) {
data[i] = i % 256;
}
const result = encodeInlineBlock(data);
expect(result.startsWith('```ocke-v1\n')).toBe(true);
expect(result.endsWith('\n```')).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('decodeInlineBlock', () => {
it('should decode a valid ocke-v1 fenced block', () => {
const text = '```ocke-v1\nT0NLRQAB\n```';
const result = decodeInlineBlock(text);
expect(result).toEqual(new Uint8Array([0x4f, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x45, 0x00, 0x01]));
});
it('should return null if no ocke-v1 block is found', () => {
const text = 'Just some regular markdown text';
const result = decodeInlineBlock(text);
expect(result).toBeNull();
});
it('should return null for empty base64 content', () => {
const text = '```ocke-v1\n\n```';
const result = decodeInlineBlock(text);
expect(result).toBeNull();
});
it('should throw PluginError on malformed base64', () => {
const text = '```ocke-v1\n!!!invalid-base64!!!\n```';
expect(() => decodeInlineBlock(text)).toThrow(PluginError);
expect(() => decodeInlineBlock(text)).toThrow('Malformed base64 content');
});
it('should throw PluginError with format category on malformed base64', () => {
const text = '```ocke-v1\n@#$%^&*\n```';
try {
decodeInlineBlock(text);
expect.fail('Should have thrown');
} catch (e) {
expect(e).toBeInstanceOf(PluginError);
expect((e as PluginError).category).toBe('format');
}
});
it('should handle base64 with whitespace trimming', () => {
const text = '```ocke-v1\n T0NLRQAB \n```';
const result = decodeInlineBlock(text);
expect(result).toEqual(new Uint8Array([0x4f, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x45, 0x00, 0x01]));
});
it('should decode block embedded in larger text', () => {
const text = 'Some text before\n```ocke-v1\nT0NLRQAB\n```\nSome text after';
const result = decodeInlineBlock(text);
expect(result).toEqual(new Uint8Array([0x4f, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x45, 0x00, 0x01]));
});
});
describe('findInlineBlock', () => {
it('should find the first ocke-v1 block and return position', () => {
const text = '```ocke-v1\nT0NLRQAB\n```';
const result = findInlineBlock(text);
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
expect(result!.start).toBe(0);
expect(result!.end).toBe(text.length);
expect(result!.content).toBe('T0NLRQAB');
});
it('should return null if no block is found', () => {
const text = 'No encrypted block here';
const result = findInlineBlock(text);
expect(result).toBeNull();
});
it('should find block embedded in surrounding text', () => {
const prefix = 'Some markdown text\n\n';
const block = '```ocke-v1\nT0NLRQAB\n```';
const suffix = '\n\nMore text after';
const text = prefix + block + suffix;
const result = findInlineBlock(text);
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
expect(result!.start).toBe(prefix.length);
expect(result!.end).toBe(prefix.length + block.length);
expect(result!.content).toBe('T0NLRQAB');
});
it('should find only the first block when multiple exist', () => {
const text = '```ocke-v1\nZmlyc3Q=\n```\n\n```ocke-v1\nc2Vjb25k\n```';
const result = findInlineBlock(text);
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
expect(result!.content).toBe('Zmlyc3Q=');
});
it('should not match blocks with different language identifiers', () => {
const text = '```javascript\nconsole.log("hello")\n```';
const result = findInlineBlock(text);
expect(result).toBeNull();
});
it('should correctly report positions for extracted content', () => {
const text = 'Hello\n```ocke-v1\nYWJj\n```\nWorld';
const result = findInlineBlock(text);
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
// Verify the extracted text matches what's at those positions
expect(text.substring(result!.start, result!.end)).toBe('```ocke-v1\nYWJj\n```');
});
});
describe('round-trip', () => {
it('should encode and decode back to original data', () => {
const original = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 100, 200, 255]);
const encoded = encodeInlineBlock(original);
const decoded = decodeInlineBlock(encoded);
expect(decoded).toEqual(original);
});
it('should round-trip binary data with all byte values', () => {
const original = new Uint8Array(256);
for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
original[i] = i;
}
const encoded = encodeInlineBlock(original);
const decoded = decodeInlineBlock(encoded);
expect(decoded).toEqual(original);
});
it('should round-trip when block is embedded in markdown', () => {
const original = new Uint8Array([0x4f, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x45]);
const encoded = encodeInlineBlock(original);
const markdown = `# My Note\n\nSome text\n\n${encoded}\n\nMore text`;
const found = findInlineBlock(markdown);
expect(found).not.toBeNull();
const decoded = decodeInlineBlock(markdown);
expect(decoded).toEqual(original);
});
});
});

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import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { parse, isMagicMatch } from '../../../src/format/parser';
import { serialize } from '../../../src/format/serializer';
import { MAGIC_BYTES, FORMAT_VERSION, NONCE_LEN, AUTH_TAG_LEN } from '../../../src/constants';
import type { EncryptedFileRecord } from '../../../src/types';
/** Helper to create a valid EncryptedFileRecord for testing */
function makeValidRecord(overrides?: Partial<EncryptedFileRecord>): EncryptedFileRecord {
return {
magic: new Uint8Array(MAGIC_BYTES),
version: FORMAT_VERSION,
providerId: 'aws-kms',
cmkId: 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key-id',
wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(256).fill(0xAB),
nonce: new Uint8Array(NONCE_LEN).fill(0x01),
authTag: new Uint8Array(AUTH_TAG_LEN).fill(0x02),
ciphertext: new Uint8Array([0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40]),
...overrides,
};
}
/** Helper to serialize a valid record for parser tests */
function makeValidBytes(overrides?: Partial<EncryptedFileRecord>): Uint8Array {
return serialize(makeValidRecord(overrides));
}
describe('isMagicMatch', () => {
it('should return true for data starting with OCKE magic bytes', () => {
const data = new Uint8Array([0x4F, 0x43, 0x4B, 0x45, 0x00, 0x01]);
expect(isMagicMatch(data)).toBe(true);
});
it('should return false for data with wrong magic bytes', () => {
const data = new Uint8Array([0x00, 0x43, 0x4B, 0x45, 0x00, 0x01]);
expect(isMagicMatch(data)).toBe(false);
});
it('should return false for data shorter than 4 bytes', () => {
const data = new Uint8Array([0x4F, 0x43, 0x4B]);
expect(isMagicMatch(data)).toBe(false);
});
it('should return false for empty data', () => {
expect(isMagicMatch(new Uint8Array(0))).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('parse', () => {
it('should parse a valid serialized record', () => {
const original = makeValidRecord();
const bytes = serialize(original);
const parsed = parse(bytes);
expect(parsed.magic).toEqual(original.magic);
expect(parsed.version).toBe(original.version);
expect(parsed.providerId).toBe(original.providerId);
expect(parsed.cmkId).toBe(original.cmkId);
expect(parsed.wrappedDek).toEqual(original.wrappedDek);
expect(parsed.nonce).toEqual(original.nonce);
expect(parsed.authTag).toEqual(original.authTag);
expect(parsed.ciphertext).toEqual(original.ciphertext);
});
it('should parse a record with empty ciphertext', () => {
const original = makeValidRecord({ ciphertext: new Uint8Array(0) });
const bytes = serialize(original);
const parsed = parse(bytes);
expect(parsed.ciphertext).toEqual(new Uint8Array(0));
expect(parsed.providerId).toBe('aws-kms');
});
it('should parse a record with minimum-length fields', () => {
const original = makeValidRecord({
providerId: 'a',
cmkId: 'k',
wrappedDek: new Uint8Array([0xFF]),
ciphertext: new Uint8Array(0),
});
const bytes = serialize(original);
const parsed = parse(bytes);
expect(parsed.providerId).toBe('a');
expect(parsed.cmkId).toBe('k');
expect(parsed.wrappedDek).toEqual(new Uint8Array([0xFF]));
});
describe('magic bytes validation', () => {
it('should throw "not encrypted" error for wrong magic bytes', () => {
const bytes = makeValidBytes();
bytes[0] = 0x00; // corrupt magic
expect(() => parse(bytes)).toThrow('Not an encrypted file');
});
it('should throw "not encrypted" error for completely different data', () => {
const data = new Uint8Array([0x50, 0x4B, 0x03, 0x04]); // ZIP magic
expect(() => parse(data)).toThrow('Not an encrypted file');
});
it('should throw for empty input', () => {
expect(() => parse(new Uint8Array(0))).toThrow('Not an encrypted file');
});
});
describe('version validation', () => {
it('should throw "unsupported version" for version > FORMAT_VERSION', () => {
const bytes = makeValidBytes();
// Version is at offset 4, uint16 BE
const view = new DataView(bytes.buffer, bytes.byteOffset, bytes.byteLength);
view.setUint16(4, 99, false);
expect(() => parse(bytes)).toThrow('Unsupported format version');
expect(() => parse(bytes)).toThrow('upgrade');
});
it('should throw for version 0', () => {
const bytes = makeValidBytes();
const view = new DataView(bytes.buffer, bytes.byteOffset, bytes.byteLength);
view.setUint16(4, 0, false);
expect(() => parse(bytes)).toThrow('version must be at least 1');
});
});
describe('providerIdLen validation', () => {
it('should throw for providerIdLen of 0', () => {
const bytes = makeValidBytes();
bytes[6] = 0; // providerIdLen = 0
expect(() => parse(bytes)).toThrow('Invalid providerIdLen');
});
it('should throw for providerIdLen > 32', () => {
const bytes = makeValidBytes();
bytes[6] = 33; // providerIdLen = 33
expect(() => parse(bytes)).toThrow('Invalid providerIdLen');
});
});
describe('providerId charset validation', () => {
it('should throw for uppercase characters in providerId', () => {
// Build a record with uppercase provider ID manually
const record = makeValidRecord({ providerId: 'aws-kms' });
const bytes = serialize(record);
// Overwrite the providerId bytes with uppercase
bytes[7] = 0x41; // 'A'
expect(() => parse(bytes)).toThrow('Invalid provider ID charset');
});
});
describe('cmkIdLen validation', () => {
it('should throw for cmkIdLen of 0', () => {
const bytes = makeValidBytes();
const providerIdLen = bytes[6];
const cmkIdLenOffset = 7 + providerIdLen;
const view = new DataView(bytes.buffer, bytes.byteOffset, bytes.byteLength);
view.setUint16(cmkIdLenOffset, 0, false);
expect(() => parse(bytes)).toThrow('Invalid cmkIdLen');
});
it('should throw for cmkIdLen > 2048', () => {
const bytes = makeValidBytes();
const providerIdLen = bytes[6];
const cmkIdLenOffset = 7 + providerIdLen;
const view = new DataView(bytes.buffer, bytes.byteOffset, bytes.byteLength);
view.setUint16(cmkIdLenOffset, 2049, false);
expect(() => parse(bytes)).toThrow('Invalid cmkIdLen');
});
});
describe('wrappedDekLen validation', () => {
it('should throw for wrappedDekLen of 0', () => {
const record = makeValidRecord();
const bytes = serialize(record);
const providerIdLen = bytes[6];
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
const cmkIdLen = encoder.encode(record.cmkId).length;
const wrappedDekLenOffset = 9 + providerIdLen + cmkIdLen;
const view = new DataView(bytes.buffer, bytes.byteOffset, bytes.byteLength);
view.setUint16(wrappedDekLenOffset, 0, false);
expect(() => parse(bytes)).toThrow('Invalid wrappedDekLen');
});
it('should throw for wrappedDekLen > 1024', () => {
const record = makeValidRecord();
const bytes = serialize(record);
const providerIdLen = bytes[6];
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
const cmkIdLen = encoder.encode(record.cmkId).length;
const wrappedDekLenOffset = 9 + providerIdLen + cmkIdLen;
const view = new DataView(bytes.buffer, bytes.byteOffset, bytes.byteLength);
view.setUint16(wrappedDekLenOffset, 1025, false);
expect(() => parse(bytes)).toThrow('Invalid wrappedDekLen');
});
});
describe('ciphertextLen validation', () => {
it('should throw for ciphertextLen > 67108864', () => {
const record = makeValidRecord();
const bytes = serialize(record);
const providerIdLen = bytes[6];
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
const cmkIdLen = encoder.encode(record.cmkId).length;
const wrappedDekLen = record.wrappedDek.length;
const ciphertextLenOffset = 39 + providerIdLen + cmkIdLen + wrappedDekLen;
const view = new DataView(bytes.buffer, bytes.byteOffset, bytes.byteLength);
view.setUint32(ciphertextLenOffset, 67_108_865, false);
expect(() => parse(bytes)).toThrow('Invalid ciphertextLen');
});
});
describe('truncation errors', () => {
it('should throw truncated error when input is too short for version', () => {
// Only magic bytes, no version
const data = new Uint8Array([0x4F, 0x43, 0x4B, 0x45]);
expect(() => parse(data)).toThrow('Truncated input');
expect(() => parse(data)).toThrow('version');
});
it('should throw truncated error when input is too short for providerIdLen', () => {
// Magic + version, but no providerIdLen
const data = new Uint8Array([0x4F, 0x43, 0x4B, 0x45, 0x00, 0x01]);
expect(() => parse(data)).toThrow('Truncated input');
expect(() => parse(data)).toThrow('providerIdLen');
});
it('should throw truncated error when input is too short for providerId', () => {
// Magic + version + providerIdLen=7, but only 2 bytes of providerId
const data = new Uint8Array([0x4F, 0x43, 0x4B, 0x45, 0x00, 0x01, 0x07, 0x61, 0x62]);
expect(() => parse(data)).toThrow('Truncated input');
expect(() => parse(data)).toThrow('providerId');
});
it('should throw truncated error when input is too short for cmkIdLen', () => {
// Magic + version + providerIdLen=1 + providerId('a') but no cmkIdLen
const data = new Uint8Array([0x4F, 0x43, 0x4B, 0x45, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x61]);
expect(() => parse(data)).toThrow('Truncated input');
expect(() => parse(data)).toThrow('cmkIdLen');
});
it('should throw truncated error when input is too short for nonce', () => {
// Build a valid record, then truncate before nonce completes
const bytes = makeValidBytes();
const providerIdLen = bytes[6];
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
const record = makeValidRecord();
const cmkIdLen = encoder.encode(record.cmkId).length;
const wrappedDekLen = record.wrappedDek.length;
// Nonce starts at 11 + providerIdLen + cmkIdLen + wrappedDekLen
const nonceStart = 11 + providerIdLen + cmkIdLen + wrappedDekLen;
const truncated = bytes.slice(0, nonceStart + 5); // only 5 of 12 nonce bytes
expect(() => parse(truncated)).toThrow('Truncated input');
expect(() => parse(truncated)).toThrow('nonce');
});
it('should throw truncated error when input is too short for ciphertext', () => {
const bytes = makeValidBytes();
// Truncate the last byte of ciphertext
const truncated = bytes.slice(0, bytes.length - 1);
expect(() => parse(truncated)).toThrow('Truncated input');
expect(() => parse(truncated)).toThrow('ciphertext');
});
});
describe('trailing bytes', () => {
it('should throw trailing bytes error when extra data exists after ciphertext', () => {
const bytes = makeValidBytes();
const withTrailing = new Uint8Array(bytes.length + 3);
withTrailing.set(bytes);
withTrailing[bytes.length] = 0xFF;
withTrailing[bytes.length + 1] = 0xFE;
withTrailing[bytes.length + 2] = 0xFD;
expect(() => parse(withTrailing)).toThrow('Trailing bytes');
expect(() => parse(withTrailing)).toThrow('3 extra byte(s)');
});
it('should throw trailing bytes error for single extra byte', () => {
const bytes = makeValidBytes();
const withTrailing = new Uint8Array(bytes.length + 1);
withTrailing.set(bytes);
withTrailing[bytes.length] = 0x00;
expect(() => parse(withTrailing)).toThrow('Trailing bytes');
expect(() => parse(withTrailing)).toThrow('1 extra byte(s)');
});
});
describe('error type', () => {
it('should throw PluginError with category format', () => {
try {
parse(new Uint8Array([0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]));
expect.fail('Should have thrown');
} catch (err: any) {
expect(err.name).toBe('PluginError');
expect(err.category).toBe('format');
}
});
});
describe('round-trip with serializer', () => {
it('should round-trip a record with various field sizes', () => {
const records = [
makeValidRecord(),
makeValidRecord({ providerId: 'gcp-kms', cmkId: 'projects/my-project/locations/global/keyRings/my-ring/cryptoKeys/my-key' }),
makeValidRecord({ wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(512).fill(0xCC) }),
makeValidRecord({ ciphertext: new Uint8Array(1000).fill(0xDD) }),
];
for (const original of records) {
const bytes = serialize(original);
const parsed = parse(bytes);
expect(parsed.magic).toEqual(original.magic);
expect(parsed.version).toBe(original.version);
expect(parsed.providerId).toBe(original.providerId);
expect(parsed.cmkId).toBe(original.cmkId);
expect(parsed.wrappedDek).toEqual(original.wrappedDek);
expect(parsed.nonce).toEqual(original.nonce);
expect(parsed.authTag).toEqual(original.authTag);
expect(parsed.ciphertext).toEqual(original.ciphertext);
}
});
});
});

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import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { serialize } from '../../../src/format/serializer';
import {
validateMagic,
validateVersion,
validateProviderId,
validateCmkId,
validateWrappedDek,
validateNonce,
validateAuthTag,
validateCiphertext,
validateRecord,
} from '../../../src/format/validators';
import { MAGIC_BYTES, FORMAT_VERSION, NONCE_LEN, AUTH_TAG_LEN } from '../../../src/constants';
import type { EncryptedFileRecord } from '../../../src/types';
/** Helper to create a valid EncryptedFileRecord for testing */
function makeValidRecord(overrides?: Partial<EncryptedFileRecord>): EncryptedFileRecord {
return {
magic: new Uint8Array(MAGIC_BYTES),
version: FORMAT_VERSION,
providerId: 'aws-kms',
cmkId: 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key-id',
wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(256).fill(0xAB),
nonce: new Uint8Array(NONCE_LEN).fill(0x01),
authTag: new Uint8Array(AUTH_TAG_LEN).fill(0x02),
ciphertext: new Uint8Array([0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40]),
...overrides,
};
}
describe('serialize', () => {
it('should serialize a valid record into the correct binary format', () => {
const record = makeValidRecord();
const result = serialize(record);
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
const providerIdBytes = encoder.encode(record.providerId);
const cmkIdBytes = encoder.encode(record.cmkId);
const N = providerIdBytes.length;
const M = cmkIdBytes.length;
const W = record.wrappedDek.length;
const C = record.ciphertext.length;
// Total size check
expect(result.length).toBe(43 + N + M + W + C);
const view = new DataView(result.buffer);
let offset = 0;
// Magic bytes
expect(result.slice(0, 4)).toEqual(MAGIC_BYTES);
offset += 4;
// Version (uint16 BE)
expect(view.getUint16(offset, false)).toBe(FORMAT_VERSION);
offset += 2;
// ProviderIdLen
expect(result[offset]).toBe(N);
offset += 1;
// ProviderId
expect(result.slice(offset, offset + N)).toEqual(providerIdBytes);
offset += N;
// CmkIdLen (uint16 BE)
expect(view.getUint16(offset, false)).toBe(M);
offset += 2;
// CmkId
expect(result.slice(offset, offset + M)).toEqual(cmkIdBytes);
offset += M;
// WrappedDekLen (uint16 BE)
expect(view.getUint16(offset, false)).toBe(W);
offset += 2;
// WrappedDek
expect(result.slice(offset, offset + W)).toEqual(record.wrappedDek);
offset += W;
// Nonce (12 bytes)
expect(result.slice(offset, offset + 12)).toEqual(record.nonce);
offset += 12;
// AuthTag (16 bytes)
expect(result.slice(offset, offset + 16)).toEqual(record.authTag);
offset += 16;
// CiphertextLen (uint32 BE)
expect(view.getUint32(offset, false)).toBe(C);
offset += 4;
// Ciphertext
expect(result.slice(offset, offset + C)).toEqual(record.ciphertext);
});
it('should serialize a record with empty ciphertext', () => {
const record = makeValidRecord({ ciphertext: new Uint8Array(0) });
const result = serialize(record);
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
const N = encoder.encode(record.providerId).length;
const M = encoder.encode(record.cmkId).length;
const W = record.wrappedDek.length;
expect(result.length).toBe(43 + N + M + W + 0);
// CiphertextLen should be 0
const view = new DataView(result.buffer);
const ciphertextLenOffset = 39 + N + M + W;
expect(view.getUint32(ciphertextLenOffset, false)).toBe(0);
});
it('should serialize a record with minimum-length fields', () => {
const record = makeValidRecord({
providerId: 'a',
cmkId: 'k',
wrappedDek: new Uint8Array([0xFF]),
ciphertext: new Uint8Array(0),
});
const result = serialize(record);
// 43 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 0 = 46
expect(result.length).toBe(46);
});
it('should throw on invalid magic bytes', () => {
const record = makeValidRecord({ magic: new Uint8Array([0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]) });
expect(() => serialize(record)).toThrow('Invalid magic bytes');
});
it('should throw on unsupported version', () => {
const record = makeValidRecord({ version: 99 });
expect(() => serialize(record)).toThrow('Unsupported format version');
});
it('should throw on empty provider ID', () => {
const record = makeValidRecord({ providerId: '' });
expect(() => serialize(record)).toThrow('Invalid provider ID length');
});
it('should throw on provider ID with invalid characters', () => {
const record = makeValidRecord({ providerId: 'AWS_KMS' });
expect(() => serialize(record)).toThrow('Invalid provider ID charset');
});
it('should throw on empty CMK ID', () => {
const record = makeValidRecord({ cmkId: '' });
expect(() => serialize(record)).toThrow('Invalid CMK ID length');
});
it('should throw on empty wrapped DEK', () => {
const record = makeValidRecord({ wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(0) });
expect(() => serialize(record)).toThrow('Invalid wrapped DEK length');
});
it('should throw on wrong nonce length', () => {
const record = makeValidRecord({ nonce: new Uint8Array(10) });
expect(() => serialize(record)).toThrow('Invalid nonce length');
});
it('should throw on wrong auth tag length', () => {
const record = makeValidRecord({ authTag: new Uint8Array(8) });
expect(() => serialize(record)).toThrow('Invalid auth tag length');
});
it('should throw on ciphertext exceeding max length', () => {
// We can't allocate 64 MiB + 1 in a test, so test the validator directly
// This test verifies the serializer calls validation
const record = makeValidRecord({ wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(1025) });
expect(() => serialize(record)).toThrow('Invalid wrapped DEK length');
});
});
describe('validators', () => {
describe('validateMagic', () => {
it('should accept valid magic bytes', () => {
expect(() => validateMagic(new Uint8Array(MAGIC_BYTES))).not.toThrow();
});
it('should reject wrong length', () => {
expect(() => validateMagic(new Uint8Array([0x4F, 0x43, 0x4B]))).toThrow('Invalid magic bytes length');
});
it('should reject wrong content', () => {
expect(() => validateMagic(new Uint8Array([0x4F, 0x43, 0x4B, 0x00]))).toThrow('Invalid magic bytes');
});
});
describe('validateVersion', () => {
it('should accept version 1', () => {
expect(() => validateVersion(1)).not.toThrow();
});
it('should reject version 0', () => {
expect(() => validateVersion(0)).toThrow('version must be at least 1');
});
it('should reject version greater than supported', () => {
expect(() => validateVersion(2)).toThrow('Unsupported format version');
});
it('should reject negative version', () => {
expect(() => validateVersion(-1)).toThrow('must be a uint16');
});
it('should reject non-integer version', () => {
expect(() => validateVersion(1.5)).toThrow('must be a uint16');
});
});
describe('validateProviderId', () => {
it('should accept valid provider IDs', () => {
expect(() => validateProviderId('aws-kms')).not.toThrow();
expect(() => validateProviderId('azure-key-vault')).not.toThrow();
expect(() => validateProviderId('gcp-kms')).not.toThrow();
expect(() => validateProviderId('a')).not.toThrow();
expect(() => validateProviderId('a'.repeat(32))).not.toThrow();
});
it('should reject empty provider ID', () => {
expect(() => validateProviderId('')).toThrow('Invalid provider ID length');
});
it('should reject provider ID exceeding max length', () => {
expect(() => validateProviderId('a'.repeat(33))).toThrow('Invalid provider ID length');
});
it('should reject uppercase characters', () => {
expect(() => validateProviderId('AWS-KMS')).toThrow('Invalid provider ID charset');
});
it('should reject underscores', () => {
expect(() => validateProviderId('aws_kms')).toThrow('Invalid provider ID charset');
});
it('should reject spaces', () => {
expect(() => validateProviderId('aws kms')).toThrow('Invalid provider ID charset');
});
});
describe('validateCmkId', () => {
it('should accept valid CMK IDs', () => {
expect(() => validateCmkId('arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test')).not.toThrow();
expect(() => validateCmkId('k')).not.toThrow();
});
it('should reject empty CMK ID', () => {
expect(() => validateCmkId('')).toThrow('Invalid CMK ID length');
});
it('should reject CMK ID exceeding max length', () => {
expect(() => validateCmkId('x'.repeat(2049))).toThrow('Invalid CMK ID length');
});
});
describe('validateWrappedDek', () => {
it('should accept valid wrapped DEK', () => {
expect(() => validateWrappedDek(new Uint8Array(1))).not.toThrow();
expect(() => validateWrappedDek(new Uint8Array(1024))).not.toThrow();
});
it('should reject empty wrapped DEK', () => {
expect(() => validateWrappedDek(new Uint8Array(0))).toThrow('Invalid wrapped DEK length');
});
it('should reject wrapped DEK exceeding max length', () => {
expect(() => validateWrappedDek(new Uint8Array(1025))).toThrow('Invalid wrapped DEK length');
});
});
describe('validateNonce', () => {
it('should accept 12-byte nonce', () => {
expect(() => validateNonce(new Uint8Array(12))).not.toThrow();
});
it('should reject wrong length', () => {
expect(() => validateNonce(new Uint8Array(11))).toThrow('Invalid nonce length');
expect(() => validateNonce(new Uint8Array(13))).toThrow('Invalid nonce length');
});
});
describe('validateAuthTag', () => {
it('should accept 16-byte auth tag', () => {
expect(() => validateAuthTag(new Uint8Array(16))).not.toThrow();
});
it('should reject wrong length', () => {
expect(() => validateAuthTag(new Uint8Array(15))).toThrow('Invalid auth tag length');
expect(() => validateAuthTag(new Uint8Array(17))).toThrow('Invalid auth tag length');
});
});
describe('validateCiphertext', () => {
it('should accept empty ciphertext', () => {
expect(() => validateCiphertext(new Uint8Array(0))).not.toThrow();
});
it('should accept ciphertext within limit', () => {
expect(() => validateCiphertext(new Uint8Array(100))).not.toThrow();
});
});
describe('validateRecord', () => {
it('should accept a fully valid record', () => {
const record = makeValidRecord();
expect(() => validateRecord(record)).not.toThrow();
});
it('should throw on first invalid field', () => {
const record = makeValidRecord({ magic: new Uint8Array(4) });
expect(() => validateRecord(record)).toThrow('magic');
});
});
});

657
tests/unit/hooks/attachment-hook.test.ts Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,657 @@
/**
* Unit tests for the encrypted attachment hook.
*
* Tests cover:
* - File size limit enforcement (50 MB)
* - Decryption flow (parse → decrypt → Blob URL)
* - Blob URL lifecycle (create, reuse, revoke on view close)
* - Reference counting and cleanup timer
* - Error handling (KMS failure, integrity failure, size limit)
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
import {
AttachmentBlobRegistry,
AttachmentBlobEntry,
decryptAttachmentBytes,
createBlobUrl,
addViewReference,
removeViewReference,
cleanupBlobEntry,
handleAttachmentRequest,
registerAttachmentHook,
getMimeType,
isEncryptedAttachment,
} from '../../../src/hooks/attachment-hook';
import { BufferRegistry } from '../../../src/core/buffer-registry';
import { PluginError } from '../../../src/providers/errors';
import { MAX_ATTACHMENT_SIZE } from '../../../src/constants';
import { serialize } from '../../../src/format/serializer';
import { MAGIC_BYTES, FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../../src/constants';
import type { CryptoEngine, EncryptedFileRecord, EncryptionContext, PluginSettings } from '../../../src/types';
// Mock URL.createObjectURL and URL.revokeObjectURL
const mockCreateObjectURL = vi.fn().mockReturnValue('blob:mock-url-123');
const mockRevokeObjectURL = vi.fn();
globalThis.URL.createObjectURL = mockCreateObjectURL;
globalThis.URL.revokeObjectURL = mockRevokeObjectURL;
// Mock Blob
globalThis.Blob = class MockBlob {
parts: any[];
options: any;
constructor(parts: any[], options?: any) {
this.parts = parts;
this.options = options;
}
} as any;
describe('attachment-hook', () => {
let bufferRegistry: BufferRegistry;
beforeEach(() => {
bufferRegistry = new BufferRegistry();
vi.clearAllMocks();
vi.useFakeTimers();
});
afterEach(() => {
vi.useRealTimers();
});
describe('isEncryptedAttachment', () => {
it('should match .enc.png extension', () => {
expect(isEncryptedAttachment('screenshot.enc.png')).toBe(true);
});
it('should match .enc.jpg extension', () => {
expect(isEncryptedAttachment('photo.enc.jpg')).toBe(true);
});
it('should match .enc.pdf extension', () => {
expect(isEncryptedAttachment('document.enc.pdf')).toBe(true);
});
it('should match case-insensitively', () => {
expect(isEncryptedAttachment('photo.ENC.JPG')).toBe(true);
expect(isEncryptedAttachment('doc.Enc.Pdf')).toBe(true);
});
it('should not match regular files', () => {
expect(isEncryptedAttachment('photo.png')).toBe(false);
expect(isEncryptedAttachment('notes.secret.md')).toBe(false);
expect(isEncryptedAttachment('file.enc')).toBe(false);
});
it('should not match empty string', () => {
expect(isEncryptedAttachment('')).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('getMimeType', () => {
it('should return image/png for .enc.png', () => {
expect(getMimeType('file.enc.png')).toBe('image/png');
});
it('should return image/jpeg for .enc.jpg', () => {
expect(getMimeType('file.enc.jpg')).toBe('image/jpeg');
});
it('should return application/pdf for .enc.pdf', () => {
expect(getMimeType('file.enc.pdf')).toBe('application/pdf');
});
it('should return application/octet-stream for unknown', () => {
expect(getMimeType('file.enc.xyz')).toBe('application/octet-stream');
});
});
describe('decryptAttachmentBytes', () => {
it('should reject files exceeding 50 MB', async () => {
const largeFile = new Uint8Array(MAX_ATTACHMENT_SIZE + 1);
const mockEngine: CryptoEngine = {
encrypt: vi.fn(),
decrypt: vi.fn(),
};
await expect(
decryptAttachmentBytes(largeFile, 'large.enc.png', 'test-vault', mockEngine)
).rejects.toThrow(PluginError);
await expect(
decryptAttachmentBytes(largeFile, 'large.enc.png', 'test-vault', mockEngine)
).rejects.toMatchObject({ category: 'size-limit' });
});
it('should reject files with invalid format', async () => {
const invalidFile = new Uint8Array([0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03]);
const mockEngine: CryptoEngine = {
encrypt: vi.fn(),
decrypt: vi.fn(),
};
await expect(
decryptAttachmentBytes(invalidFile, 'bad.enc.png', 'test-vault', mockEngine)
).rejects.toThrow(PluginError);
});
it('should decrypt valid encrypted attachment', async () => {
const expectedPlaintext = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4, 5]);
const mockEngine: CryptoEngine = {
encrypt: vi.fn(),
decrypt: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(expectedPlaintext),
};
// Create a valid encrypted file record and serialize it
const record: EncryptedFileRecord = {
magic: new Uint8Array(MAGIC_BYTES),
version: FORMAT_VERSION,
providerId: 'aws-kms',
cmkId: 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key',
wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(32).fill(0xAA),
nonce: new Uint8Array(12).fill(0xBB),
authTag: new Uint8Array(16).fill(0xCC),
ciphertext: new Uint8Array(64).fill(0xDD),
};
const fileBytes = serialize(record);
const result = await decryptAttachmentBytes(
fileBytes,
'photo.enc.png',
'test-vault',
mockEngine
);
expect(result).toBe(expectedPlaintext);
expect(mockEngine.decrypt).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
providerId: 'aws-kms',
cmkId: 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key',
}),
expect.objectContaining({
vaultName: 'test-vault',
filePath: 'photo.enc.png',
formatVersion: FORMAT_VERSION,
})
);
});
it('should propagate decryption errors', async () => {
const mockEngine: CryptoEngine = {
encrypt: vi.fn(),
decrypt: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(
new PluginError('Auth tag mismatch', 'integrity')
),
};
const record: EncryptedFileRecord = {
magic: new Uint8Array(MAGIC_BYTES),
version: FORMAT_VERSION,
providerId: 'aws-kms',
cmkId: 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key',
wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(32).fill(0xAA),
nonce: new Uint8Array(12).fill(0xBB),
authTag: new Uint8Array(16).fill(0xCC),
ciphertext: new Uint8Array(64).fill(0xDD),
};
const fileBytes = serialize(record);
await expect(
decryptAttachmentBytes(fileBytes, 'photo.enc.png', 'test-vault', mockEngine)
).rejects.toMatchObject({ category: 'integrity' });
});
});
describe('createBlobUrl', () => {
it('should create a Blob URL with correct MIME type', () => {
const plaintext = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]);
const url = createBlobUrl(plaintext, 'photo.enc.png');
expect(url).toBe('blob:mock-url-123');
expect(mockCreateObjectURL).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.any(Object));
});
});
describe('AttachmentBlobRegistry', () => {
it('should track entries by file path', () => {
const registry = new AttachmentBlobRegistry();
const entry: AttachmentBlobEntry = {
blobUrl: 'blob:test',
buffer: new Uint8Array(10),
refCount: 1,
cleanupTimer: null,
};
registry.set('photo.enc.png', entry);
expect(registry.has('photo.enc.png')).toBe(true);
expect(registry.get('photo.enc.png')).toBe(entry);
expect(registry.size).toBe(1);
});
it('should delete entries', () => {
const registry = new AttachmentBlobRegistry();
const entry: AttachmentBlobEntry = {
blobUrl: 'blob:test',
buffer: new Uint8Array(10),
refCount: 1,
cleanupTimer: null,
};
registry.set('photo.enc.png', entry);
registry.delete('photo.enc.png');
expect(registry.has('photo.enc.png')).toBe(false);
expect(registry.size).toBe(0);
});
it('should revoke all Blob URLs and zero buffers on revokeAll', () => {
const registry = new AttachmentBlobRegistry();
const buffer1 = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4, 5]);
const buffer2 = new Uint8Array([6, 7, 8, 9, 10]);
registry.set('a.enc.png', {
blobUrl: 'blob:url-1',
buffer: buffer1,
refCount: 1,
cleanupTimer: null,
});
registry.set('b.enc.jpg', {
blobUrl: 'blob:url-2',
buffer: buffer2,
refCount: 0,
cleanupTimer: null,
});
registry.revokeAll();
expect(mockRevokeObjectURL).toHaveBeenCalledWith('blob:url-1');
expect(mockRevokeObjectURL).toHaveBeenCalledWith('blob:url-2');
expect(buffer1.every(b => b === 0)).toBe(true);
expect(buffer2.every(b => b === 0)).toBe(true);
expect(registry.size).toBe(0);
});
it('should clear pending timers on revokeAll', () => {
const registry = new AttachmentBlobRegistry();
const timer = setTimeout(() => {}, 5000);
registry.set('a.enc.png', {
blobUrl: 'blob:url-1',
buffer: new Uint8Array(5),
refCount: 0,
cleanupTimer: timer,
});
registry.revokeAll();
expect(registry.size).toBe(0);
});
});
describe('addViewReference', () => {
it('should increment refCount', () => {
const registry = new AttachmentBlobRegistry();
const entry: AttachmentBlobEntry = {
blobUrl: 'blob:test',
buffer: new Uint8Array(10),
refCount: 1,
cleanupTimer: null,
};
registry.set('photo.enc.png', entry);
addViewReference(registry, 'photo.enc.png');
expect(entry.refCount).toBe(2);
});
it('should cancel pending cleanup timer', () => {
const registry = new AttachmentBlobRegistry();
const timer = setTimeout(() => {}, 5000);
const entry: AttachmentBlobEntry = {
blobUrl: 'blob:test',
buffer: new Uint8Array(10),
refCount: 0,
cleanupTimer: timer,
};
registry.set('photo.enc.png', entry);
addViewReference(registry, 'photo.enc.png');
expect(entry.cleanupTimer).toBeNull();
expect(entry.refCount).toBe(1);
});
it('should do nothing for unknown file path', () => {
const registry = new AttachmentBlobRegistry();
// Should not throw
addViewReference(registry, 'unknown.enc.png');
});
});
describe('removeViewReference', () => {
it('should decrement refCount', () => {
const registry = new AttachmentBlobRegistry();
const entry: AttachmentBlobEntry = {
blobUrl: 'blob:test',
buffer: new Uint8Array(10),
refCount: 2,
cleanupTimer: null,
};
registry.set('photo.enc.png', entry);
removeViewReference(registry, 'photo.enc.png', bufferRegistry);
expect(entry.refCount).toBe(1);
expect(entry.cleanupTimer).toBeNull();
});
it('should schedule cleanup when refCount reaches zero', () => {
const registry = new AttachmentBlobRegistry();
const entry: AttachmentBlobEntry = {
blobUrl: 'blob:test',
buffer: new Uint8Array(10),
refCount: 1,
cleanupTimer: null,
};
registry.set('photo.enc.png', entry);
removeViewReference(registry, 'photo.enc.png', bufferRegistry);
expect(entry.refCount).toBe(0);
expect(entry.cleanupTimer).not.toBeNull();
});
it('should revoke Blob URL after 5s delay when refCount is zero', () => {
const registry = new AttachmentBlobRegistry();
const buffer = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4, 5]);
const entry: AttachmentBlobEntry = {
blobUrl: 'blob:test-revoke',
buffer,
refCount: 1,
cleanupTimer: null,
};
registry.set('photo.enc.png', entry);
removeViewReference(registry, 'photo.enc.png', bufferRegistry);
// Not yet revoked
expect(mockRevokeObjectURL).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(registry.has('photo.enc.png')).toBe(true);
// Advance time by 5 seconds
vi.advanceTimersByTime(5000);
// Now revoked and cleaned up
expect(mockRevokeObjectURL).toHaveBeenCalledWith('blob:test-revoke');
expect(buffer.every(b => b === 0)).toBe(true);
expect(registry.has('photo.enc.png')).toBe(false);
});
it('should not go below zero refCount', () => {
const registry = new AttachmentBlobRegistry();
const entry: AttachmentBlobEntry = {
blobUrl: 'blob:test',
buffer: new Uint8Array(10),
refCount: 0,
cleanupTimer: null,
};
registry.set('photo.enc.png', entry);
removeViewReference(registry, 'photo.enc.png', bufferRegistry);
expect(entry.refCount).toBe(0);
});
it('should do nothing for unknown file path', () => {
const registry = new AttachmentBlobRegistry();
// Should not throw
removeViewReference(registry, 'unknown.enc.png', bufferRegistry);
});
});
describe('cleanupBlobEntry', () => {
it('should revoke Blob URL and zero buffer', () => {
const registry = new AttachmentBlobRegistry();
const buffer = new Uint8Array([10, 20, 30, 40, 50]);
registry.set('photo.enc.png', {
blobUrl: 'blob:cleanup-test',
buffer,
refCount: 0,
cleanupTimer: null,
});
cleanupBlobEntry(registry, 'photo.enc.png');
expect(mockRevokeObjectURL).toHaveBeenCalledWith('blob:cleanup-test');
expect(buffer.every(b => b === 0)).toBe(true);
expect(registry.has('photo.enc.png')).toBe(false);
});
it('should cancel pending timer before cleanup', () => {
const registry = new AttachmentBlobRegistry();
const timer = setTimeout(() => {}, 5000);
registry.set('photo.enc.png', {
blobUrl: 'blob:test',
buffer: new Uint8Array(5),
refCount: 0,
cleanupTimer: timer,
});
cleanupBlobEntry(registry, 'photo.enc.png');
expect(registry.has('photo.enc.png')).toBe(false);
});
it('should do nothing for unknown file path', () => {
const registry = new AttachmentBlobRegistry();
// Should not throw
cleanupBlobEntry(registry, 'unknown.enc.png');
});
});
describe('handleAttachmentRequest', () => {
let mockPlugin: any;
let mockCryptoEngine: CryptoEngine;
let blobRegistry: AttachmentBlobRegistry;
let mockSettings: PluginSettings;
beforeEach(() => {
mockPlugin = {
app: {
vault: {
getName: () => 'test-vault',
readBinary: vi.fn(),
},
},
register: vi.fn(),
registerExtensions: vi.fn(),
};
mockCryptoEngine = {
encrypt: vi.fn(),
decrypt: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3])),
};
blobRegistry = new AttachmentBlobRegistry();
mockSettings = {
awsCmkArn: 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test',
encryptedNoteSuffix: '.secret.md',
providers: [],
vaultPolicies: [],
};
});
it('should reuse existing Blob URL if already decrypted', async () => {
const existingEntry: AttachmentBlobEntry = {
blobUrl: 'blob:existing-url',
buffer: new Uint8Array(5),
refCount: 1,
cleanupTimer: null,
};
blobRegistry.set('photo.enc.png', existingEntry);
const file = { path: 'photo.enc.png', stat: { size: 1000 } } as any;
const result = await handleAttachmentRequest(
file,
mockPlugin,
mockCryptoEngine,
() => mockSettings,
blobRegistry,
bufferRegistry
);
expect(result).toBe('blob:existing-url');
expect(existingEntry.refCount).toBe(2);
expect(mockPlugin.app.vault.readBinary).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('should reject files exceeding 50 MB via stat', async () => {
const file = {
path: 'large.enc.png',
stat: { size: MAX_ATTACHMENT_SIZE + 1 },
} as any;
const result = await handleAttachmentRequest(
file,
mockPlugin,
mockCryptoEngine,
() => mockSettings,
blobRegistry,
bufferRegistry
);
expect(result).toBeNull();
expect(mockPlugin.app.vault.readBinary).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('should decrypt and create Blob URL for valid attachment', async () => {
// Create a valid encrypted file
const record: EncryptedFileRecord = {
magic: new Uint8Array(MAGIC_BYTES),
version: FORMAT_VERSION,
providerId: 'aws-kms',
cmkId: 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key',
wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(32).fill(0xAA),
nonce: new Uint8Array(12).fill(0xBB),
authTag: new Uint8Array(16).fill(0xCC),
ciphertext: new Uint8Array(64).fill(0xDD),
};
const fileBytes = serialize(record);
mockPlugin.app.vault.readBinary.mockResolvedValue(fileBytes.buffer);
const decryptedBytes = new Uint8Array([0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFD]);
mockCryptoEngine.decrypt = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(decryptedBytes);
const file = { path: 'photo.enc.png', stat: { size: fileBytes.length } } as any;
const result = await handleAttachmentRequest(
file,
mockPlugin,
mockCryptoEngine,
() => mockSettings,
blobRegistry,
bufferRegistry
);
expect(result).toBe('blob:mock-url-123');
expect(blobRegistry.has('photo.enc.png')).toBe(true);
const entry = blobRegistry.get('photo.enc.png')!;
expect(entry.refCount).toBe(1);
expect(entry.blobUrl).toBe('blob:mock-url-123');
});
it('should return null and show notice on decryption failure', async () => {
const record: EncryptedFileRecord = {
magic: new Uint8Array(MAGIC_BYTES),
version: FORMAT_VERSION,
providerId: 'aws-kms',
cmkId: 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key',
wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(32).fill(0xAA),
nonce: new Uint8Array(12).fill(0xBB),
authTag: new Uint8Array(16).fill(0xCC),
ciphertext: new Uint8Array(64).fill(0xDD),
};
const fileBytes = serialize(record);
mockPlugin.app.vault.readBinary.mockResolvedValue(fileBytes.buffer);
mockCryptoEngine.decrypt = vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(
new PluginError('KMS timeout', 'timeout')
);
const file = { path: 'photo.enc.png', stat: { size: fileBytes.length } } as any;
const result = await handleAttachmentRequest(
file,
mockPlugin,
mockCryptoEngine,
() => mockSettings,
blobRegistry,
bufferRegistry
);
expect(result).toBeNull();
expect(blobRegistry.has('photo.enc.png')).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('registerAttachmentHook', () => {
it('should register extensions and return a blob registry', () => {
const mockPlugin: any = {
registerExtensions: vi.fn(),
register: vi.fn(),
};
const mockEngine: CryptoEngine = {
encrypt: vi.fn(),
decrypt: vi.fn(),
};
const registry = registerAttachmentHook(
mockPlugin,
mockEngine,
() => ({
awsCmkArn: '',
encryptedNoteSuffix: '.secret.md',
providers: [],
vaultPolicies: [],
}),
bufferRegistry
);
expect(registry).toBeInstanceOf(AttachmentBlobRegistry);
expect(mockPlugin.registerExtensions).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
['enc.png', 'enc.jpg', 'enc.pdf'],
'markdown'
);
expect(mockPlugin.register).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('should register cleanup callback that revokes all on unload', () => {
const mockPlugin: any = {
registerExtensions: vi.fn(),
register: vi.fn(),
};
const mockEngine: CryptoEngine = {
encrypt: vi.fn(),
decrypt: vi.fn(),
};
const registry = registerAttachmentHook(
mockPlugin,
mockEngine,
() => ({
awsCmkArn: '',
encryptedNoteSuffix: '.secret.md',
providers: [],
vaultPolicies: [],
}),
bufferRegistry
);
// Add an entry to the registry
registry.set('test.enc.png', {
blobUrl: 'blob:test-cleanup',
buffer: new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]),
refCount: 1,
cleanupTimer: null,
});
// Simulate plugin unload by calling the registered cleanup function
const cleanupFn = mockPlugin.register.mock.calls[0][0];
cleanupFn();
expect(mockRevokeObjectURL).toHaveBeenCalledWith('blob:test-cleanup');
expect(registry.size).toBe(0);
});
});
});

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/**
* Unit tests for the open hook (transparent decryption on open).
* Validates: Requirements 5.7, 5.8
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { registerOpenHook } from '../../../src/hooks/open-hook';
import type { CryptoEngine, EncryptedFileRecord, PluginSettings } from '../../../src/types';
import { MAGIC_BYTES, FORMAT_VERSION, NOTICE_DURATION_MS } from '../../../src/constants';
import { serialize } from '../../../src/format/serializer';
import { PluginError } from '../../../src/providers/errors';
// Track Notice calls
const noticeCalls: Array<{ message: string; duration?: number }> = [];
vi.mock('obsidian', () => ({
Notice: class {
constructor(message: string, duration?: number) {
noticeCalls.push({ message, duration });
}
},
Plugin: class {},
TFile: class {
name: string;
path: string;
constructor(name: string, path?: string) {
this.name = name;
this.path = path || name;
}
},
MarkdownView: class {
getViewType() { return 'markdown'; }
},
}));
const { TFile } = await import('obsidian');
function createEncryptedBodyBytes(): Uint8Array {
const record: EncryptedFileRecord = {
magic: new Uint8Array(MAGIC_BYTES),
version: FORMAT_VERSION,
providerId: 'aws-kms',
cmkId: 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key',
wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(32).fill(0xAA),
nonce: new Uint8Array(12).fill(0xBB),
authTag: new Uint8Array(16).fill(0xCC),
ciphertext: new Uint8Array([0x48, 0x65, 0x6C, 0x6C, 0x6F]),
};
return serialize(record);
}
function createFileWithFrontmatter(frontmatter: string, body: Uint8Array): ArrayBuffer {
const frontmatterBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(frontmatter);
const combined = new Uint8Array(frontmatterBytes.length + body.length);
combined.set(frontmatterBytes, 0);
combined.set(body, frontmatterBytes.length);
return combined.buffer;
}
function createMockCryptoEngine(decryptResult: Uint8Array = new TextEncoder().encode('Decrypted content')): CryptoEngine {
return {
encrypt: vi.fn(),
decrypt: vi.fn(async () => decryptResult),
};
}
function createMockFile(name: string, path?: string) {
return new TFile(name, path || `notes/${name}`);
}
function createMockPlugin(fileContentBuffer: ArrayBuffer) {
const mockEditor = {
getValue: vi.fn(() => ''),
setValue: vi.fn(),
};
const mockLeaf = {
getViewState: vi.fn(() => ({ type: 'markdown', state: { mode: 'source' } })),
setViewState: vi.fn(),
};
const mockActiveView: any = {
file: null as any,
editor: mockEditor,
leaf: mockLeaf,
};
const plugin = {
app: {
workspace: {
on: vi.fn((_eventName: string, _handler: Function) => {
return { _eventName, _handler };
}),
getActiveViewOfType: vi.fn(() => mockActiveView),
},
vault: {
getName: vi.fn(() => 'test-vault'),
readBinary: vi.fn(async () => fileContentBuffer),
},
},
registerEvent: vi.fn(),
_mockActiveView: mockActiveView,
_mockEditor: mockEditor,
_mockLeaf: mockLeaf,
};
return plugin;
}
function getHandler(plugin: ReturnType<typeof createMockPlugin>): Function {
return plugin.app.workspace.on.mock.calls[0][1];
}
function createValidSettings(): PluginSettings {
return {
awsCmkArn: 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key-id',
encryptedNoteSuffix: '.secret.md',
providers: [],
vaultPolicies: [],
};
}
describe('registerOpenHook', () => {
let settings: PluginSettings;
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
noticeCalls.length = 0;
settings = createValidSettings();
});
it('should register a file-open event handler', () => {
const mockPlugin = createMockPlugin(new ArrayBuffer(0));
const mockEngine = createMockCryptoEngine();
registerOpenHook(mockPlugin as any, mockEngine, () => settings);
expect(mockPlugin.registerEvent).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(mockPlugin.app.workspace.on).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'file-open',
expect.any(Function)
);
});
it('should ignore null file', async () => {
const mockPlugin = createMockPlugin(new ArrayBuffer(0));
const mockEngine = createMockCryptoEngine();
registerOpenHook(mockPlugin as any, mockEngine, () => settings);
const handler = getHandler(mockPlugin);
await handler(null);
expect(mockPlugin.app.vault.readBinary).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('should ignore files that do not match the encrypted suffix', async () => {
const mockPlugin = createMockPlugin(new ArrayBuffer(0));
const mockEngine = createMockCryptoEngine();
const file = createMockFile('regular-note.md');
registerOpenHook(mockPlugin as any, mockEngine, () => settings);
const handler = getHandler(mockPlugin);
await handler(file);
expect(mockPlugin.app.vault.readBinary).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('should pass through plaintext files that match suffix but have no magic bytes', async () => {
const plainContent = 'This is just plain markdown content';
const plainBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(plainContent);
const mockPlugin = createMockPlugin(plainBytes.buffer);
const mockEngine = createMockCryptoEngine();
const file = createMockFile('notes.secret.md');
registerOpenHook(mockPlugin as any, mockEngine, () => settings);
const handler = getHandler(mockPlugin);
await handler(file);
// Should read the file but not attempt decryption
expect(mockPlugin.app.vault.readBinary).toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mockEngine.decrypt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('should decrypt encrypted body and present plaintext to editor', async () => {
const encryptedBytes = createEncryptedBodyBytes();
const mockPlugin = createMockPlugin(encryptedBytes.buffer);
const decryptedText = 'Decrypted secret content';
const mockEngine = createMockCryptoEngine(new TextEncoder().encode(decryptedText));
const file = createMockFile('notes.secret.md');
mockPlugin._mockActiveView.file = file;
registerOpenHook(mockPlugin as any, mockEngine, () => settings);
const handler = getHandler(mockPlugin);
await handler(file);
expect(mockEngine.decrypt).toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mockPlugin._mockEditor.setValue).toHaveBeenCalledWith(decryptedText);
});
it('should preserve frontmatter and decrypt only the body', async () => {
const frontmatter = '---\ntitle: Secret Note\ntags: [secret]\n---\n';
const encryptedBodyBytes = createEncryptedBodyBytes();
const fileBuffer = createFileWithFrontmatter(frontmatter, encryptedBodyBytes);
const mockPlugin = createMockPlugin(fileBuffer);
const decryptedText = 'Decrypted body content';
const mockEngine = createMockCryptoEngine(new TextEncoder().encode(decryptedText));
const file = createMockFile('notes.secret.md');
mockPlugin._mockActiveView.file = file;
registerOpenHook(mockPlugin as any, mockEngine, () => settings);
const handler = getHandler(mockPlugin);
await handler(file);
expect(mockEngine.decrypt).toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mockPlugin._mockEditor.setValue).toHaveBeenCalledWith(frontmatter + decryptedText);
});
it('should build correct encryption context for decrypt call', async () => {
const encryptedBytes = createEncryptedBodyBytes();
const mockPlugin = createMockPlugin(encryptedBytes.buffer);
const mockEngine = createMockCryptoEngine();
const file = createMockFile('notes.secret.md', 'notes/notes.secret.md');
mockPlugin._mockActiveView.file = file;
registerOpenHook(mockPlugin as any, mockEngine, () => settings);
const handler = getHandler(mockPlugin);
await handler(file);
expect(mockEngine.decrypt).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.any(Object),
{
vaultName: 'test-vault',
filePath: 'notes/notes.secret.md',
formatVersion: FORMAT_VERSION,
}
);
});
it('should show error notice on decryption failure (PluginError)', async () => {
const encryptedBytes = createEncryptedBodyBytes();
const mockPlugin = createMockPlugin(encryptedBytes.buffer);
const failingEngine: CryptoEngine = {
encrypt: vi.fn(),
decrypt: vi.fn(async () => {
throw new PluginError('KMS access denied', 'authorization');
}),
};
const file = createMockFile('notes.secret.md');
mockPlugin._mockActiveView.file = file;
registerOpenHook(mockPlugin as any, failingEngine, () => settings);
const handler = getHandler(mockPlugin);
await handler(file);
expect(noticeCalls.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(noticeCalls[0].message).toContain('Access denied');
});
it('should set view to preview mode on decryption failure', async () => {
const encryptedBytes = createEncryptedBodyBytes();
const mockPlugin = createMockPlugin(encryptedBytes.buffer);
const failingEngine: CryptoEngine = {
encrypt: vi.fn(),
decrypt: vi.fn(async () => {
throw new PluginError('KMS access denied', 'authorization');
}),
};
const file = createMockFile('notes.secret.md');
mockPlugin._mockActiveView.file = file;
registerOpenHook(mockPlugin as any, failingEngine, () => settings);
const handler = getHandler(mockPlugin);
await handler(file);
expect(mockPlugin._mockLeaf.setViewState).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
state: expect.objectContaining({ mode: 'preview' }),
})
);
});
it('should show generic error notice on non-PluginError failure', async () => {
const encryptedBytes = createEncryptedBodyBytes();
const mockPlugin = createMockPlugin(encryptedBytes.buffer);
const failingEngine: CryptoEngine = {
encrypt: vi.fn(),
decrypt: vi.fn(async () => {
throw new Error('Network timeout');
}),
};
const file = createMockFile('notes.secret.md');
mockPlugin._mockActiveView.file = file;
registerOpenHook(mockPlugin as any, failingEngine, () => settings);
const handler = getHandler(mockPlugin);
await handler(file);
expect(noticeCalls.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(noticeCalls[0].message).toContain('Network timeout');
});
it('should not set editor value if content is already decrypted', async () => {
const decryptedText = 'Already decrypted content';
const encryptedBytes = createEncryptedBodyBytes();
const mockPlugin = createMockPlugin(encryptedBytes.buffer);
const mockEngine = createMockCryptoEngine(new TextEncoder().encode(decryptedText));
const file = createMockFile('notes.secret.md');
mockPlugin._mockActiveView.file = file;
// Editor already has the decrypted content
mockPlugin._mockEditor.getValue = vi.fn(() => decryptedText);
registerOpenHook(mockPlugin as any, mockEngine, () => settings);
const handler = getHandler(mockPlugin);
await handler(file);
expect(mockPlugin._mockEditor.setValue).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('should use custom suffix from settings', async () => {
const customSettings: PluginSettings = {
...settings,
encryptedNoteSuffix: '.encrypted.md',
};
const mockPlugin = createMockPlugin(new ArrayBuffer(0));
const mockEngine = createMockCryptoEngine();
const file = createMockFile('notes.secret.md');
registerOpenHook(mockPlugin as any, mockEngine, () => customSettings);
const handler = getHandler(mockPlugin);
await handler(file);
expect(mockPlugin.app.vault.readBinary).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('should not modify editor if active view file does not match opened file', async () => {
const encryptedBytes = createEncryptedBodyBytes();
const mockPlugin = createMockPlugin(encryptedBytes.buffer);
const mockEngine = createMockCryptoEngine();
const file = createMockFile('notes.secret.md', 'notes/notes.secret.md');
// Active view has a different file
mockPlugin._mockActiveView.file = createMockFile('other.secret.md', 'other/other.secret.md');
registerOpenHook(mockPlugin as any, mockEngine, () => settings);
const handler = getHandler(mockPlugin);
await handler(file);
// Should decrypt but not set editor value (wrong file in view)
expect(mockEngine.decrypt).toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mockPlugin._mockEditor.setValue).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});

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import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { sanitizeValue, sanitizeLogPayload } from '../../../src/logging/sanitizer';
describe('sanitizer', () => {
describe('sanitizeValue', () => {
it('redacts Uint8Array values', () => {
const bytes = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3, 4]);
expect(sanitizeValue(bytes)).toBe('[REDACTED binary data]');
});
it('redacts ArrayBuffer values', () => {
const buffer = new ArrayBuffer(16);
expect(sanitizeValue(buffer)).toBe('[REDACTED binary data]');
});
it('redacts sensitive field names regardless of value', () => {
expect(sanitizeValue('some-value', 'plaintextDek')).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect(sanitizeValue('some-value', 'dek')).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect(sanitizeValue('some-value', 'wrappedDek')).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect(sanitizeValue('some-value', 'authTag')).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect(sanitizeValue('some-value', 'ciphertext')).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect(sanitizeValue('some-value', 'plaintext')).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect(sanitizeValue('some-value', 'secretKey')).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect(sanitizeValue('some-value', 'accessKey')).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect(sanitizeValue('some-value', 'sessionToken')).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect(sanitizeValue('some-value', 'password')).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect(sanitizeValue('some-value', 'credential')).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect(sanitizeValue('some-value', 'credentials')).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect(sanitizeValue('some-value', 'token')).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect(sanitizeValue('some-value', 'secret')).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect(sanitizeValue('some-value', 'privateKey')).toBe('[REDACTED]');
});
it('passes through safe string values', () => {
expect(sanitizeValue('hello world')).toBe('hello world');
expect(sanitizeValue('aws-kms')).toBe('aws-kms');
});
it('redacts AWS access key IDs in strings', () => {
const input = 'key is AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE here';
const result = sanitizeValue(input) as string;
expect(result).not.toContain('AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE');
expect(result).toContain('[REDACTED]');
});
it('redacts Bearer tokens in strings', () => {
const input = 'Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.test';
const result = sanitizeValue(input) as string;
expect(result).not.toContain('eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.test');
expect(result).toContain('[REDACTED]');
});
it('passes through numbers unchanged', () => {
expect(sanitizeValue(42)).toBe(42);
expect(sanitizeValue(0)).toBe(0);
});
it('passes through booleans unchanged', () => {
expect(sanitizeValue(true)).toBe(true);
expect(sanitizeValue(false)).toBe(false);
});
it('passes through null and undefined unchanged', () => {
expect(sanitizeValue(null)).toBe(null);
expect(sanitizeValue(undefined)).toBe(undefined);
});
it('recursively sanitizes arrays', () => {
const input = [new Uint8Array([1, 2]), 'safe', 42];
const result = sanitizeValue(input) as unknown[];
expect(result[0]).toBe('[REDACTED binary data]');
expect(result[1]).toBe('safe');
expect(result[2]).toBe(42);
});
it('recursively sanitizes nested objects', () => {
const input = {
providerId: 'aws-kms',
dek: new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]),
nested: {
plaintext: 'secret content',
},
};
const result = sanitizeValue(input) as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(result.providerId).toBe('aws-kms');
expect(result.dek).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect((result.nested as Record<string, unknown>).plaintext).toBe('[REDACTED]');
});
});
describe('sanitizeLogPayload', () => {
it('sanitizes a typical encrypt log payload', () => {
const payload = {
level: 'info',
timestamp: '2024-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
providerId: 'aws-kms',
cmkId: 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key',
filePath: 'notes/secret.md',
payloadByteLength: 1024,
message: 'File encrypted successfully',
};
const result = sanitizeLogPayload(payload);
expect(result.level).toBe('info');
expect(result.providerId).toBe('aws-kms');
expect(result.cmkId).toBe('arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key');
expect(result.filePath).toBe('notes/secret.md');
expect(result.payloadByteLength).toBe(1024);
});
it('strips sensitive fields from log payload', () => {
const payload = {
level: 'info',
providerId: 'aws-kms',
plaintext: 'this should not appear',
dek: new Uint8Array(32),
wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(256),
authTag: new Uint8Array(16),
};
const result = sanitizeLogPayload(payload);
expect(result.level).toBe('info');
expect(result.providerId).toBe('aws-kms');
expect(result.plaintext).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect(result.dek).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect(result.wrappedDek).toBe('[REDACTED]');
expect(result.authTag).toBe('[REDACTED]');
});
it('does not modify the original payload object', () => {
const payload = {
level: 'info',
providerId: 'aws-kms',
dek: new Uint8Array(32),
};
sanitizeLogPayload(payload);
expect(payload.dek).toBeInstanceOf(Uint8Array);
});
});
});

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import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
import { logEncrypt, logDecrypt, logError } from '../../../src/logging/structured-logger';
describe('structured-logger', () => {
let consoleLogSpy: ReturnType<typeof vi.spyOn>;
let consoleErrorSpy: ReturnType<typeof vi.spyOn>;
beforeEach(() => {
consoleLogSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'log').mockImplementation(() => {});
consoleErrorSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {});
});
afterEach(() => {
consoleLogSpy.mockRestore();
consoleErrorSpy.mockRestore();
});
describe('logEncrypt', () => {
it('emits a structured info log entry with all required fields', () => {
logEncrypt({
providerId: 'aws-kms',
cmkId: 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key',
filePath: 'clients/acme/notes/secret.secret.md',
payloadByteLength: 2048,
});
expect(consoleLogSpy).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
const json = consoleLogSpy.mock.calls[0][0] as string;
const entry = JSON.parse(json);
expect(entry.level).toBe('info');
expect(entry.timestamp).toMatch(/^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}.\d{3}Z$/);
expect(entry.providerId).toBe('aws-kms');
expect(entry.cmkId).toBe('arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key');
expect(entry.filePath).toBe('clients/acme/notes/secret.secret.md');
expect(entry.payloadByteLength).toBe(2048);
expect(entry.message).toBe('File encrypted successfully');
});
it('does not include formatVersion or errorCode fields', () => {
logEncrypt({
providerId: 'aws-kms',
cmkId: 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key',
filePath: 'notes/test.md',
payloadByteLength: 512,
});
const json = consoleLogSpy.mock.calls[0][0] as string;
const entry = JSON.parse(json);
expect(entry.formatVersion).toBeUndefined();
expect(entry.errorCode).toBeUndefined();
});
it('emits to console.log (not console.error)', () => {
logEncrypt({
providerId: 'aws-kms',
cmkId: 'test-key',
filePath: 'test.md',
payloadByteLength: 100,
});
expect(consoleLogSpy).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
expect(consoleErrorSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('logDecrypt', () => {
it('emits a structured info log entry with all required fields', () => {
logDecrypt({
providerId: 'azure-key-vault',
cmkId: 'https://myvault.vault.azure.net/keys/mykey/version',
filePath: 'clients/beta/report.secret.md',
formatVersion: 1,
});
expect(consoleLogSpy).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
const json = consoleLogSpy.mock.calls[0][0] as string;
const entry = JSON.parse(json);
expect(entry.level).toBe('info');
expect(entry.timestamp).toMatch(/^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}.\d{3}Z$/);
expect(entry.providerId).toBe('azure-key-vault');
expect(entry.cmkId).toBe('https://myvault.vault.azure.net/keys/mykey/version');
expect(entry.filePath).toBe('clients/beta/report.secret.md');
expect(entry.formatVersion).toBe(1);
expect(entry.message).toBe('File decrypted successfully');
});
it('does not include payloadByteLength or errorCode fields', () => {
logDecrypt({
providerId: 'aws-kms',
cmkId: 'test-key',
filePath: 'test.md',
formatVersion: 1,
});
const json = consoleLogSpy.mock.calls[0][0] as string;
const entry = JSON.parse(json);
expect(entry.payloadByteLength).toBeUndefined();
expect(entry.errorCode).toBeUndefined();
});
it('emits to console.log (not console.error)', () => {
logDecrypt({
providerId: 'gcp-kms',
cmkId: 'projects/my-project/locations/global/keyRings/ring/cryptoKeys/key',
filePath: 'test.md',
formatVersion: 1,
});
expect(consoleLogSpy).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
expect(consoleErrorSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('logError', () => {
it('emits a structured error log entry with all required fields', () => {
logError({
providerId: 'aws-kms',
cmkId: 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key',
filePath: 'clients/acme/notes/secret.secret.md',
errorCode: 'network',
message: 'KMS unreachable: connection timeout',
});
expect(consoleErrorSpy).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
const json = consoleErrorSpy.mock.calls[0][0] as string;
const entry = JSON.parse(json);
expect(entry.level).toBe('error');
expect(entry.timestamp).toMatch(/^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}.\d{3}Z$/);
expect(entry.providerId).toBe('aws-kms');
expect(entry.cmkId).toBe('arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key');
expect(entry.filePath).toBe('clients/acme/notes/secret.secret.md');
expect(entry.errorCode).toBe('network');
expect(entry.message).toBe('KMS unreachable: connection timeout');
});
it('emits to console.error (not console.log)', () => {
logError({
providerId: 'aws-kms',
cmkId: 'test-key',
filePath: 'test.md',
errorCode: 'timeout',
message: 'Request timed out',
});
expect(consoleErrorSpy).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
expect(consoleLogSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('does not include payloadByteLength or formatVersion fields', () => {
logError({
providerId: 'aws-kms',
cmkId: 'test-key',
filePath: 'test.md',
errorCode: 'credential',
message: 'Credentials expired',
});
const json = consoleErrorSpy.mock.calls[0][0] as string;
const entry = JSON.parse(json);
expect(entry.payloadByteLength).toBeUndefined();
expect(entry.formatVersion).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe('sanitization in logger', () => {
it('does not leak sensitive data even if passed in unexpected fields', () => {
// The logger should sanitize through the sanitizer module
logEncrypt({
providerId: 'aws-kms',
cmkId: 'test-key',
filePath: 'test.md',
payloadByteLength: 100,
});
const json = consoleLogSpy.mock.calls[0][0] as string;
// Verify it's valid JSON
expect(() => JSON.parse(json)).not.toThrow();
// Verify no binary data leaked
expect(json).not.toContain('Uint8Array');
});
});
});

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import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import {
matchesEncryptedSuffix,
matchesEncryptedAttachment,
} from "../../../src/policies/suffix-matcher";
describe("matchesEncryptedSuffix", () => {
describe("case-sensitive suffix matching", () => {
it("returns true when file name ends with the suffix", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedSuffix("notes.secret.md", ".secret.md")).toBe(true);
});
it("returns false when suffix case does not match", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedSuffix("notes.Secret.md", ".secret.md")).toBe(false);
});
it("returns false when suffix case differs in extension", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedSuffix("notes.secret.MD", ".secret.md")).toBe(false);
});
it("returns true when file name equals the suffix exactly", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedSuffix(".secret.md", ".secret.md")).toBe(true);
});
it("returns true for longer file names ending with suffix", () => {
expect(
matchesEncryptedSuffix("my-project/clients/acme.secret.md", ".secret.md")
).toBe(true);
});
it("returns false when suffix appears in the middle but not at end", () => {
expect(
matchesEncryptedSuffix(".secret.md.backup", ".secret.md")
).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("default suffix", () => {
it("uses .secret.md as default suffix", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedSuffix("notes.secret.md")).toBe(true);
});
it("does not match plain .md files with default suffix", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedSuffix("notes.md")).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("custom suffixes", () => {
it("matches custom suffix .encrypted.md", () => {
expect(
matchesEncryptedSuffix("data.encrypted.md", ".encrypted.md")
).toBe(true);
});
it("matches single character suffix", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedSuffix("file.x", ".x")).toBe(true);
});
});
describe("edge cases", () => {
it("returns false for empty file name", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedSuffix("", ".secret.md")).toBe(false);
});
it("returns false for empty suffix", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedSuffix("notes.secret.md", "")).toBe(false);
});
it("returns false when file name is shorter than suffix", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedSuffix("a.md", ".secret.md")).toBe(false);
});
});
});
describe("matchesEncryptedAttachment", () => {
describe("case-insensitive matching", () => {
it("matches .enc.png (lowercase)", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedAttachment("screenshot.enc.png")).toBe(true);
});
it("matches .ENC.PNG (uppercase)", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedAttachment("screenshot.ENC.PNG")).toBe(true);
});
it("matches .Enc.Jpg (mixed case)", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedAttachment("photo.Enc.Jpg")).toBe(true);
});
it("matches .enc.jpg", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedAttachment("photo.enc.jpg")).toBe(true);
});
it("matches .enc.pdf", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedAttachment("document.enc.pdf")).toBe(true);
});
it("matches .ENC.PDF (uppercase)", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedAttachment("document.ENC.PDF")).toBe(true);
});
});
describe("non-matching files", () => {
it("does not match plain .png", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedAttachment("screenshot.png")).toBe(false);
});
it("does not match .secret.md", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedAttachment("notes.secret.md")).toBe(false);
});
it("does not match unsupported encrypted extension .enc.gif", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedAttachment("animation.enc.gif")).toBe(false);
});
it("does not match .enc without extension", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedAttachment("file.enc")).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("edge cases", () => {
it("returns false for empty file name", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedAttachment("")).toBe(false);
});
it("matches when file name equals extension exactly", () => {
expect(matchesEncryptedAttachment(".enc.png")).toBe(true);
});
});
});

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/**
* Unit tests for AwsKmsAdapter.
*
* Mocks the @aws-sdk/client-kms client to test:
* - Successful generateDataKey, wrapDek, unwrapDek, validateAccess flows
* - Timeout handling (AbortController)
* - Credential errors, authorization errors, network errors
* - Encryption context passing
* - KeyId verification on unwrapDek
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { AwsKmsAdapter } from '../../../src/providers/aws-kms-adapter';
import { PluginError } from '../../../src/providers/errors';
import { EncryptionContext } from '../../../src/types';
// Mock KMSClient
function createMockClient() {
return {
send: vi.fn(),
};
}
const TEST_CMK_ID = 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key-id';
const TEST_CONTEXT: EncryptionContext = {
vaultName: 'test-vault',
filePath: 'notes/secret.md',
formatVersion: 1,
};
describe('AwsKmsAdapter', () => {
let mockClient: ReturnType<typeof createMockClient>;
let adapter: AwsKmsAdapter;
beforeEach(() => {
mockClient = createMockClient();
adapter = new AwsKmsAdapter(mockClient as any, 10_000);
});
it('has providerId "aws-kms"', () => {
expect(adapter.providerId).toBe('aws-kms');
});
describe('generateDataKey', () => {
it('calls GenerateDataKeyCommand with correct parameters', async () => {
const plaintext = new Uint8Array(32).fill(0xAB);
const ciphertextBlob = new Uint8Array(64).fill(0xCD);
mockClient.send.mockResolvedValue({
Plaintext: plaintext,
CiphertextBlob: ciphertextBlob,
});
const result = await adapter.generateDataKey(TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT);
expect(mockClient.send).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
const call = mockClient.send.mock.calls[0];
const command = call[0];
expect(command.input).toEqual({
KeyId: TEST_CMK_ID,
KeySpec: 'AES_256',
EncryptionContext: {
vaultName: 'test-vault',
filePath: 'notes/secret.md',
formatVersion: '1',
},
});
expect(result.plaintextDek).toEqual(plaintext);
expect(result.wrappedDek).toEqual(ciphertextBlob);
});
it('passes AbortSignal to the send call', async () => {
mockClient.send.mockResolvedValue({
Plaintext: new Uint8Array(32),
CiphertextBlob: new Uint8Array(64),
});
await adapter.generateDataKey(TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT);
const options = mockClient.send.mock.calls[0][1];
expect(options).toHaveProperty('abortSignal');
expect(options.abortSignal).toBeInstanceOf(AbortSignal);
});
it('throws PluginError with crypto category when Plaintext is missing', async () => {
mockClient.send.mockResolvedValue({
Plaintext: undefined,
CiphertextBlob: new Uint8Array(64),
});
await expect(adapter.generateDataKey(TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT))
.rejects.toThrow(PluginError);
try {
await adapter.generateDataKey(TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT);
} catch (err) {
expect((err as PluginError).category).toBe('crypto');
expect((err as PluginError).providerId).toBe('aws-kms');
}
});
it('throws PluginError with crypto category when CiphertextBlob is missing', async () => {
mockClient.send.mockResolvedValue({
Plaintext: new Uint8Array(32),
CiphertextBlob: undefined,
});
await expect(adapter.generateDataKey(TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT))
.rejects.toThrow(PluginError);
});
});
describe('wrapDek', () => {
it('calls EncryptCommand with correct parameters', async () => {
const dek = new Uint8Array(32).fill(0x11);
const wrappedDek = new Uint8Array(64).fill(0x22);
mockClient.send.mockResolvedValue({
CiphertextBlob: wrappedDek,
});
const result = await adapter.wrapDek(dek, TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT);
expect(mockClient.send).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
const command = mockClient.send.mock.calls[0][0];
expect(command.input).toEqual({
KeyId: TEST_CMK_ID,
Plaintext: dek,
EncryptionContext: {
vaultName: 'test-vault',
filePath: 'notes/secret.md',
formatVersion: '1',
},
});
expect(result).toEqual(wrappedDek);
});
it('throws PluginError with crypto category when CiphertextBlob is missing', async () => {
mockClient.send.mockResolvedValue({
CiphertextBlob: undefined,
});
const dek = new Uint8Array(32);
await expect(adapter.wrapDek(dek, TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT))
.rejects.toThrow(PluginError);
});
});
describe('unwrapDek', () => {
it('calls DecryptCommand with correct parameters', async () => {
const wrappedDek = new Uint8Array(64).fill(0x33);
const plaintext = new Uint8Array(32).fill(0x44);
mockClient.send.mockResolvedValue({
Plaintext: plaintext,
KeyId: TEST_CMK_ID,
});
const result = await adapter.unwrapDek(wrappedDek, TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT);
expect(mockClient.send).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
const command = mockClient.send.mock.calls[0][0];
expect(command.input).toEqual({
CiphertextBlob: wrappedDek,
KeyId: TEST_CMK_ID,
EncryptionContext: {
vaultName: 'test-vault',
filePath: 'notes/secret.md',
formatVersion: '1',
},
});
expect(result).toEqual(plaintext);
});
it('throws PluginError when Plaintext is missing from response', async () => {
mockClient.send.mockResolvedValue({
Plaintext: undefined,
KeyId: TEST_CMK_ID,
});
const wrappedDek = new Uint8Array(64);
await expect(adapter.unwrapDek(wrappedDek, TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT))
.rejects.toThrow(PluginError);
});
it('throws PluginError when returned KeyId does not match expected cmkId', async () => {
mockClient.send.mockResolvedValue({
Plaintext: new Uint8Array(32),
KeyId: 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/different-key',
});
const wrappedDek = new Uint8Array(64);
await expect(adapter.unwrapDek(wrappedDek, TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT))
.rejects.toThrow(PluginError);
try {
await adapter.unwrapDek(wrappedDek, TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT);
} catch (err) {
expect((err as PluginError).category).toBe('crypto');
expect((err as PluginError).message).toContain('unexpected KeyId');
}
});
it('succeeds when KeyId is not returned (some KMS configurations)', async () => {
mockClient.send.mockResolvedValue({
Plaintext: new Uint8Array(32).fill(0x55),
KeyId: undefined,
});
const wrappedDek = new Uint8Array(64);
const result = await adapter.unwrapDek(wrappedDek, TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT);
expect(result).toEqual(new Uint8Array(32).fill(0x55));
});
});
describe('validateAccess', () => {
it('calls DescribeKeyCommand with the cmkId', async () => {
mockClient.send.mockResolvedValue({
KeyMetadata: { KeyId: TEST_CMK_ID },
});
await expect(adapter.validateAccess(TEST_CMK_ID)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
expect(mockClient.send).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
const command = mockClient.send.mock.calls[0][0];
expect(command.input).toEqual({
KeyId: TEST_CMK_ID,
});
});
it('throws PluginError on access denied', async () => {
const error = new Error('Access denied');
(error as any).name = 'AccessDeniedException';
mockClient.send.mockRejectedValue(error);
await expect(adapter.validateAccess(TEST_CMK_ID))
.rejects.toThrow(PluginError);
try {
await adapter.validateAccess(TEST_CMK_ID);
} catch (err) {
expect((err as PluginError).category).toBe('authorization');
}
});
});
describe('error mapping', () => {
it('maps AbortError to timeout category', async () => {
const error = new Error('The operation was aborted');
(error as any).name = 'AbortError';
mockClient.send.mockRejectedValue(error);
try {
await adapter.generateDataKey(TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT);
} catch (err) {
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(PluginError);
expect((err as PluginError).category).toBe('timeout');
expect((err as PluginError).providerId).toBe('aws-kms');
expect((err as PluginError).cmkId).toBe(TEST_CMK_ID);
}
});
it('maps CredentialsProviderError to credential category', async () => {
const error = new Error('Could not load credentials');
(error as any).name = 'CredentialsProviderError';
mockClient.send.mockRejectedValue(error);
try {
await adapter.wrapDek(new Uint8Array(32), TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT);
} catch (err) {
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(PluginError);
expect((err as PluginError).category).toBe('credential');
}
});
it('maps ExpiredTokenException to credential category', async () => {
const error = new Error('Token expired');
(error as any).name = 'ExpiredTokenException';
mockClient.send.mockRejectedValue(error);
try {
await adapter.unwrapDek(new Uint8Array(64), TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT);
} catch (err) {
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(PluginError);
expect((err as PluginError).category).toBe('credential');
}
});
it('maps AccessDeniedException to authorization category', async () => {
const error = new Error('Not authorized');
(error as any).name = 'AccessDeniedException';
mockClient.send.mockRejectedValue(error);
try {
await adapter.generateDataKey(TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT);
} catch (err) {
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(PluginError);
expect((err as PluginError).category).toBe('authorization');
}
});
it('maps KMSAccessDeniedException to authorization category', async () => {
const error = new Error('KMS access denied');
(error as any).name = 'KMSAccessDeniedException';
mockClient.send.mockRejectedValue(error);
try {
await adapter.generateDataKey(TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT);
} catch (err) {
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(PluginError);
expect((err as PluginError).category).toBe('authorization');
}
});
it('maps KMSInternalException to network category', async () => {
const error = new Error('Internal error');
(error as any).name = 'KMSInternalException';
mockClient.send.mockRejectedValue(error);
try {
await adapter.generateDataKey(TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT);
} catch (err) {
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(PluginError);
expect((err as PluginError).category).toBe('network');
}
});
it('maps network-related message to network category', async () => {
const error = new Error('ECONNREFUSED: connection refused');
(error as any).name = 'Error';
mockClient.send.mockRejectedValue(error);
try {
await adapter.generateDataKey(TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT);
} catch (err) {
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(PluginError);
expect((err as PluginError).category).toBe('network');
}
});
it('maps unknown errors to crypto category', async () => {
const error = new Error('Something unexpected');
(error as any).name = 'SomeUnknownError';
mockClient.send.mockRejectedValue(error);
try {
await adapter.generateDataKey(TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT);
} catch (err) {
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(PluginError);
expect((err as PluginError).category).toBe('crypto');
}
});
it('preserves original error as cause', async () => {
const originalError = new Error('Original');
(originalError as any).name = 'AccessDeniedException';
mockClient.send.mockRejectedValue(originalError);
try {
await adapter.generateDataKey(TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT);
} catch (err) {
expect((err as PluginError).cause).toBe(originalError);
}
});
});
describe('encryption context', () => {
it('converts EncryptionContext to Record<string, string> with formatVersion as string', async () => {
mockClient.send.mockResolvedValue({
Plaintext: new Uint8Array(32),
CiphertextBlob: new Uint8Array(64),
});
const context: EncryptionContext = {
vaultName: 'my-vault',
filePath: 'clients/acme/notes.md',
formatVersion: 2,
};
await adapter.generateDataKey(TEST_CMK_ID, context);
const command = mockClient.send.mock.calls[0][0];
expect(command.input.EncryptionContext).toEqual({
vaultName: 'my-vault',
filePath: 'clients/acme/notes.md',
formatVersion: '2',
});
});
});
describe('timeout behavior', () => {
it('uses custom timeout when provided', () => {
const customAdapter = new AwsKmsAdapter(mockClient as any, 5000);
expect(customAdapter.providerId).toBe('aws-kms');
// The timeout is internal, but we can verify it works by testing abort behavior
});
it('maps aborted message to timeout category', async () => {
const error = new Error('Request aborted');
(error as any).name = 'AbortError';
mockClient.send.mockRejectedValue(error);
try {
await adapter.generateDataKey(TEST_CMK_ID, TEST_CONTEXT);
} catch (err) {
expect((err as PluginError).category).toBe('timeout');
}
});
});
});

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import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { ProviderDispatcherImpl } from '../../../src/providers/dispatcher';
import { ProviderAdapter, EncryptionContext, GenerateDataKeyResult } from '../../../src/types';
import { PluginError } from '../../../src/providers/errors';
/**
* Creates a mock ProviderAdapter with all required methods.
*/
function createMockAdapter(providerId: string): ProviderAdapter {
return {
providerId,
generateDataKey: async (_cmkId: string, _context: EncryptionContext): Promise<GenerateDataKeyResult> => ({
plaintextDek: new Uint8Array(32),
wrappedDek: new Uint8Array(64),
}),
wrapDek: async (_dek: Uint8Array, _cmkId: string, _context: EncryptionContext): Promise<Uint8Array> =>
new Uint8Array(64),
unwrapDek: async (_wrappedDek: Uint8Array, _cmkId: string, _context: EncryptionContext): Promise<Uint8Array> =>
new Uint8Array(32),
validateAccess: async (_cmkId: string): Promise<void> => {},
};
}
describe('ProviderDispatcherImpl', () => {
let dispatcher: ProviderDispatcherImpl;
beforeEach(() => {
dispatcher = new ProviderDispatcherImpl();
});
describe('register()', () => {
it('should register a valid adapter', () => {
const adapter = createMockAdapter('aws-kms');
dispatcher.register(adapter);
expect(dispatcher.listProviders()).toContain('aws-kms');
});
it('should register multiple adapters with different providerIds', () => {
dispatcher.register(createMockAdapter('aws-kms'));
dispatcher.register(createMockAdapter('azure-key-vault'));
dispatcher.register(createMockAdapter('gcp-kms'));
expect(dispatcher.listProviders()).toEqual(['aws-kms', 'azure-key-vault', 'gcp-kms']);
});
it('should reject duplicate providerId with validation error', () => {
dispatcher.register(createMockAdapter('aws-kms'));
expect(() => dispatcher.register(createMockAdapter('aws-kms'))).toThrow(PluginError);
try {
dispatcher.register(createMockAdapter('aws-kms'));
} catch (e) {
expect(e).toBeInstanceOf(PluginError);
expect((e as PluginError).category).toBe('validation');
expect((e as PluginError).message).toContain('already registered');
}
});
it('should reject adapter with empty providerId', () => {
const adapter = createMockAdapter('');
expect(() => dispatcher.register(adapter)).toThrow(PluginError);
try {
dispatcher.register(adapter);
} catch (e) {
expect((e as PluginError).category).toBe('validation');
expect((e as PluginError).message).toContain('Invalid provider identifier');
}
});
it('should reject adapter with providerId containing uppercase', () => {
const adapter = createMockAdapter('AWS-KMS');
expect(() => dispatcher.register(adapter)).toThrow(PluginError);
});
it('should reject adapter with providerId containing special characters', () => {
const adapter = createMockAdapter('aws_kms');
expect(() => dispatcher.register(adapter)).toThrow(PluginError);
});
it('should reject adapter with providerId longer than 32 characters', () => {
const adapter = createMockAdapter('a'.repeat(33));
expect(() => dispatcher.register(adapter)).toThrow(PluginError);
});
it('should accept adapter with single character providerId', () => {
const adapter = createMockAdapter('a');
dispatcher.register(adapter);
expect(dispatcher.listProviders()).toContain('a');
});
it('should accept adapter with 32 character providerId', () => {
const adapter = createMockAdapter('a'.repeat(32));
dispatcher.register(adapter);
expect(dispatcher.listProviders()).toContain('a'.repeat(32));
});
it('should reject adapter with providerId starting with hyphen', () => {
const adapter = createMockAdapter('-aws-kms');
expect(() => dispatcher.register(adapter)).toThrow(PluginError);
});
it('should reject adapter with providerId ending with hyphen', () => {
const adapter = createMockAdapter('aws-kms-');
expect(() => dispatcher.register(adapter)).toThrow(PluginError);
});
it('should reject adapter missing generateDataKey method', () => {
const adapter = createMockAdapter('test') as Record<string, unknown>;
delete adapter.generateDataKey;
expect(() => dispatcher.register(adapter as unknown as ProviderAdapter)).toThrow(PluginError);
try {
dispatcher.register(adapter as unknown as ProviderAdapter);
} catch (e) {
expect((e as PluginError).category).toBe('validation');
expect((e as PluginError).message).toContain('generateDataKey');
}
});
it('should reject adapter missing multiple methods', () => {
const adapter = {
providerId: 'test',
} as unknown as ProviderAdapter;
try {
dispatcher.register(adapter);
} catch (e) {
expect((e as PluginError).category).toBe('validation');
expect((e as PluginError).message).toContain('generateDataKey');
expect((e as PluginError).message).toContain('wrapDek');
expect((e as PluginError).message).toContain('unwrapDek');
expect((e as PluginError).message).toContain('validateAccess');
}
});
it('should reject adapter where a required method is not a function', () => {
const adapter = {
providerId: 'test',
generateDataKey: 'not a function',
wrapDek: async () => new Uint8Array(64),
unwrapDek: async () => new Uint8Array(32),
validateAccess: async () => {},
} as unknown as ProviderAdapter;
expect(() => dispatcher.register(adapter)).toThrow(PluginError);
try {
dispatcher.register(adapter);
} catch (e) {
expect((e as PluginError).message).toContain('generateDataKey');
}
});
});
describe('getAdapter()', () => {
it('should return the registered adapter by providerId', () => {
const adapter = createMockAdapter('aws-kms');
dispatcher.register(adapter);
expect(dispatcher.getAdapter('aws-kms')).toBe(adapter);
});
it('should throw PluginError with format category for unregistered providerId', () => {
expect(() => dispatcher.getAdapter('nonexistent')).toThrow(PluginError);
try {
dispatcher.getAdapter('nonexistent');
} catch (e) {
expect(e).toBeInstanceOf(PluginError);
expect((e as PluginError).category).toBe('format');
expect((e as PluginError).message).toContain('not registered');
}
});
it('should return correct adapter when multiple are registered', () => {
const aws = createMockAdapter('aws-kms');
const azure = createMockAdapter('azure-key-vault');
dispatcher.register(aws);
dispatcher.register(azure);
expect(dispatcher.getAdapter('aws-kms')).toBe(aws);
expect(dispatcher.getAdapter('azure-key-vault')).toBe(azure);
});
});
describe('listProviders()', () => {
it('should return empty array when no providers registered', () => {
expect(dispatcher.listProviders()).toEqual([]);
});
it('should return all registered provider IDs', () => {
dispatcher.register(createMockAdapter('aws-kms'));
dispatcher.register(createMockAdapter('gcp-kms'));
const providers = dispatcher.listProviders();
expect(providers).toHaveLength(2);
expect(providers).toContain('aws-kms');
expect(providers).toContain('gcp-kms');
});
it('should return a new array each time (not a reference to internal state)', () => {
dispatcher.register(createMockAdapter('aws-kms'));
const list1 = dispatcher.listProviders();
const list2 = dispatcher.listProviders();
expect(list1).toEqual(list2);
expect(list1).not.toBe(list2);
});
});
});

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import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
describe("project setup", () => {
it("vitest runs successfully", () => {
expect(1 + 1).toBe(2);
});
it("TypeScript types work", () => {
const value: number = 42;
expect(value).toBe(42);
});
});

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/**
* Unit tests for the encrypted file read-only view.
*
* Tests:
* - View type and display text
* - Error banner rendering with message
* - Raw content displayed as base64
* - registerEncryptedFileView registers the view type
* - openEncryptedFileView creates a leaf and sets content
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import {
EncryptedFileView,
ENCRYPTED_FILE_VIEW_TYPE,
registerEncryptedFileView,
openEncryptedFileView,
showEncryptedFileError,
} from '../../../src/ui/encrypted-view';
import { Plugin, WorkspaceLeaf } from 'obsidian';
import { PluginError } from '../../../src/providers/errors';
describe('EncryptedFileView', () => {
let view: EncryptedFileView;
let leaf: WorkspaceLeaf;
beforeEach(() => {
leaf = new WorkspaceLeaf();
view = new EncryptedFileView(leaf);
});
describe('getViewType', () => {
it('returns the encrypted-file-view type', () => {
expect(view.getViewType()).toBe('encrypted-file-view');
});
});
describe('getDisplayText', () => {
it('returns default text when no file path is set', () => {
expect(view.getDisplayText()).toBe('Encrypted File (Read-Only)');
});
it('returns file path in display text when set', () => {
const rawContent = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]);
view.setContent('notes/secret.md', 'KMS timeout', rawContent);
expect(view.getDisplayText()).toBe('Encrypted: notes/secret.md');
});
});
describe('getIcon', () => {
it('returns lock icon', () => {
expect(view.getIcon()).toBe('lock');
});
});
describe('setContent', () => {
it('stores file path, error message, and base64-encoded content', () => {
const rawContent = new Uint8Array([72, 101, 108, 108, 111]); // "Hello"
view.setContent('path/to/file.md', 'Decryption failed: KMS timeout', rawContent);
const state = view.getState();
expect(state.filePath).toBe('path/to/file.md');
expect(state.errorMessage).toBe('Decryption failed: KMS timeout');
expect(state.rawContentBase64).toBe(btoa('Hello'));
});
it('handles empty content', () => {
const rawContent = new Uint8Array(0);
view.setContent('file.md', 'Error', rawContent);
const state = view.getState();
expect(state.rawContentBase64).toBe('');
});
});
describe('getState / setState', () => {
it('round-trips state correctly', async () => {
const rawContent = new Uint8Array([0x4F, 0x43, 0x4B, 0x45]);
view.setContent('test.secret.md', 'Auth failed', rawContent);
const state = view.getState();
const newView = new EncryptedFileView(leaf);
await newView.setState(state, {});
expect(newView.getState()).toEqual(state);
});
it('handles partial state updates', async () => {
view.setContent('original.md', 'Original error', new Uint8Array([1]));
await view.setState({ errorMessage: 'Updated error' }, {});
const state = view.getState();
expect(state.filePath).toBe('original.md');
expect(state.errorMessage).toBe('Updated error');
});
});
describe('ENCRYPTED_FILE_VIEW_TYPE', () => {
it('is the expected string constant', () => {
expect(ENCRYPTED_FILE_VIEW_TYPE).toBe('encrypted-file-view');
});
});
});
describe('registerEncryptedFileView', () => {
it('registers the view type with the plugin', () => {
const plugin = new Plugin();
registerEncryptedFileView(plugin as any);
expect(plugin.registerView).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
ENCRYPTED_FILE_VIEW_TYPE,
expect.any(Function)
);
});
it('factory function creates an EncryptedFileView instance', () => {
const plugin = new Plugin();
registerEncryptedFileView(plugin as any);
const factory = (plugin.registerView as any).mock.calls[0][1];
const leaf = new WorkspaceLeaf();
const instance = factory(leaf);
expect(instance).toBeInstanceOf(EncryptedFileView);
});
});
describe('openEncryptedFileView', () => {
it('detaches existing views, creates a leaf, and sets content', async () => {
const plugin = new Plugin();
const mockLeaf = new WorkspaceLeaf();
const mockView = new EncryptedFileView(mockLeaf);
mockLeaf.view = mockView;
mockLeaf.setViewState = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
(plugin.app.workspace.getLeaf as any).mockReturnValue(mockLeaf);
const rawContent = new Uint8Array([10, 20, 30]);
await openEncryptedFileView(
plugin as any,
'secret/note.md',
'Decryption failed: access denied',
rawContent
);
expect(plugin.app.workspace.detachLeavesOfType).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
ENCRYPTED_FILE_VIEW_TYPE
);
expect(plugin.app.workspace.getLeaf).toHaveBeenCalledWith(true);
expect(mockLeaf.setViewState).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
type: ENCRYPTED_FILE_VIEW_TYPE,
active: true,
});
expect(plugin.app.workspace.revealLeaf).toHaveBeenCalledWith(mockLeaf);
// Verify content was set on the view
const state = mockView.getState();
expect(state.filePath).toBe('secret/note.md');
expect(state.errorMessage).toBe('Decryption failed: access denied');
});
});
describe('showEncryptedFileError', () => {
it('opens the encrypted view with error category and message for PluginError', async () => {
const plugin = new Plugin();
const mockLeaf = new WorkspaceLeaf();
const mockView = new EncryptedFileView(mockLeaf);
mockLeaf.view = mockView;
mockLeaf.setViewState = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
(plugin.app.workspace.getLeaf as any).mockReturnValue(mockLeaf);
const rawContent = new Uint8Array([0x4F, 0x43, 0x4B, 0x45]);
const error = new PluginError(
'KMS request timed out',
'timeout',
'aws-kms',
'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/abc',
'notes/secret.md'
);
await showEncryptedFileError(plugin as any, 'notes/secret.md', rawContent, error);
const state = mockView.getState();
expect(state.filePath).toBe('notes/secret.md');
expect(state.errorMessage).toBe('[timeout] KMS request timed out');
});
it('opens the encrypted view with plain message for generic Error', async () => {
const plugin = new Plugin();
const mockLeaf = new WorkspaceLeaf();
const mockView = new EncryptedFileView(mockLeaf);
mockLeaf.view = mockView;
mockLeaf.setViewState = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
(plugin.app.workspace.getLeaf as any).mockReturnValue(mockLeaf);
const rawContent = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]);
const error = new Error('Something went wrong');
await showEncryptedFileError(plugin as any, 'file.md', rawContent, error);
const state = mockView.getState();
expect(state.filePath).toBe('file.md');
expect(state.errorMessage).toBe('Something went wrong');
});
it('uses default message when error has no message', async () => {
const plugin = new Plugin();
const mockLeaf = new WorkspaceLeaf();
const mockView = new EncryptedFileView(mockLeaf);
mockLeaf.view = mockView;
mockLeaf.setViewState = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
(plugin.app.workspace.getLeaf as any).mockReturnValue(mockLeaf);
const rawContent = new Uint8Array([]);
const error = new Error('');
await showEncryptedFileError(plugin as any, 'empty.md', rawContent, error);
const state = mockView.getState();
expect(state.errorMessage).toBe('Decryption failed');
});
it('detaches existing views and reveals the new leaf', async () => {
const plugin = new Plugin();
const mockLeaf = new WorkspaceLeaf();
const mockView = new EncryptedFileView(mockLeaf);
mockLeaf.view = mockView;
mockLeaf.setViewState = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
(plugin.app.workspace.getLeaf as any).mockReturnValue(mockLeaf);
const rawContent = new Uint8Array([10, 20]);
const error = new PluginError('Access denied', 'authorization');
await showEncryptedFileError(plugin as any, 'denied.md', rawContent, error);
expect(plugin.app.workspace.detachLeavesOfType).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
ENCRYPTED_FILE_VIEW_TYPE
);
expect(plugin.app.workspace.getLeaf).toHaveBeenCalledWith(true);
expect(plugin.app.workspace.revealLeaf).toHaveBeenCalledWith(mockLeaf);
});
});

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/**
* Unit tests for notice helper functions.
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { Notice } from 'obsidian';
import { showErrorNotice, showNotice } from '../../../src/ui/notices';
import { PluginError, ErrorCategory } from '../../../src/providers/errors';
import { NOTICE_DURATION_MS } from '../../../src/constants';
vi.mock('obsidian');
describe('showErrorNotice', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
});
it('displays credential error with prefix and message', () => {
const error = new PluginError('invalid token', 'credential');
showErrorNotice(error);
expect(Notice).toHaveBeenCalledWith('Authentication failed: invalid token', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
});
it('displays authorization error with prefix and message', () => {
const error = new PluginError('key policy denies access', 'authorization');
showErrorNotice(error);
expect(Notice).toHaveBeenCalledWith('Access denied: key policy denies access', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
});
it('displays network error with prefix and message', () => {
const error = new PluginError('connection refused', 'network');
showErrorNotice(error);
expect(Notice).toHaveBeenCalledWith('Network error: connection refused', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
});
it('displays timeout error as self-contained message', () => {
const error = new PluginError('exceeded 10s', 'timeout');
showErrorNotice(error);
expect(Notice).toHaveBeenCalledWith('Request timed out', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
});
it('displays integrity error as self-contained message', () => {
const error = new PluginError('auth tag mismatch', 'integrity');
showErrorNotice(error);
expect(Notice).toHaveBeenCalledWith('Integrity check failed', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
});
it('displays format error with prefix and message', () => {
const error = new PluginError('unsupported version 99', 'format');
showErrorNotice(error);
expect(Notice).toHaveBeenCalledWith('File format error: unsupported version 99', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
});
it('displays validation error with prefix and message', () => {
const error = new PluginError('invalid ARN format', 'validation');
showErrorNotice(error);
expect(Notice).toHaveBeenCalledWith('Configuration error: invalid ARN format', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
});
it('displays crypto error with prefix and message', () => {
const error = new PluginError('WebCrypto unavailable', 'crypto');
showErrorNotice(error);
expect(Notice).toHaveBeenCalledWith('Encryption error: WebCrypto unavailable', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
});
it('displays size-limit error with prefix and message', () => {
const error = new PluginError('exceeds 50 MB limit', 'size-limit');
showErrorNotice(error);
expect(Notice).toHaveBeenCalledWith('File too large: exceeds 50 MB limit', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
});
it('uses NOTICE_DURATION_MS (5000ms) for all error notices', () => {
const error = new PluginError('test', 'network');
showErrorNotice(error);
expect(Notice).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.any(String), 5000);
});
});
describe('showNotice', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
});
it('displays a simple message with NOTICE_DURATION_MS', () => {
showNotice('Encryption complete');
expect(Notice).toHaveBeenCalledWith('Encryption complete', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
});
it('passes the exact message string provided', () => {
showNotice('File decrypted successfully');
expect(Notice).toHaveBeenCalledWith('File decrypted successfully', NOTICE_DURATION_MS);
});
});

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import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import type { PluginSettings } from "../../../src/types";
// Use dynamic import to avoid module resolution ordering issues
let CloudKmsSettingsTab: any;
let DEFAULT_SETTINGS: PluginSettings;
let loadSettings: any;
let SettingsPlugin: any;
beforeEach(async () => {
const mod = await import("../../../src/ui/settings-tab");
CloudKmsSettingsTab = mod.CloudKmsSettingsTab;
DEFAULT_SETTINGS = mod.DEFAULT_SETTINGS;
loadSettings = mod.loadSettings;
});
/**
* Creates a mock plugin for testing settings.
*/
function createMockPlugin(initialSettings?: Partial<PluginSettings>) {
const defaultSettings: PluginSettings = {
awsCmkArn: "",
encryptedNoteSuffix: ".secret.md",
providers: [],
vaultPolicies: [],
};
const settings: PluginSettings = {
...defaultSettings,
...initialSettings,
};
return {
app: {} as any,
settings,
loadData: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(settings),
saveData: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
};
}
describe("CloudKmsSettingsTab", () => {
describe("constructor", () => {
it("creates a settings tab instance", () => {
const plugin = createMockPlugin();
const tab = new CloudKmsSettingsTab(plugin.app, plugin);
expect(tab).toBeDefined();
});
});
describe("DEFAULT_SETTINGS", () => {
it("has empty awsCmkArn", () => {
expect(DEFAULT_SETTINGS.awsCmkArn).toBe("");
});
it("has default encrypted note suffix", () => {
expect(DEFAULT_SETTINGS.encryptedNoteSuffix).toBe(".secret.md");
});
it("has empty providers array", () => {
expect(DEFAULT_SETTINGS.providers).toEqual([]);
});
it("has empty vaultPolicies array", () => {
expect(DEFAULT_SETTINGS.vaultPolicies).toEqual([]);
});
});
});
describe("loadSettings", () => {
it("returns default settings when no data is stored", async () => {
const plugin = createMockPlugin();
(plugin.loadData as any).mockResolvedValue(null);
const settings = await loadSettings(plugin);
expect(settings).toEqual(DEFAULT_SETTINGS);
});
it("merges stored data with defaults", async () => {
const plugin = createMockPlugin();
(plugin.loadData as any).mockResolvedValue({
awsCmkArn: "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key",
});
const settings = await loadSettings(plugin);
expect(settings.awsCmkArn).toBe(
"arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/test-key"
);
expect(settings.encryptedNoteSuffix).toBe(".secret.md");
expect(settings.providers).toEqual([]);
expect(settings.vaultPolicies).toEqual([]);
});
it("preserves all stored fields", async () => {
const stored: PluginSettings = {
awsCmkArn: "arn:aws:kms:eu-west-1:999888777666:key/my-key",
keys: [{ alias: "finance", arn: "arn:aws:kms:eu-west-1:999888777666:key/my-key" }],
defaultKeyAlias: "finance",
encryptedNoteSuffix: ".encrypted.md",
autoDecryptBlocks: true,
providers: [{ providerId: "aws-kms", enabled: true, cmkId: "test" }],
vaultPolicies: [],
};
const plugin = createMockPlugin();
(plugin.loadData as any).mockResolvedValue(stored);
const settings = await loadSettings(plugin);
expect(settings).toEqual(stored);
});
it("handles undefined loadData result", async () => {
const plugin = createMockPlugin();
(plugin.loadData as any).mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const settings = await loadSettings(plugin);
expect(settings).toEqual(DEFAULT_SETTINGS);
});
});

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import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import { validateAwsKmsArn } from "../../../src/utils/arn-validator";
describe("validateAwsKmsArn", () => {
describe("empty/whitespace input", () => {
it("returns error for empty string", () => {
const result = validateAwsKmsArn("");
expect(result).toEqual({ valid: false, error: "ARN is required" });
});
it("returns error for whitespace-only string", () => {
const result = validateAwsKmsArn(" ");
expect(result).toEqual({ valid: false, error: "ARN is required" });
});
it("returns error for tab/newline whitespace", () => {
const result = validateAwsKmsArn("\t\n ");
expect(result).toEqual({ valid: false, error: "ARN is required" });
});
});
describe("valid ARNs", () => {
it("accepts a standard AWS KMS key ARN", () => {
const result = validateAwsKmsArn(
"arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012"
);
expect(result).toEqual({ valid: true });
});
it("accepts ARN with different region", () => {
const result = validateAwsKmsArn(
"arn:aws:kms:eu-west-1:999888777666:key/abcdef01-2345-6789-abcd-ef0123456789"
);
expect(result).toEqual({ valid: true });
});
it("accepts ARN with non-UUID key-id", () => {
const result = validateAwsKmsArn(
"arn:aws:kms:ap-southeast-2:111222333444:key/mrk-some-multi-region-key"
);
expect(result).toEqual({ valid: true });
});
it("accepts ARN with alias-style key-id", () => {
const result = validateAwsKmsArn(
"arn:aws:kms:us-west-2:123456789012:key/alias-key-name"
);
expect(result).toEqual({ valid: true });
});
});
describe("invalid ARN formats", () => {
it("rejects ARN missing arn: prefix", () => {
const result = validateAwsKmsArn(
"aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/12345678"
);
expect(result).toEqual({
valid: false,
error: "Invalid AWS KMS key ARN format",
});
});
it("rejects ARN with wrong service (not kms)", () => {
const result = validateAwsKmsArn(
"arn:aws:s3:us-east-1:123456789012:key/12345678"
);
expect(result).toEqual({
valid: false,
error: "Invalid AWS KMS key ARN format",
});
});
it("rejects ARN with non-12-digit account ID", () => {
const result = validateAwsKmsArn(
"arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:12345:key/12345678"
);
expect(result).toEqual({
valid: false,
error: "Invalid AWS KMS key ARN format",
});
});
it("rejects ARN with 13-digit account ID", () => {
const result = validateAwsKmsArn(
"arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:1234567890123:key/12345678"
);
expect(result).toEqual({
valid: false,
error: "Invalid AWS KMS key ARN format",
});
});
it("rejects ARN with non-numeric account ID", () => {
const result = validateAwsKmsArn(
"arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:12345678901a:key/12345678"
);
expect(result).toEqual({
valid: false,
error: "Invalid AWS KMS key ARN format",
});
});
it("rejects ARN missing key/ prefix in resource", () => {
const result = validateAwsKmsArn(
"arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:alias/my-key"
);
expect(result).toEqual({
valid: false,
error: "Invalid AWS KMS key ARN format",
});
});
it("rejects ARN with empty region", () => {
const result = validateAwsKmsArn(
"arn:aws:kms::123456789012:key/12345678"
);
expect(result).toEqual({
valid: false,
error: "Invalid AWS KMS key ARN format",
});
});
it("rejects ARN with empty key-id", () => {
const result = validateAwsKmsArn(
"arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/"
);
expect(result).toEqual({
valid: false,
error: "Invalid AWS KMS key ARN format",
});
});
it("rejects random string", () => {
const result = validateAwsKmsArn("not-an-arn-at-all");
expect(result).toEqual({
valid: false,
error: "Invalid AWS KMS key ARN format",
});
});
});
});

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import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { splitFrontmatter } from '../../../src/utils/frontmatter';
describe('splitFrontmatter', () => {
describe('notes with valid frontmatter', () => {
it('splits a note with frontmatter and body', () => {
const content = '---\ntitle: Hello\ntags: [test]\n---\nThis is the body.';
const result = splitFrontmatter(content);
expect(result.frontmatter).toBe('---\ntitle: Hello\ntags: [test]\n---\n');
expect(result.body).toBe('This is the body.');
});
it('preserves frontmatter delimiters in the returned frontmatter', () => {
const content = '---\nkey: value\n---\nbody content';
const result = splitFrontmatter(content);
expect(result.frontmatter!.startsWith('---\n')).toBe(true);
expect(result.frontmatter!.endsWith('\n---\n')).toBe(true);
});
it('handles frontmatter with empty body', () => {
const content = '---\ntitle: Test\n---\n';
const result = splitFrontmatter(content);
expect(result.frontmatter).toBe('---\ntitle: Test\n---\n');
expect(result.body).toBe('');
});
it('handles frontmatter with multi-line body', () => {
const content = '---\ntitle: Test\n---\nLine 1\nLine 2\nLine 3';
const result = splitFrontmatter(content);
expect(result.frontmatter).toBe('---\ntitle: Test\n---\n');
expect(result.body).toBe('Line 1\nLine 2\nLine 3');
});
it('handles frontmatter ending at EOF without trailing newline', () => {
const content = '---\ntitle: Test\n---';
const result = splitFrontmatter(content);
expect(result.frontmatter).toBe('---\ntitle: Test\n---');
expect(result.body).toBe('');
});
it('handles frontmatter with --- in the YAML values', () => {
const content = '---\ntitle: A---B\ndesc: test\n---\nbody here';
const result = splitFrontmatter(content);
expect(result.frontmatter).toBe('---\ntitle: A---B\ndesc: test\n---\n');
expect(result.body).toBe('body here');
});
it('handles frontmatter with empty YAML content', () => {
const content = '---\n\n---\nbody';
const result = splitFrontmatter(content);
expect(result.frontmatter).toBe('---\n\n---\n');
expect(result.body).toBe('body');
});
});
describe('notes without frontmatter', () => {
it('returns null frontmatter and entire content as body for plain text', () => {
const content = 'This is just a plain note.';
const result = splitFrontmatter(content);
expect(result.frontmatter).toBeNull();
expect(result.body).toBe(content);
});
it('returns null frontmatter for empty content', () => {
const result = splitFrontmatter('');
expect(result.frontmatter).toBeNull();
expect(result.body).toBe('');
});
it('returns null frontmatter when --- is not at position 0', () => {
const content = ' ---\ntitle: Test\n---\nbody';
const result = splitFrontmatter(content);
expect(result.frontmatter).toBeNull();
expect(result.body).toBe(content);
});
it('returns null frontmatter when opening --- has no newline after it', () => {
const content = '---title: Test\n---\nbody';
const result = splitFrontmatter(content);
expect(result.frontmatter).toBeNull();
expect(result.body).toBe(content);
});
it('returns null frontmatter when no closing delimiter is found', () => {
const content = '---\ntitle: Test\nno closing delimiter here';
const result = splitFrontmatter(content);
expect(result.frontmatter).toBeNull();
expect(result.body).toBe(content);
});
it('returns null frontmatter for content that is just ---\\n', () => {
const content = '---\n';
const result = splitFrontmatter(content);
expect(result.frontmatter).toBeNull();
expect(result.body).toBe(content);
});
});
describe('edge cases', () => {
it('handles body containing --- patterns', () => {
const content = '---\ntitle: Test\n---\nBody with --- in it\nAnd more ---';
const result = splitFrontmatter(content);
expect(result.frontmatter).toBe('---\ntitle: Test\n---\n');
expect(result.body).toBe('Body with --- in it\nAnd more ---');
});
it('uses the first valid closing delimiter', () => {
const content = '---\ntitle: Test\n---\nbody\n---\nmore body';
const result = splitFrontmatter(content);
expect(result.frontmatter).toBe('---\ntitle: Test\n---\n');
expect(result.body).toBe('body\n---\nmore body');
});
it('handles frontmatter with special characters in values', () => {
const content = '---\ntitle: "Hello: World"\ntags: [a, b, c]\n---\nbody';
const result = splitFrontmatter(content);
expect(result.frontmatter).toBe('---\ntitle: "Hello: World"\ntags: [a, b, c]\n---\n');
expect(result.body).toBe('body');
});
it('reconstructs original content from frontmatter + body', () => {
const content = '---\ntitle: Test\n---\nHello world';
const result = splitFrontmatter(content);
const reconstructed = (result.frontmatter ?? '') + result.body;
expect(reconstructed).toBe(content);
});
it('reconstructs original content when no frontmatter', () => {
const content = 'Just a plain note';
const result = splitFrontmatter(content);
const reconstructed = (result.frontmatter ?? '') + result.body;
expect(reconstructed).toBe(content);
});
});
});

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#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* ocke-decrypt — Node.js CLI tool for decrypting OCKE encrypted files/blocks.
*
* Usage:
* node ocke-decrypt.mjs <file> # Decrypt and print to stdout
* node ocke-decrypt.mjs <file> -o <output> # Decrypt and write to file
*
* Environment:
* OCKE_VAULT_NAME — vault name for encryption context (optional)
* AWS_REGION — fallback region (auto-detected from ARN)
*
* Requirements:
* - Node.js >= 18
* - AWS credentials configured (~/.aws/credentials or env vars)
* - @aws-sdk/client-kms (installed via: npm install @aws-sdk/client-kms)
*
* Install globally:
* npm install -g @aws-sdk/client-kms
* # Then run: node ocke-decrypt.mjs <file>
*/
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync } from 'fs';
import { createDecipheriv } from 'crypto';
import { KMSClient, DecryptCommand } from '@aws-sdk/client-kms';
import { fromIni } from '@aws-sdk/credential-provider-ini';
// --- OCKE Binary Parser ---
function parseOckeBinary(data) {
let offset = 0;
// Magic (4 bytes)
const magic = data.slice(offset, offset + 4);
if (Buffer.compare(magic, Buffer.from('OCKE')) !== 0) return null;
offset += 4;
// Version (uint16 BE)
const version = data.readUInt16BE(offset);
offset += 2;
// ProviderIdLen (1 byte) + ProviderId
const providerIdLen = data[offset];
offset += 1;
const providerId = data.slice(offset, offset + providerIdLen).toString('ascii');
offset += providerIdLen;
// CmkIdLen (uint16 BE) + CmkId
const cmkIdLen = data.readUInt16BE(offset);
offset += 2;
const cmkId = data.slice(offset, offset + cmkIdLen).toString('utf-8');
offset += cmkIdLen;
// WrappedDekLen (uint16 BE) + WrappedDek
const wrappedDekLen = data.readUInt16BE(offset);
offset += 2;
const wrappedDek = data.slice(offset, offset + wrappedDekLen);
offset += wrappedDekLen;
// Nonce (12 bytes)
const nonce = data.slice(offset, offset + 12);
offset += 12;
// AuthTag (16 bytes)
const authTag = data.slice(offset, offset + 16);
offset += 16;
// CiphertextLen (uint32 BE) + Ciphertext
const ciphertextLen = data.readUInt32BE(offset);
offset += 4;
const ciphertext = data.slice(offset, offset + ciphertextLen);
return { version, providerId, cmkId, wrappedDek, nonce, authTag, ciphertext };
}
function extractRegionFromArn(arn) {
const parts = arn.split(':');
if (parts.length >= 6 && parts[0] === 'arn' && parts[2] === 'kms') {
return parts[3];
}
return process.env.AWS_REGION || 'us-east-1';
}
async function kmsDecrypt(wrappedDek, cmkId, encryptionContext) {
const region = extractRegionFromArn(cmkId);
const client = new KMSClient({ region, credentials: fromIni() });
const command = new DecryptCommand({
CiphertextBlob: wrappedDek,
KeyId: cmkId,
EncryptionContext: encryptionContext,
});
const response = await client.send(command);
return Buffer.from(response.Plaintext);
}
function aesGcmDecrypt(key, nonce, ciphertext, authTag) {
const decipher = createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', key, nonce);
decipher.setAuthTag(authTag);
const decrypted = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ciphertext), decipher.final()]);
return decrypted;
}
async function decryptRecord(record, filePath, vaultName) {
const encryptionContext = {
vaultName: vaultName || '',
filePath: filePath || '',
formatVersion: String(record.version),
};
// Unwrap DEK via KMS
const dek = await kmsDecrypt(record.wrappedDek, record.cmkId, encryptionContext);
// Decrypt content via AES-256-GCM
return aesGcmDecrypt(dek, record.nonce, record.ciphertext, record.authTag);
}
// --- Main ---
async function main() {
const args = process.argv.slice(2);
if (args.length === 0) {
console.error('Usage: node ocke-decrypt.mjs <file> [-o output] [--vault-name NAME] [--file-path PATH]');
console.error('');
console.error('Decrypts OCKE encrypted content (markdown blocks or binary files).');
console.error('');
console.error('Options:');
console.error(' -o <file> Write output to file instead of stdout');
console.error(' --vault-name NAME Vault name for encryption context');
console.error(' --file-path PATH File path for encryption context (vault-relative)');
console.error('');
console.error('Environment (alternative to flags):');
console.error(' OCKE_VAULT_NAME Vault name for encryption context');
console.error(' OCKE_FILE_PATH File path for encryption context');
console.error('');
console.error('Requirements: Node.js >= 18, @aws-sdk/client-kms');
console.error(' npm install @aws-sdk/client-kms @aws-sdk/credential-provider-ini');
process.exit(1);
}
const inputFile = args[0];
const outputIdx = args.indexOf('-o');
const outputFile = outputIdx !== -1 ? args[outputIdx + 1] : null;
const vaultNameIdx = args.indexOf('--vault-name');
const filePathIdx = args.indexOf('--file-path');
const vaultName = vaultNameIdx !== -1 ? args[vaultNameIdx + 1] : (process.env.OCKE_VAULT_NAME || '');
const filePath = filePathIdx !== -1 ? args[filePathIdx + 1] : (process.env.OCKE_FILE_PATH || inputFile.split('/').pop().split('\\').pop());
const rawData = readFileSync(inputFile);
// Check if binary OCKE file
if (rawData.length >= 4 && rawData.slice(0, 4).toString() === 'OCKE') {
const record = parseOckeBinary(rawData);
if (!record) {
console.error('Error: Failed to parse OCKE binary format');
process.exit(1);
}
const plaintext = await decryptRecord(record, filePath, vaultName);
if (outputFile) {
writeFileSync(outputFile, plaintext);
console.error(`Decrypted: ${inputFile} -> ${outputFile}`);
} else {
process.stdout.write(plaintext);
}
return;
}
// Text file — look for ````ocke-v1 blocks
const text = rawData.toString('utf-8');
const pattern = /````ocke-v1\n([\s\S]*?)\n````/g;
const matches = [...text.matchAll(pattern)];
if (matches.length === 0) {
console.error('No encrypted blocks found in file');
process.exit(1);
}
let result = text;
for (const match of matches) {
const b64Content = match[1].trim().replace(/\s/g, '');
const binaryData = Buffer.from(b64Content, 'base64');
const record = parseOckeBinary(binaryData);
if (!record) continue;
try {
const plaintext = await decryptRecord(record, filePath, vaultName);
const plaintextText = plaintext.toString('utf-8');
const secretBlock = `%%secret-start%%\n${plaintextText}\n%%secret-end%%`;
result = result.replace(match[0], secretBlock);
} catch (err) {
console.error(`Warning: Failed to decrypt block: ${err.message}`);
}
}
if (outputFile) {
writeFileSync(outputFile, result, 'utf-8');
console.error(`Decrypted: ${inputFile} -> ${outputFile}`);
} else {
process.stdout.write(result);
}
}
main().catch(err => {
console.error(`Error: ${err.message}`);
process.exit(1);
});

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
#
# ocke-decrypt.sh — Decrypt OCKE encrypted blocks/files using AWS CLI + Python
#
# Usage:
# ./ocke-decrypt.sh <file> # Decrypt and print to stdout
# ./ocke-decrypt.sh <file> -o <output> # Decrypt and write to file
#
# Requirements:
# - aws cli (configured with credentials that have kms:Decrypt)
# - python3 (for AES-256-GCM decryption and binary parsing)
#
# This script works WITHOUT Node.js or Obsidian.
# Useful for: disaster recovery, CI/CD pipelines, backup verification.
set -euo pipefail
if [ $# -lt 1 ]; then
echo "Usage: $0 <file> [-o output_file] [--vault-name NAME] [--file-path PATH]"
echo ""
echo "Decrypts OCKE encrypted content (markdown blocks or binary files)."
echo ""
echo "Options:"
echo " -o <file> Write output to file (default: stdout)"
echo " --vault-name NAME Obsidian vault name (folder name)"
echo " --file-path PATH Vault-relative file path used during encryption"
echo ""
echo "Environment (alternative to flags):"
echo " OCKE_VAULT_NAME Vault name for encryption context"
echo " OCKE_FILE_PATH File path for encryption context"
echo ""
echo "Requires: aws cli, python3, pip install cryptography"
exit 1
fi
INPUT_FILE="$1"
shift
OUTPUT_FILE=""
VAULT_NAME="${OCKE_VAULT_NAME:-}"
FILE_PATH="${OCKE_FILE_PATH:-}"
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
-o) OUTPUT_FILE="$2"; shift 2 ;;
--vault-name) VAULT_NAME="$2"; shift 2 ;;
--file-path) FILE_PATH="$2"; shift 2 ;;
*) shift ;;
esac
done
export OCKE_VAULT_NAME="$VAULT_NAME"
export OCKE_FILE_PATH="$FILE_PATH"
if [ ! -f "$INPUT_FILE" ]; then
echo "Error: File not found: $INPUT_FILE" >&2
exit 1
fi
python3 - "$INPUT_FILE" "$OUTPUT_FILE" << 'PYTHON_SCRIPT'
import sys
import os
import struct
import base64
import json
import subprocess
import re
from pathlib import Path
def aws_kms_decrypt(ciphertext_blob, encryption_context, region):
"""Call aws kms decrypt and return plaintext bytes."""
import tempfile
# Write ciphertext to temp file
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False, suffix='.bin') as f:
f.write(ciphertext_blob)
tmp_path = f.name
try:
ctx_str = ','.join(f'{k}={v}' for k, v in encryption_context.items())
cmd = [
'aws', 'kms', 'decrypt',
'--ciphertext-blob', f'fileb://{tmp_path}',
'--encryption-context', ctx_str,
'--region', region,
'--output', 'json'
]
result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)
response = json.loads(result.stdout)
plaintext_b64 = response['Plaintext']
return base64.b64decode(plaintext_b64)
finally:
os.unlink(tmp_path)
def aes_gcm_decrypt(key, nonce, ciphertext, auth_tag):
"""Decrypt AES-256-GCM using Python cryptography or PyCryptodome."""
try:
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
aesgcm = AESGCM(key)
# GCM expects ciphertext + tag concatenated
ct_with_tag = ciphertext + auth_tag
return aesgcm.decrypt(nonce, ct_with_tag, None)
except ImportError:
pass
try:
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_GCM, nonce=nonce)
return cipher.decrypt_and_verify(ciphertext, auth_tag)
except ImportError:
pass
print("Error: Install 'cryptography' or 'pycryptodome':", file=sys.stderr)
print(" pip install cryptography", file=sys.stderr)
print(" # or", file=sys.stderr)
print(" pip install pycryptodome", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
def parse_ocke_binary(data):
"""Parse OCKE binary format and return fields."""
offset = 0
# Magic (4 bytes)
magic = data[offset:offset+4]
if magic != b'OCKE':
return None
offset += 4
# Version (uint16 BE)
version = struct.unpack('>H', data[offset:offset+2])[0]
offset += 2
# ProviderIdLen (1 byte) + ProviderId
provider_id_len = data[offset]
offset += 1
provider_id = data[offset:offset+provider_id_len].decode('ascii')
offset += provider_id_len
# CmkIdLen (uint16 BE) + CmkId
cmk_id_len = struct.unpack('>H', data[offset:offset+2])[0]
offset += 2
cmk_id = data[offset:offset+cmk_id_len].decode('utf-8')
offset += cmk_id_len
# WrappedDekLen (uint16 BE) + WrappedDek
wrapped_dek_len = struct.unpack('>H', data[offset:offset+2])[0]
offset += 2
wrapped_dek = data[offset:offset+wrapped_dek_len]
offset += wrapped_dek_len
# Nonce (12 bytes)
nonce = data[offset:offset+12]
offset += 12
# AuthTag (16 bytes)
auth_tag = data[offset:offset+16]
offset += 16
# CiphertextLen (uint32 BE) + Ciphertext
ciphertext_len = struct.unpack('>I', data[offset:offset+4])[0]
offset += 4
ciphertext = data[offset:offset+ciphertext_len]
return {
'version': version,
'provider_id': provider_id,
'cmk_id': cmk_id,
'wrapped_dek': wrapped_dek,
'nonce': nonce,
'auth_tag': auth_tag,
'ciphertext': ciphertext,
}
def extract_region_from_arn(arn):
"""Extract AWS region from KMS key ARN."""
parts = arn.split(':')
if len(parts) >= 6 and parts[0] == 'arn' and parts[2] == 'kms':
return parts[3]
return 'us-east-1'
def decrypt_record(record, file_path='', vault_name=''):
"""Decrypt a single OCKE record."""
region = extract_region_from_arn(record['cmk_id'])
encryption_context = {
'vaultName': vault_name,
'filePath': file_path,
'formatVersion': str(record['version']),
}
# Unwrap DEK via KMS
dek = aws_kms_decrypt(record['wrapped_dek'], encryption_context, region)
# Decrypt content via AES-256-GCM
plaintext = aes_gcm_decrypt(dek, record['nonce'], record['ciphertext'], record['auth_tag'])
return plaintext
def main():
input_file = sys.argv[1]
output_file = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2 and sys.argv[2] else None
file_path = Path(input_file).name
vault_name = '' # Can be set via env var if needed
if os.environ.get('OCKE_VAULT_NAME'):
vault_name = os.environ['OCKE_VAULT_NAME']
with open(input_file, 'rb') as f:
raw_data = f.read()
# Check if it's a binary OCKE file (starts with magic bytes)
if raw_data[:4] == b'OCKE':
record = parse_ocke_binary(raw_data)
if not record:
print("Error: Failed to parse OCKE binary format", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
plaintext = decrypt_record(record, file_path, vault_name)
if output_file:
with open(output_file, 'wb') as f:
f.write(plaintext)
print(f"Decrypted: {input_file} -> {output_file}")
else:
sys.stdout.buffer.write(plaintext)
return
# It's a text file — look for ````ocke-v1 blocks
text = raw_data.decode('utf-8')
pattern = re.compile(r'````ocke-v1\n([\s\S]*?)\n````')
matches = list(pattern.finditer(text))
if not matches:
print("No encrypted blocks found in file", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
result = text
for match in matches:
b64_content = match.group(1).strip().replace('\n', '').replace('\r', '').replace(' ', '')
binary_data = base64.b64decode(b64_content)
record = parse_ocke_binary(binary_data)
if not record:
continue
plaintext = decrypt_record(record, file_path, vault_name)
plaintext_text = plaintext.decode('utf-8')
secret_block = f'%%secret-start%%\n{plaintext_text}\n%%secret-end%%'
result = result.replace(match.group(0), secret_block)
if output_file:
with open(output_file, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f:
f.write(result)
print(f"Decrypted: {input_file} -> {output_file}")
else:
print(result)
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()
PYTHON_SCRIPT

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#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* ocke-rekey — Re-encrypt vault with a new KMS key (key rotation / migration).
*
* Scans a vault directory, finds all encrypted blocks and binary files,
* unwraps DEK with the old key, re-wraps with the new key.
* Ciphertext is NOT re-encrypted — only the wrapped DEK changes (fast).
*
* Usage:
* node ocke-rekey.mjs <vault-path> --new-key <ARN> [--old-key <ARN>] [--dry-run]
*
* Options:
* --new-key <ARN> ARN of the new KMS key to wrap DEKs with
* --old-key <ARN> ARN of the old key (optional — auto-detected from files)
* --dry-run Show what would be changed without modifying files
* --vault-name <N> Vault name for encryption context
*
* Requirements:
* - Node.js >= 18
* - @aws-sdk/client-kms
* - AWS credentials with Decrypt on old key + Encrypt on new key
*
* Example (migrate to new AWS account):
* node ocke-rekey.mjs /path/to/vault \
* --new-key arn:aws:kms:eu-north-1:NEW_ACCOUNT:key/new-key-id \
* --vault-name my-vault
*/
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, readdirSync, statSync } from 'fs';
import { join, relative } from 'path';
import { KMSClient, DecryptCommand, EncryptCommand } from '@aws-sdk/client-kms';
import { fromIni } from '@aws-sdk/credential-provider-ini';
// --- Args parsing ---
const args = process.argv.slice(2);
if (args.length === 0 || args.includes('--help')) {
console.log(`
ocke-rekey — Re-encrypt vault with a new KMS key
Usage:
node ocke-rekey.mjs <vault-path> --new-key <ARN> [options]
Options:
--new-key <ARN> New KMS key ARN (required)
--old-key <ARN> Old KMS key ARN (optional, auto-detected)
--vault-name <N> Vault name for encryption context
--dry-run Show changes without modifying files
--help Show this help
Example:
node ocke-rekey.mjs ./my-vault \\
--new-key arn:aws:kms:eu-north-1:111122223333:key/new-key \\
--vault-name my-vault
`);
process.exit(0);
}
const vaultPath = args[0];
const newKeyIdx = args.indexOf('--new-key');
const oldKeyIdx = args.indexOf('--old-key');
const vaultNameIdx = args.indexOf('--vault-name');
const dryRun = args.includes('--dry-run');
const newKeyArn = newKeyIdx !== -1 ? args[newKeyIdx + 1] : null;
const oldKeyArn = oldKeyIdx !== -1 ? args[oldKeyIdx + 1] : null;
const vaultName = vaultNameIdx !== -1 ? args[vaultNameIdx + 1] : '';
if (!newKeyArn) {
console.error('Error: --new-key is required');
process.exit(1);
}
// --- OCKE Binary Parser/Serializer ---
function parseOckeHeader(data) {
let offset = 0;
if (data.length < 4 || Buffer.compare(data.slice(0, 4), Buffer.from('OCKE')) !== 0) return null;
offset += 4;
const version = data.readUInt16BE(offset); offset += 2;
const pidLen = data[offset]; offset += 1;
const providerId = data.slice(offset, offset + pidLen).toString('ascii'); offset += pidLen;
const cmkLen = data.readUInt16BE(offset); offset += 2;
const cmkId = data.slice(offset, offset + cmkLen).toString('utf-8'); offset += cmkLen;
const wdekLen = data.readUInt16BE(offset); offset += 2;
const wrappedDek = data.slice(offset, offset + wdekLen); offset += wdekLen;
const nonce = data.slice(offset, offset + 12); offset += 12;
const authTag = data.slice(offset, offset + 16); offset += 16;
const ctLen = data.readUInt32BE(offset); offset += 4;
const ciphertext = data.slice(offset, offset + ctLen);
return {
version, providerId, cmkId, wrappedDek, nonce, authTag, ciphertext,
// For re-serialization
pidLen, cmkLen, wdekLen, ctLen
};
}
function serializeOcke(record, newCmkId, newWrappedDek) {
const providerBuf = Buffer.from(record.providerId, 'ascii');
const cmkBuf = Buffer.from(newCmkId, 'utf-8');
const totalLen = 4 + 2 + 1 + providerBuf.length + 2 + cmkBuf.length + 2 + newWrappedDek.length + 12 + 16 + 4 + record.ciphertext.length;
const out = Buffer.alloc(totalLen);
let offset = 0;
out.write('OCKE', offset); offset += 4;
out.writeUInt16BE(record.version, offset); offset += 2;
out[offset] = providerBuf.length; offset += 1;
providerBuf.copy(out, offset); offset += providerBuf.length;
out.writeUInt16BE(cmkBuf.length, offset); offset += 2;
cmkBuf.copy(out, offset); offset += cmkBuf.length;
out.writeUInt16BE(newWrappedDek.length, offset); offset += 2;
newWrappedDek.copy(out, offset); offset += newWrappedDek.length;
record.nonce.copy(out, offset); offset += 12;
record.authTag.copy(out, offset); offset += 16;
out.writeUInt32BE(record.ciphertext.length, offset); offset += 4;
record.ciphertext.copy(out, offset);
return out;
}
// --- KMS operations ---
function extractRegion(arn) {
const parts = arn.split(':');
return parts.length >= 4 ? parts[3] : 'us-east-1';
}
async function unwrapDek(wrappedDek, cmkId, encryptionContext) {
const region = extractRegion(cmkId);
const client = new KMSClient({ region, credentials: fromIni() });
const resp = await client.send(new DecryptCommand({
CiphertextBlob: wrappedDek,
KeyId: cmkId,
EncryptionContext: encryptionContext,
}));
return Buffer.from(resp.Plaintext);
}
async function wrapDek(dek, cmkId, encryptionContext) {
const region = extractRegion(cmkId);
const client = new KMSClient({ region, credentials: fromIni() });
const resp = await client.send(new EncryptCommand({
KeyId: cmkId,
Plaintext: dek,
EncryptionContext: encryptionContext,
}));
return Buffer.from(resp.CiphertextBlob);
}
// --- File scanning ---
function walkDir(dir) {
const results = [];
for (const entry of readdirSync(dir)) {
if (entry.startsWith('.')) continue;
const full = join(dir, entry);
const stat = statSync(full);
if (stat.isDirectory()) {
results.push(...walkDir(full));
} else {
results.push(full);
}
}
return results;
}
// --- Main ---
async function main() {
console.log(`Vault: ${vaultPath}`);
console.log(`New key: ${newKeyArn}`);
console.log(`Old key: ${oldKeyArn || '(auto-detect from files)'}`);
console.log(`Dry run: ${dryRun}`);
console.log('');
const files = walkDir(vaultPath);
let rekeyed = 0;
let skipped = 0;
let errors = 0;
for (const filePath of files) {
const relPath = relative(vaultPath, filePath);
try {
if (filePath.endsWith('.md')) {
// Check for ````ocke-v1 blocks
const content = readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8');
const pattern = /````ocke-v1\n([\s\S]*?)\n````/g;
const matches = [...content.matchAll(pattern)];
if (matches.length === 0) { skipped++; continue; }
let newContent = content;
for (const match of matches) {
const b64 = match[1].trim().replace(/\s/g, '');
const bin = Buffer.from(b64, 'base64');
const record = parseOckeHeader(bin);
if (!record) continue;
// Skip if already using new key
if (record.cmkId === newKeyArn) continue;
// Skip if old key specified and doesn't match
if (oldKeyArn && record.cmkId !== oldKeyArn) continue;
const ctx = { vaultName, filePath: relPath, formatVersion: String(record.version) };
if (dryRun) {
console.log(` [DRY] ${relPath}: block ${record.cmkId} → ${newKeyArn}`);
rekeyed++;
continue;
}
// Unwrap with old key, re-wrap with new key
const dek = await unwrapDek(record.wrappedDek, record.cmkId, ctx);
const newWrappedDek = await wrapDek(dek, newKeyArn, ctx);
dek.fill(0); // Zero DEK
// Re-serialize with new cmkId and wrappedDek
const newBin = serializeOcke(record, newKeyArn, newWrappedDek);
const newB64 = newBin.toString('base64');
const newBlock = '````ocke-v1\n' + newB64 + '\n````';
newContent = newContent.replace(match[0], newBlock);
rekeyed++;
}
if (!dryRun && newContent !== content) {
writeFileSync(filePath, newContent, 'utf-8');
console.log(` ✓ ${relPath} (${matches.length} block(s))`);
}
} else {
// Binary file — check for OCKE magic
const data = readFileSync(filePath);
if (data.length < 4 || data[0] !== 0x4F || data[1] !== 0x43 || data[2] !== 0x4B || data[3] !== 0x45) {
skipped++;
continue;
}
const record = parseOckeHeader(data);
if (!record) { skipped++; continue; }
// Skip if already using new key
if (record.cmkId === newKeyArn) { skipped++; continue; }
// Skip if old key specified and doesn't match
if (oldKeyArn && record.cmkId !== oldKeyArn) { skipped++; continue; }
const ctx = { vaultName, filePath: relPath, formatVersion: String(record.version) };
if (dryRun) {
console.log(` [DRY] ${relPath}: ${record.cmkId} → ${newKeyArn}`);
rekeyed++;
continue;
}
// Unwrap with old key, re-wrap with new key
const dek = await unwrapDek(record.wrappedDek, record.cmkId, ctx);
const newWrappedDek = await wrapDek(dek, newKeyArn, ctx);
dek.fill(0);
const newBin = serializeOcke(record, newKeyArn, newWrappedDek);
writeFileSync(filePath, newBin);
console.log(` ✓ ${relPath} (binary)`);
rekeyed++;
}
} catch (err) {
console.error(` ✗ ${relPath}: ${err.message}`);
errors++;
}
}
console.log('');
console.log(`Done. Re-keyed: ${rekeyed}, Skipped: ${skipped}, Errors: ${errors}`);
if (dryRun) {
console.log('(Dry run — no files were modified)');
}
}
main().catch(err => {
console.error(`Fatal: ${err.message}`);
process.exit(1);
});

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
#
# Git pre-commit hook: prevents committing plaintext in secret blocks.
#
# Checks that no staged .md files contain %%secret-start%% markers.
# If the plugin is working correctly, all secret blocks should be encrypted
# to ````ocke-v1 before reaching disk. If %%secret-start%% is found in a
# staged file, it means plaintext would be committed to Git.
#
# Install:
# cp tools/pre-commit-hook.sh .git/hooks/pre-commit
# chmod +x .git/hooks/pre-commit
#
# Or with a symlink:
# ln -sf ../../tools/pre-commit-hook.sh .git/hooks/pre-commit
set -euo pipefail
RED='\033[0;31m'
NC='\033[0m' # No Color
# Get list of staged .md files
STAGED_MD_FILES=$(git diff --cached --name-only --diff-filter=ACM | grep '\.md$' || true)
if [ -z "$STAGED_MD_FILES" ]; then
exit 0
fi
FOUND_PLAINTEXT=0
for file in $STAGED_MD_FILES; do
# Check staged content (not working tree) for secret markers
if git show ":$file" 2>/dev/null | grep -q '%%secret-start%%'; then
echo -e "${RED}ERROR: Plaintext secret block found in staged file: $file${NC}"
echo " The file contains %%secret-start%% markers which means"
echo " the encryption plugin did not encrypt before save."
echo ""
echo " Possible causes:"
echo " - Plugin was disabled or not loaded"
echo " - KMS credentials were unavailable"
echo " - File was edited outside Obsidian"
echo ""
echo " Fix: Open the file in Obsidian with the plugin enabled,"
echo " save it, then stage again."
echo ""
FOUND_PLAINTEXT=1
fi
done
if [ $FOUND_PLAINTEXT -ne 0 ]; then
echo -e "${RED}Commit blocked: plaintext secrets detected.${NC}"
echo "Use 'git commit --no-verify' to bypass (NOT recommended)."
exit 1
fi
exit 0

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#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* Submit plugin to obsidian-releases community-plugins.json
*/
import { execSync } from 'child_process';
import { writeFileSync, unlinkSync } from 'fs';
// Get current file content
const raw = execSync(
'gh api repos/ViktorUJ/obsidian-releases/contents/community-plugins.json -H "Accept: application/vnd.github.raw"',
{ maxBuffer: 10 * 1024 * 1024 }
).toString();
const json = JSON.parse(raw);
// Check if already exists
if (json.some(p => p.id === 'obsidian-cloud-kms-encryption')) {
console.log('Plugin already exists in community-plugins.json');
process.exit(0);
}
// Add our plugin
json.push({
id: 'obsidian-cloud-kms-encryption',
name: 'Cloud KMS Encryption',
author: 'ViktorUJ',
description: 'Transparent encryption of secret blocks and binary files using AWS KMS. Zero plaintext on disk.',
repo: 'ViktorUJ/obsidian-cloud-kms'
});
// Encode
const newContent = JSON.stringify(json, null, 2) + '\n';
const encoded = Buffer.from(newContent).toString('base64');
// Get file SHA
const shaOutput = execSync(
'gh api repos/ViktorUJ/obsidian-releases/contents/community-plugins.json --jq .sha'
).toString().trim();
// Push to branch
const body = JSON.stringify({
message: 'Add Cloud KMS Encryption plugin',
content: encoded,
sha: shaOutput,
branch: 'add-cloud-kms-encryption'
});
writeFileSync('/tmp/submit-body.json', body);
try {
execSync('gh api repos/ViktorUJ/obsidian-releases/contents/community-plugins.json -X PUT --input /tmp/submit-body.json', { stdio: 'pipe' });
console.log('File updated on branch add-cloud-kms-encryption');
} catch (e) {
console.error('Error updating file:', e.stderr?.toString() || e.message);
process.exit(1);
} finally {
try { unlinkSync('/tmp/submit-body.json'); } catch {}
}
// Create PR
try {
const prBody = `## Plugin submission: Cloud KMS Encryption
- **Plugin ID:** obsidian-cloud-kms-encryption
- **Repo:** https://github.com/ViktorUJ/obsidian-cloud-kms
- **Description:** Transparent envelope encryption of secret blocks and binary files using AWS KMS (AES-256-GCM + KMS DEK wrap). Zero plaintext on disk.
- **Desktop only:** yes
- **License:** MIT
### Features
- Transparent encrypt-on-write / decrypt-on-read via vault adapter patch
- Multi-key support with aliases (per-team access control)
- Binary file encryption (PDF, images, audio)
- Pre-commit hook for plaintext leak protection
- CLI tools for disaster recovery
- SLSA Level 2 provenance, Cosign signed releases, SBOM
- OpenSSF Scorecard monitored`;
writeFileSync('/tmp/pr-body.md', prBody);
const result = execSync(
'gh pr create --repo obsidianmd/obsidian-releases --head ViktorUJ:add-cloud-kms-encryption --base master --title "Add Cloud KMS Encryption plugin" --body-file /tmp/pr-body.md',
{ stdio: 'pipe' }
).toString();
console.log('PR created:', result.trim());
unlinkSync('/tmp/pr-body.md');
} catch (e) {
console.error('Error creating PR:', e.stderr?.toString() || e.message);
}

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tsconfig.json Normal file
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{
"compilerOptions": {
"target": "ES2021",
"module": "ESNext",
"moduleResolution": "bundler",
"lib": ["ES2021", "DOM"],
"strict": true,
"noImplicitAny": true,
"strictNullChecks": true,
"noUnusedLocals": true,
"noUnusedParameters": true,
"esModuleInterop": true,
"skipLibCheck": true,
"forceConsistentCasingInFileNames": true,
"resolveJsonModule": true,
"declaration": true,
"declarationMap": true,
"sourceMap": true,
"outDir": "./dist",
"rootDir": "./src",
"baseUrl": ".",
"paths": {
"@/*": ["src/*"]
}
},
"include": ["src/**/*.ts"],
"exclude": ["node_modules", "dist", "tests"]
}

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versions.json Normal file
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{
"0.1.0": "1.4.0"
}

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import { defineConfig } from "vitest/config";
import path from "path";
export default defineConfig({
test: {
globals: true,
environment: "node",
include: [
"tests/**/*.test.ts",
"tests/**/*.property.test.ts",
],
coverage: {
provider: "v8",
include: ["src/**/*.ts"],
exclude: ["src/main.ts", "src/ui/**"],
},
testTimeout: 30000,
},
resolve: {
alias: {
"@": "./src",
obsidian: path.resolve(__dirname, "tests/__mocks__/obsidian.ts"),
},
},
});